14ed554660
coming in via qemu-stable (except for the vdmk fix, which was tagged for-7.0 on the qemu-devel list, but didn't make it into the release). Also took the chance to switch the gluster fix to the version that made it into upstream. Signed-off-by: Fabian Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com> Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
75 lines
3.2 KiB
Diff
75 lines
3.2 KiB
Diff
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@redhat.com>
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Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 19:57:46 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538
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The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint,
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whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This
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made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large
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values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64
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to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is
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significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely
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be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow.
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Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper.
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Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
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Message-Id: <20220512175747.142058-6-eperezma@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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(cherry-picked from commit d792199de55ca5cb5334016884039c740290b5c7)
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Signed-off-by: Fabian Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
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---
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hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++-
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hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 +++---
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2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
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index 1067e72b39..e4748a7e6c 100644
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--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
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+++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
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@@ -1443,7 +1443,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
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}
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iov_cnt = elem->out_num;
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- iov2 = iov = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
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+ iov2 = iov = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg,
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+ sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
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s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl));
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iov_discard_front(&iov, &iov_cnt, sizeof(ctrl));
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if (s != sizeof(ctrl)) {
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diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
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index dcd80b904d..0e31e3cc04 100644
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--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
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+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
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@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
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}
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out_num = elem->out_num;
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- out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
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+ out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
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out_iov = out_iov_copy;
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in_num = elem->in_num;
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@@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request)
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}
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out_num = elem->out_num;
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- out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
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+ out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
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out_iov = out_iov_copy;
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in_num = elem->in_num;
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- in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
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+ in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
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in_iov = in_iov_copy;
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if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req))
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