mirror_zfs/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c
Richard Yao d8a33bc0a5
icp: Use explicit_memset() exclusively in gcm_clear_ctx()
d634d20d1b had been intended to fix a
potential information leak issue where the compiler's optimization
passes appeared to remove `memset()` operations that sanitize sensitive
data before memory is freed for use by the rest of the kernel.

When I wrote it, I had assumed that the compiler would not remove the
other `memset()` operations, but upon reflection, I have realized that
this was a bad assumption to make. I would rather have a very slight
amount of additional overhead when calling `gcm_clear_ctx()` than risk a
future compiler remove `memset()` calls. This is likely to happen if
someone decides to try doing link time optimization and the person will
not think to audit the assembly output for issues like this, so it is
best to preempt the possibility before it happens.

Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Rob Norris <robn@despairlabs.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Motin <mav@FreeBSD.org>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard@ryao.dev>
Closes #17343
2025-05-19 10:04:05 -07:00

188 lines
5.0 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: CDDL-1.0
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
* or https://opensource.org/licenses/CDDL-1.0.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
* and limitations under the License.
*
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*/
#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
#include <modes/modes.h>
#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
/*
* Initialize by setting iov_or_mp to point to the current iovec or mp,
* and by setting current_offset to an offset within the current iovec or mp.
*/
void
crypto_init_ptrs(crypto_data_t *out, void **iov_or_mp, offset_t *current_offset)
{
offset_t offset;
switch (out->cd_format) {
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
*current_offset = out->cd_offset;
break;
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: {
zfs_uio_t *uiop = out->cd_uio;
uint_t vec_idx;
offset = out->cd_offset;
offset = zfs_uio_index_at_offset(uiop, offset, &vec_idx);
*current_offset = offset;
*iov_or_mp = (void *)(uintptr_t)vec_idx;
break;
}
} /* end switch */
}
/*
* Get pointers for where in the output to copy a block of encrypted or
* decrypted data. The iov_or_mp argument stores a pointer to the current
* iovec or mp, and offset stores an offset into the current iovec or mp.
*/
void
crypto_get_ptrs(crypto_data_t *out, void **iov_or_mp, offset_t *current_offset,
uint8_t **out_data_1, size_t *out_data_1_len, uint8_t **out_data_2,
size_t amt)
{
offset_t offset;
switch (out->cd_format) {
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: {
iovec_t *iov;
offset = *current_offset;
iov = &out->cd_raw;
if ((offset + amt) <= iov->iov_len) {
/* one block fits */
*out_data_1 = (uint8_t *)iov->iov_base + offset;
*out_data_1_len = amt;
*out_data_2 = NULL;
*current_offset = offset + amt;
}
break;
}
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: {
zfs_uio_t *uio = out->cd_uio;
offset_t offset;
uint_t vec_idx;
uint8_t *p;
uint64_t iov_len;
void *iov_base;
offset = *current_offset;
vec_idx = (uintptr_t)(*iov_or_mp);
zfs_uio_iov_at_index(uio, vec_idx, &iov_base, &iov_len);
p = (uint8_t *)iov_base + offset;
*out_data_1 = p;
if (offset + amt <= iov_len) {
/* can fit one block into this iov */
*out_data_1_len = amt;
*out_data_2 = NULL;
*current_offset = offset + amt;
} else {
/* one block spans two iovecs */
*out_data_1_len = iov_len - offset;
if (vec_idx == zfs_uio_iovcnt(uio)) {
*out_data_2 = NULL;
return;
}
vec_idx++;
zfs_uio_iov_at_index(uio, vec_idx, &iov_base, &iov_len);
*out_data_2 = (uint8_t *)iov_base;
*current_offset = amt - *out_data_1_len;
}
*iov_or_mp = (void *)(uintptr_t)vec_idx;
break;
}
} /* end switch */
}
void
crypto_free_mode_ctx(void *ctx)
{
common_ctx_t *common_ctx = (common_ctx_t *)ctx;
switch (common_ctx->cc_flags & (CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE)) {
case CCM_MODE:
if (((ccm_ctx_t *)ctx)->ccm_pt_buf != NULL)
vmem_free(((ccm_ctx_t *)ctx)->ccm_pt_buf,
((ccm_ctx_t *)ctx)->ccm_data_len);
kmem_free(ctx, sizeof (ccm_ctx_t));
break;
case GCM_MODE:
gcm_clear_ctx((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx);
kmem_free(ctx, sizeof (gcm_ctx_t));
break;
default:
__builtin_unreachable();
}
}
static void *
explicit_memset(void *s, int c, size_t n)
{
memset(s, c, n);
__asm__ __volatile__("" :: "r"(s) : "memory");
return (s);
}
/*
* Clear sensitive data in the context and free allocated memory.
*
* ctx->gcm_remainder may contain a plaintext remainder. ctx->gcm_H and
* ctx->gcm_Htable contain the hash sub key which protects authentication.
* ctx->gcm_pt_buf contains the plaintext result of decryption.
*
* Although extremely unlikely, ctx->gcm_J0 and ctx->gcm_tmp could be used for
* a known plaintext attack, they consist of the IV and the first and last
* counter respectively. If they should be cleared is debatable.
*/
void
gcm_clear_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx)
{
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_remainder, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_remainder));
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_H, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
#if defined(CAN_USE_GCM_ASM)
if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) {
ASSERT3P(ctx->gcm_Htable, !=, NULL);
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_Htable, 0, ctx->gcm_htab_len);
kmem_free(ctx->gcm_Htable, ctx->gcm_htab_len);
}
#endif
if (ctx->gcm_pt_buf != NULL) {
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, 0, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
vmem_free(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
}
/* Optional */
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_J0, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_tmp, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_tmp));
}