pve-kernel-lowlatency-qoup/patches/kernel/0033-x86-speculation-Add-Kconfig-option-for-GDS.patch

76 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
Raw Normal View History

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 19:43:13 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is mitigated in microcode. However, on
systems that haven't received the updated microcode, disabling AVX
can act as a mitigation. Add a Kconfig option that uses the microcode
mitigation if available and disables AVX otherwise. Setting this
option has no effect on systems not affected by GDS. This is the
equivalent of setting gather_data_sampling=force.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53cf5797f114ba2bd86d23a862302119848eff19)
CVE-2022-40982
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
(cherry picked from commit 92bd969bbe475c5bca376d007ed6558085b237ba)
Signed-off-by: Stoiko Ivanov <s.ivanov@proxmox.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 598a303819da..8451e0f36c66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2640,6 +2640,25 @@ config SLS
against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
larger.
+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+ bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default n
+ help
+ Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+ unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
+ vector registers.
+
+ This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
+ command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
+ AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
+ the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
+ break with this option set.
+
+ Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
+
+ If in doubt, say N.
+
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0cc3c4f09dd7..819a8aa0c706 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -658,7 +658,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#else
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+#endif
static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",