From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 08:01:21 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] UBUNTU: SAUCE: bpf: reject out-of-bounds stack pointer calculation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Reject programs that compute wildly out-of-bounds stack pointers. Otherwise, pointers can be computed with an offset that doesn't fit into an `int`, causing security issues in the stack memory access check (as well as signed integer overflow during offset addition). This is a fix specifically for the v4.9 stable tree because the mainline code looks very different at this point. Fixes: 7bca0a9702edf ("bpf: enhance verifier to understand stack pointer arithmetic") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann CVE-2017-17863 Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg206985.html Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza (cherry picked from commit 1c26ffd0e9b24d512824cabc6687a14d4777d0f3) Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 3940019b9740..4321625fe32a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2122,10 +2122,28 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) ((BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && regs[insn->src_reg].type == CONST_IMM) || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)) { - if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { + /* check in case the register contains a big + * 64-bit value + */ + if (regs[insn->src_reg].imm < -MAX_BPF_STACK || + regs[insn->src_reg].imm > MAX_BPF_STACK) { + verbose("R%d value too big in R%d pointer arithmetic\n", + insn->src_reg, insn->dst_reg); + return -EACCES; + } dst_reg->imm += regs[insn->src_reg].imm; - else + } else { + /* safe against overflow: addition of 32-bit + * numbers in 64-bit representation + */ dst_reg->imm += insn->imm; + } + if (dst_reg->imm > 0 || dst_reg->imm < -MAX_BPF_STACK) { + verbose("R%d out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic\n", + insn->dst_reg); + return -EACCES; + } return 0; } else if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && -- 2.14.2