add CVE fixes
CVE-2017-1000364 (rather bugfix for the original CVE fix): * mm/mmap.c: expand_downwards: don't require the gap if !vm_prev * mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in the stack CVE-2017-1000365: fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers CVE-2017-10810: drm/virtio: don't leak bo on drm_gem_object_init failure CVE-2017-7482: rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Lamprecht
Wolfgang Bumiller
parent
a7f181d4b0
commit
4c390211d8
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
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From 3e4f09eef73ad12d4876e24daf52a0dc0891d7da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
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Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 14:53:28 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in
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the stack
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Commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") has
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introduced a regression in some rust and Java environments which are
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trying to implement their own stack guard page. They are punching a new
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MAP_FIXED mapping inside the existing stack Vma.
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This will confuse expand_{downwards,upwards} into thinking that the
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stack expansion would in fact get us too close to an existing non-stack
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vma which is a correct behavior wrt safety. It is a real regression on
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the other hand.
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Let's work around the problem by considering PROT_NONE mapping as a part
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of the stack. This is a gros hack but overflowing to such a mapping
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would trap anyway an we only can hope that usespace knows what it is
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doing and handle it propely.
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Fixes: 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
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Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170705182849.GA18027@dhcp22.suse.cz
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Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
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Debugged-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
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Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
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Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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CVE-2017-1000364
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(cherry picked from commit 561b5e0709e4a248c67d024d4d94b6e31e3edf2f)
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
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---
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mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++--
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1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
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index ef78a5ca5599..9fabd8c82f38 100644
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--- a/mm/mmap.c
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+++ b/mm/mmap.c
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@@ -2240,7 +2240,8 @@ int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
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gap_addr = TASK_SIZE;
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next = vma->vm_next;
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- if (next && next->vm_start < gap_addr) {
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+ if (next && next->vm_start < gap_addr &&
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+ (next->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
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if (!(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP))
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
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@@ -2324,7 +2325,8 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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if (gap_addr > address)
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return -ENOMEM;
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prev = vma->vm_prev;
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- if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr) {
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+ if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr &&
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+ (prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
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if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
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return -ENOMEM;
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/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
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From aea792ba99ba73a6b0c4e5aea3b4b6b3f9d821f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 14:53:29 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mm/mmap.c: expand_downwards: don't require the gap if
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!vm_prev
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expand_stack(vma) fails if address < stack_guard_gap even if there is no
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vma->vm_prev. I don't think this makes sense, and we didn't do this
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before the recent commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap,
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between vmas").
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We do not need a gap in this case, any address is fine as long as
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security_mmap_addr() doesn't object.
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This also simplifies the code, we know that address >= prev->vm_end and
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thus underflow is not possible.
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Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628175258.GA24881@redhat.com
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Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
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Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
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Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
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Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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CVE-2017-1000364
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(cherry picked from commit 32e4e6d5cbb0c0e427391635991fe65e17797af8)
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
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---
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mm/mmap.c | 10 +++-------
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
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index 9fabd8c82f38..09c728a1eeee 100644
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--- a/mm/mmap.c
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+++ b/mm/mmap.c
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@@ -2312,7 +2312,6 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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{
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struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
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struct vm_area_struct *prev;
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- unsigned long gap_addr;
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int error;
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address &= PAGE_MASK;
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@@ -2321,15 +2320,12 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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return error;
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/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
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- gap_addr = address - stack_guard_gap;
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- if (gap_addr > address)
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- return -ENOMEM;
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prev = vma->vm_prev;
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- if (prev && prev->vm_end > gap_addr &&
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+ /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
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+ if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
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(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
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- if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
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+ if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
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return -ENOMEM;
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- /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
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}
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/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
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From 6b44f156198491839655077fc7f3a469c67e1f8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 15:30:39 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
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When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
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the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
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that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
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limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
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pointers to the strings.
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For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
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single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
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4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
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remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).
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The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
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entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
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pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).
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[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
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Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
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Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
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Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
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Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
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Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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CVE-2017-1000365
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(cherry-picked from commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c)
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
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---
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fs/exec.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
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1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
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index 9fb90c37c37f..8cf76e2a0b83 100644
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--- a/fs/exec.c
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+++ b/fs/exec.c
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@@ -225,8 +225,26 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
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if (write) {
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unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
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+ unsigned long ptr_size;
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struct rlimit *rlim;
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+ /*
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+ * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
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+ * must account for them as well.
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+ *
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+ * The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is
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+ * built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it
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+ * is currently (rather than each call being just the newly
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+ * added size from the arg page). As a result, we need to
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+ * always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the
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+ * last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire
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+ * correct size.
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+ */
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+ ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
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+ if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
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+ goto fail;
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+ size += ptr_size;
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+
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acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
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/*
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@@ -244,13 +262,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
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* to work from.
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*/
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rlim = current->signal->rlim;
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- if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
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- put_page(page);
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- return NULL;
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- }
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+ if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
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+ goto fail;
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}
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return page;
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+
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+fail:
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+ put_page(page);
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+ return NULL;
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}
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static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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From de1c3d4474562e9d9dc9952f9283f07d8d58ef98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:35:52 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/3] drm/virtio: don't leak bo on drm_gem_object_init failure
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
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Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170406155941.458-1-kraxel@redhat.com
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CVE-2017-10810
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(cherry picked from commit 385aee965b4e4c36551c362a334378d2985b722a)
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
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Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
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---
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drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c | 4 +++-
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c
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index 1483daebe057..6f66b7347cd0 100644
|
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--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c
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+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_object.c
|
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@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ int virtio_gpu_object_create(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
|
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return -ENOMEM;
|
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size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE);
|
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ret = drm_gem_object_init(vgdev->ddev, &bo->gem_base, size);
|
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- if (ret != 0)
|
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+ if (ret != 0) {
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+ kfree(bo);
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return ret;
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+ }
|
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bo->dumb = false;
|
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virtio_gpu_init_ttm_placement(bo, pinned);
|
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|
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
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From 453b5039843f7dac534ee23af6b34c2d0a116416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
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Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:30:25 +0200
|
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Subject: [PATCH 3/3] rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked
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in ticket decode
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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This fixes CVE-2017-7482.
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When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
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rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
|
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variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
|
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overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
|
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four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could
|
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lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
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over the end of the buffer.
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Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
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length.
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|
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Reported-by: 石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
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Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com>
|
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Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
|
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
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|
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CVE-2017-7482
|
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|
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(cherry-picked from commit 5f2f97656ada8d811d3c1bef503ced266fcd53a0)
|
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
|
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Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
|
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Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
|
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Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
|
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|
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Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
|
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---
|
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net/rxrpc/key.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
|
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1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
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|
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diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c
|
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index 18c737a61d80..7fc340726d03 100644
|
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--- a/net/rxrpc/key.c
|
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+++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c
|
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@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_principal(struct krb5_principal *princ,
|
||||
unsigned int *_toklen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
|
||||
- unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, n_parts, loop, tmp;
|
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+ unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, n_parts, loop, tmp, paddedlen;
|
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|
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/* there must be at least one name, and at least #names+1 length
|
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* words */
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@@ -247,16 +247,16 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_principal(struct krb5_principal *princ,
|
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toklen -= 4;
|
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if (tmp <= 0 || tmp > AFSTOKEN_STRING_MAX)
|
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return -EINVAL;
|
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- if (tmp > toklen)
|
||||
+ paddedlen = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
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princ->name_parts[loop] = kmalloc(tmp + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!princ->name_parts[loop])
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
memcpy(princ->name_parts[loop], xdr, tmp);
|
||||
princ->name_parts[loop][tmp] = 0;
|
||||
- tmp = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
|
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- toklen -= tmp;
|
||||
- xdr += tmp >> 2;
|
||||
+ toklen -= paddedlen;
|
||||
+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (toklen < 4)
|
||||
@@ -265,16 +265,16 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_principal(struct krb5_principal *princ,
|
||||
toklen -= 4;
|
||||
if (tmp <= 0 || tmp > AFSTOKEN_K5_REALM_MAX)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
- if (tmp > toklen)
|
||||
+ paddedlen = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
princ->realm = kmalloc(tmp + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!princ->realm)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
memcpy(princ->realm, xdr, tmp);
|
||||
princ->realm[tmp] = 0;
|
||||
- tmp = (tmp + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
- toklen -= tmp;
|
||||
- xdr += tmp >> 2;
|
||||
+ toklen -= paddedlen;
|
||||
+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
|
||||
|
||||
_debug("%s/...@%s", princ->name_parts[0], princ->realm);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_tagged_data(struct krb5_tagged_data *td,
|
||||
unsigned int *_toklen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
|
||||
- unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len;
|
||||
+ unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len, paddedlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/* there must be at least one tag and one length word */
|
||||
if (toklen <= 8)
|
||||
@@ -307,15 +307,17 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_tagged_data(struct krb5_tagged_data *td,
|
||||
toklen -= 8;
|
||||
if (len > max_data_size)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+ paddedlen = (len + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
td->data_len = len;
|
||||
|
||||
if (len > 0) {
|
||||
td->data = kmemdup(xdr, len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!td->data)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
- len = (len + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
- toklen -= len;
|
||||
- xdr += len >> 2;
|
||||
+ toklen -= paddedlen;
|
||||
+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_debug("tag %x len %x", td->tag, td->data_len);
|
||||
@@ -387,7 +389,7 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
|
||||
const __be32 **_xdr, unsigned int *_toklen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
|
||||
- unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len;
|
||||
+ unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, len, paddedlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/* there must be at least one length word */
|
||||
if (toklen <= 4)
|
||||
@@ -399,6 +401,9 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
|
||||
toklen -= 4;
|
||||
if (len > AFSTOKEN_K5_TIX_MAX)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+ paddedlen = (len + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
+ if (paddedlen > toklen)
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
*_tktlen = len;
|
||||
|
||||
_debug("ticket len %u", len);
|
||||
@@ -407,9 +412,8 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen,
|
||||
*_ticket = kmemdup(xdr, len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
||||
if (!*_ticket)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
- len = (len + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
- toklen -= len;
|
||||
- xdr += len >> 2;
|
||||
+ toklen -= paddedlen;
|
||||
+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*_xdr = xdr;
|
||||
@@ -552,7 +556,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const __be32 *xdr = prep->data, *token;
|
||||
const char *cp;
|
||||
- unsigned int len, tmp, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix;
|
||||
+ unsigned int len, paddedlen, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix;
|
||||
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -578,22 +582,21 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
||||
if (len < 1 || len > AFSTOKEN_CELL_MAX)
|
||||
goto not_xdr;
|
||||
datalen -= 4;
|
||||
- tmp = (len + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
- if (tmp > datalen)
|
||||
+ paddedlen = (len + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
+ if (paddedlen > datalen)
|
||||
goto not_xdr;
|
||||
|
||||
cp = (const char *) xdr;
|
||||
for (loop = 0; loop < len; loop++)
|
||||
if (!isprint(cp[loop]))
|
||||
goto not_xdr;
|
||||
- if (len < tmp)
|
||||
- for (; loop < tmp; loop++)
|
||||
- if (cp[loop])
|
||||
- goto not_xdr;
|
||||
+ for (; loop < paddedlen; loop++)
|
||||
+ if (cp[loop])
|
||||
+ goto not_xdr;
|
||||
_debug("cellname: [%u/%u] '%*.*s'",
|
||||
- len, tmp, len, len, (const char *) xdr);
|
||||
- datalen -= tmp;
|
||||
- xdr += tmp >> 2;
|
||||
+ len, paddedlen, len, len, (const char *) xdr);
|
||||
+ datalen -= paddedlen;
|
||||
+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
|
||||
|
||||
/* get the token count */
|
||||
if (datalen < 12)
|
||||
@@ -614,10 +617,11 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
|
||||
sec_ix = ntohl(*xdr);
|
||||
datalen -= 4;
|
||||
_debug("token: [%x/%zx] %x", toklen, datalen, sec_ix);
|
||||
- if (toklen < 20 || toklen > datalen)
|
||||
+ paddedlen = (toklen + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
+ if (toklen < 20 || toklen > datalen || paddedlen > datalen)
|
||||
goto not_xdr;
|
||||
- datalen -= (toklen + 3) & ~3;
|
||||
- xdr += (toklen + 3) >> 2;
|
||||
+ datalen -= paddedlen;
|
||||
+ xdr += paddedlen >> 2;
|
||||
|
||||
} while (--loop > 0);
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.11.0
|
||||
|
||||
5
Makefile
5
Makefile
@ -224,6 +224,11 @@ ${KERNEL_SRC}/README ${KERNEL_CFG_ORG}: ${KERNEL_SRC_SUBMODULE} | submodules
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-do-not-blow-on-PROT_NONE-MAP_FIXED-holes-i.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-expand_downwards-don-t-require-the-gap-if-.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000365-fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-10810-drm-virtio-don-t-leak-bo-on-drm_gem_object_init-fail.patch
|
||||
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7482-rxrpc-Fix-several-cases-where-a-padded-len-isn-t-che.patch
|
||||
sed -i ${KERNEL_SRC}/Makefile -e 's/^EXTRAVERSION.*$$/EXTRAVERSION=${EXTRAVERSION}/'
|
||||
touch $@
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user