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rebase patches on top of Ubuntu-4.15.0-35.38

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(generated with debian/scripts/import-upstream-tag)

Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Lamprecht 2018-09-13 09:03:03 +02:00
parent a79b66df9b
commit 9de43ded7a
2 changed files with 1 additions and 96 deletions
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2
patches/kernel/0003-pci-Enable-overrides-for-missing-ACS-capabilities-4..patch
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@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
2 files changed, 110 insertions(+) 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e1c10a202abe..e40248310433 100644 index 51210d10d905..ceb1b471d249 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3049,6 +3049,15 @@ @@ -3049,6 +3049,15 @@

95
patches/kernel/0009-x86-speculation-Protect-against-userspace-userspace-.patch
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@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2018 19:17:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace
spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
CVE-2017-5715 (SpectreRSB sub-variant)
(cherry picked from commit fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 38 +++++++-------------------------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 700b4c0a93a2..edfc64a8a154 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -322,23 +322,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return cmd;
}
-/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
-static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
-{
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
- switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
- case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
- return true;
- }
- }
- return false;
-}
-
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -399,22 +382,15 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
- * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
- * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
- * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
- * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+ * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
+ * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
+ * issues:
*
- * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
- * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
- * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
- * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
- * switch is required.
+ * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
+ * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
*/
- if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
- pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
- }
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {