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cherry-pick / backport IB fixes

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see https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/pve-5-1-and-infiniband-issues.37575/
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Fabian Grünbichler 2017-12-04 09:10:14 +01:00
parent ddad99c986
commit 905722fbce
2 changed files with 134 additions and 0 deletions
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87
patches/kernel/0011-IB-core-Avoid-crash-on-pkey-enforcement-failed-in-re.patch Normal file
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From: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Subject: [PATCH] IB/core: Avoid crash on pkey enforcement failed in received MADs
commit 89548bcafec7ecfeea58c553f0834b5d575a66eb upstream.
Below kernel crash is observed when Pkey security enforcement fails on
received MADs. This issue is reported in [1].
ib_free_recv_mad() accesses the rmpp_list, whose initialization is
needed before accessing it.
When security enformcent fails on received MADs, MAD processing avoided
due to security checks failed.
OpenSM[3770]: SM port is down
kernel: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
kernel: IP: ib_free_recv_mad+0x44/0xa0 [ib_core]
kernel: PGD 0
kernel: P4D 0
kernel:
kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 2833 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: P IO 4.13.4-1-pve #1
kernel: Hardware name: Dell XS23-TY3 /9CMP63, BIOS 1.71 09/17/2013
kernel: Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core]
kernel: task: ffffa069c6541600 task.stack: ffffb9a729054000
kernel: RIP: 0010:ib_free_recv_mad+0x44/0xa0 [ib_core]
kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffb9a729057d38 EFLAGS: 00010286
kernel: RAX: ffffa069cb138a48 RBX: ffffa069cb138a10 RCX: 0000000000000000
kernel: RDX: ffffb9a729057d38 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa069cb138a20
kernel: RBP: ffffb9a729057d60 R08: ffffa072d2d49800 R09: ffffa069cb138ae0
kernel: R10: ffffa069cb138ae0 R11: ffffa072b3994e00 R12: ffffb9a729057d38
kernel: R13: ffffa069d1c90000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa069d1c90880
kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa069dba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000011f51f2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: ib_mad_recv_done+0x5cc/0xb50 [ib_core]
kernel: __ib_process_cq+0x5c/0xb0 [ib_core]
kernel: ib_cq_poll_work+0x20/0x60 [ib_core]
kernel: process_one_work+0x1e9/0x410
kernel: worker_thread+0x4b/0x410
kernel: kthread+0x109/0x140
kernel: ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
kernel: ? kthread_create_on_node+0x70/0x70
kernel: ? SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
kernel: ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
kernel: RIP: ib_free_recv_mad+0x44/0xa0 [ib_core] RSP: ffffb9a729057d38
kernel: CR2: 0000000000000008
[1] : https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-rdma/msg56190.html
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Chris Blake <chrisrblake93@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Hal Rosenstock <hal@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c
index f8f53bb90837..cb91245e9163 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c
@@ -1974,14 +1974,15 @@ static void ib_mad_complete_recv(struct ib_mad_agent_private *mad_agent_priv,
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list);
ret = ib_mad_enforce_security(mad_agent_priv,
mad_recv_wc->wc->pkey_index);
if (ret) {
ib_free_recv_mad(mad_recv_wc);
deref_mad_agent(mad_agent_priv);
+ return;
}
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list);
list_add(&mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.list, &mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list);
if (ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(&mad_agent_priv->agent)) {
mad_recv_wc = ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc(mad_agent_priv,
--
2.14.2

47
patches/kernel/0012-IB-core-Don-t-enforce-PKey-security-on-SMI-MADs.patch Normal file
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From c7da6e780b87220187630411bcda8049072ecbf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2017 16:47:45 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 12/13] IB/core: Don't enforce PKey security on SMI MADs
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Per the infiniband spec an SMI MAD can have any PKey. Checking the pkey
on SMI MADs is not necessary, and it seems that some older adapters
using the mthca driver don't follow the convention of using the default
PKey, resulting in false denials, or errors querying the PKey cache.
SMI MAD security is still enforced, only agents allowed to manage the
subnet are able to receive or send SMI MADs.
Reported-by: Chris Blake <chrisrblake93@gmail.com>
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
index 70ad19c4c73e..8f9fd3b757db 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -692,8 +692,11 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
{
int ret;
- if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
- return -EACCES;
+ if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
+ if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return 0;
+ }
ret = ib_security_pkey_access(map->agent.device,
map->agent.port_num,
--
2.14.2