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drop patches applied upstream

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Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Lamprecht 2017-07-28 10:24:07 +02:00 committed by Wolfgang Bumiller
parent 9f7f3b58a9
commit 22fa3dbdcc
6 changed files with 0 additions and 315 deletions
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47
CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 38e360ea72f11241adede7ea2b22d8d536fe490b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 15:41:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] net: Zeroing the structure ethtool_wolinfo in
ethtool_get_wol()
CVE-2014-9900
memset() the structure ethtool_wolinfo that has padded bytes
but the padded bytes have not been zeroed out.
Change-Id: If3fd2d872a1b1ab9521d937b86a29fc468a8bbfe
Signed-off-by: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
(cherry-picked from commit 63c317dbee97983004dffdd9f742a20d17150071
https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10)
Signed-off-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
---
net/core/ethtool.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index d92de0a1f0a4..c06c6acf78c5 100644
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -1449,11 +1449,13 @@ static int ethtool_reset(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
static int ethtool_get_wol(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
{
- struct ethtool_wolinfo wol = { .cmd = ETHTOOL_GWOL };
+ struct ethtool_wolinfo wol;
if (!dev->ethtool_ops->get_wol)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ memset(&wol, 0, sizeof(struct ethtool_wolinfo));
+ wol.cmd = ETHTOOL_GWOL;
dev->ethtool_ops->get_wol(dev, &wol);
if (copy_to_user(useraddr, &wol, sizeof(wol)))
--
2.11.0

66
CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
View File

@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
From 993c7c14bbc4bf51025bb5c83c1c130417e0e823 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:56:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at
SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
__do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CVE-2017-1000380
(cherry-picked from commit ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 3c11a6983f54..e5ddc475dca4 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1622,6 +1622,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
if (err < 0)
goto __err;
+ tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue = NULL;
kfree(tu->tqueue);
--
2.11.0

83
CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
View File

@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
From 425e11483546f928109e5871a2c8b0fba3ddb3b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:56:01 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.
This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CVE-2017-1000380
(cherry-picked from commit d11662f4f798b50d8c8743f433842c3e40fe3378)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index ad153149b231..3c11a6983f54 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1963,6 +1963,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
+ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
@@ -1978,7 +1979,9 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
+ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
schedule();
+ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
@@ -1998,7 +2001,6 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
- mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
@@ -2008,7 +2010,6 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
- mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
@@ -2018,6 +2019,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
+ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
--
2.11.0

46
CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
View File

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From ab13cf852828060a7d9550c05197e5303de7aefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 11:09:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] drm/vmwgfx: limit the number of mip levels in
vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl()
CVE-2017-7346
The 'req->mip_levels' parameter in vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is
a user-controlled 'uint32_t' value which is used as a loop count limit.
This can lead to a kernel lockup and DoS. Add check for 'req->mip_levels'.
References:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1437431
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
(cherry picked from commit ee9c4e681ec4f58e42a83cb0c22a0289ade1aacf)
Signed-off-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
index 8da50fce3b77..56b803384ea2 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
@@ -1280,6 +1280,9 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
128;
--
2.11.0

68
CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
View File

@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
From a2285dfad4c68beb9a8376fa2a2df905319b11fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 17:28:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CVE-2017-9605
(cherry picked from commit 07678eca2cf9c9a18584e546c2b2a0d0c9a3150c)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
index 05fa092c942b..8da50fce3b77 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
int ret;
uint32_t size;
- uint32_t backup_handle;
+ uint32_t backup_handle = 0;
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1315,12 +1315,16 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
- if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
- res->backup_size) {
- DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
- vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if (res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
+ res->backup_size) {
+ DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
+ vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else {
+ backup_handle = req->buffer_handle;
+ }
}
} else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
--
2.11.0

5
Makefile
View File

@ -241,11 +241,6 @@ ${KERNEL_SRC}/README: ${KERNEL_SRC_SUBMODULE} | submodules
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../kvm-dynamic-halt-polling-disable-default.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../cgroup-cpuset-add-cpuset.remap_cpus.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../0001-netfilter-nft_set_rbtree-handle-re-addition-element-.patch # DoS from within (unpriv) containers
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2014-9900-net-Zeroing-the-structure-ethtool_wolinfo-in-ethtool.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-missing-queue-indices-reset-at-SNDRV_.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000380-ALSA-timer-Fix-race-between-read-and-ioctl.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-7346-drm-vmwgfx-limit-the-number-of-mip-levels-in-vmw_gb_.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-9605-drm-vmwgfx-Make-sure-backup_handle-is-always-valid.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-do-not-blow-on-PROT_NONE-MAP_FIXED-holes-i.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000364-mm-mmap.c-expand_downwards-don-t-require-the-gap-if-.patch
cd ${KERNEL_SRC}; patch -p1 < ../CVE-2017-1000365-fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch