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6a42939fcd
These were categorized as the following:
* Dead assignment 23
* Dead increment 4
* Dead initialization 6
* Dead nested assignment 18
Most of these are harmless, but since actual issues can hide among them,
we correct them.
That said, there were a few return values that were being ignored that
appeared to merit some correction:
* `destroy_callback()` in `cmd/zfs/zfs_main.c` ignored the error from
`destroy_batched()`. We handle it by returning -1 if there is an
error.
* `zfs_do_upgrade()` in `cmd/zfs/zfs_main.c` ignored the error from
`zfs_for_each()`. We handle it by doing a binary OR of the error
value from the subsequent `zfs_for_each()` call to the existing
value. This is how errors are mostly handled inside `zfs_for_each()`.
The error value here is passed to exit from the zfs command, so doing
a binary or on it is better than what we did previously.
* `get_zap_prop()` in `module/zfs/zcp_get.c` ignored the error from
`dsl_prop_get_ds()` when the property is not of type string. We
return an error when it does. There is a small concern that the
`zfs_get_temporary_prop()` call would handle things, but in the case
that it does not, we would be pushing an uninitialized numval onto
the lua stack. It is expected that `dsl_prop_get_ds()` will succeed
anytime that `zfs_get_temporary_prop()` does, so that not giving it a
chance to fix things is not a problem.
* `draid_merge_impl()` in `tests/zfs-tests/cmd/draid.c` used
`nvlist_add_nvlist()` twice in ways in which errors are expected to
be impossible, so we switch to `fnvlist_add_nvlist()`.
A few notable ones did not merit use of the return value, so we
suppressed it with `(void)`:
* `write_free_diffs()` in `lib/libzfs/libzfs_diff.c` ignored the error
value from `describe_free()`. A look through the commit history
revealed that this was intentional.
* `arc_evict_hdr()` in `module/zfs/arc.c` did not need to use the
returned handle from `arc_hdr_realloc()` because it is already
referenced in lists.
* `spa_vdev_detach()` in `module/zfs/spa.c` has a comment explicitly
saying not to use the error from `vdev_label_init()` because whatever
causes the error could be the reason why a detach is being done.
Unfortunately, I am not presently able to analyze the kernel modules
with Clang's static analyzer, so I could have missed some cases of this.
In cases where reports were present in code that is duplicated between
Linux and FreeBSD, I made a conscious effort to fix the FreeBSD version
too.
After this commit is merged, regressions like dee8934
should become
extremely obvious with Clang's static analyzer since a regression would
appear in the results as the only instance of unused code. That assumes
that Coverity does not catch the issue first.
My local branch with fixes from all of my outstanding non-draft pull
requests shows 118 reports from Clang's static anlayzer after this
patch. That is down by 51 from 169.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Cedric Berger <cedric@precidata.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes #13986
1595 lines
42 KiB
C
1595 lines
42 KiB
C
/*
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* CDDL HEADER START
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
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* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
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* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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*
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* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
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* or https://opensource.org/licenses/CDDL-1.0.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
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* and limitations under the License.
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*
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* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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*/
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#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
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#include <modes/modes.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/icp.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
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#include <sys/byteorder.h>
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#include <sys/simd.h>
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#include <modes/gcm_impl.h>
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#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
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#include <aes/aes_impl.h>
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#endif
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#define GHASH(c, d, t, o) \
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xor_block((uint8_t *)(d), (uint8_t *)(c)->gcm_ghash); \
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(o)->mul((uint64_t *)(void *)(c)->gcm_ghash, (c)->gcm_H, \
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(uint64_t *)(void *)(t));
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/* Select GCM implementation */
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#define IMPL_FASTEST (UINT32_MAX)
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#define IMPL_CYCLE (UINT32_MAX-1)
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#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
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#define IMPL_AVX (UINT32_MAX-2)
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#endif
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#define GCM_IMPL_READ(i) (*(volatile uint32_t *) &(i))
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static uint32_t icp_gcm_impl = IMPL_FASTEST;
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static uint32_t user_sel_impl = IMPL_FASTEST;
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#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
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/* Does the architecture we run on support the MOVBE instruction? */
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boolean_t gcm_avx_can_use_movbe = B_FALSE;
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/*
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* Whether to use the optimized openssl gcm and ghash implementations.
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* Set to true if module parameter icp_gcm_impl == "avx".
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*/
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static boolean_t gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
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#define GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX (*(volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_use_avx)
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extern boolean_t atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(volatile boolean_t *);
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static inline boolean_t gcm_avx_will_work(void);
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static inline void gcm_set_avx(boolean_t);
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static inline boolean_t gcm_toggle_avx(void);
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static inline size_t gcm_simd_get_htab_size(boolean_t);
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static int gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, char *, size_t,
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crypto_data_t *, size_t);
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static int gcm_encrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, size_t);
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static int gcm_decrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, size_t);
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static int gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx_t *, unsigned char *, size_t, unsigned char *,
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size_t, size_t);
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#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
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/*
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* Encrypt multiple blocks of data in GCM mode. Decrypt for GCM mode
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* is done in another function.
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*/
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int
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gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data, size_t length,
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crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size,
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int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
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void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
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void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
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{
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#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
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if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE)
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return (gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(
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ctx, data, length, out, block_size));
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#endif
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const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
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size_t remainder = length;
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size_t need = 0;
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uint8_t *datap = (uint8_t *)data;
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uint8_t *blockp;
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uint8_t *lastp;
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void *iov_or_mp;
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offset_t offset;
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uint8_t *out_data_1;
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uint8_t *out_data_2;
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size_t out_data_1_len;
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uint64_t counter;
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uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
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if (length + ctx->gcm_remainder_len < block_size) {
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/* accumulate bytes here and return */
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memcpy((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder + ctx->gcm_remainder_len,
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datap,
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length);
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ctx->gcm_remainder_len += length;
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if (ctx->gcm_copy_to == NULL) {
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ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap;
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}
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return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
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}
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crypto_init_ptrs(out, &iov_or_mp, &offset);
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gops = gcm_impl_get_ops();
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do {
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/* Unprocessed data from last call. */
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if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
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need = block_size - ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
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if (need > remainder)
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return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
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memcpy(&((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder)
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[ctx->gcm_remainder_len], datap, need);
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blockp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
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} else {
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blockp = datap;
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}
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/*
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* Increment counter. Counter bits are confined
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* to the bottom 32 bits of the counter block.
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*/
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counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask);
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counter = htonll(counter + 1);
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counter &= counter_mask;
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ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter;
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encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb,
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(uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp);
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xor_block(blockp, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp);
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lastp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
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ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size;
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crypto_get_ptrs(out, &iov_or_mp, &offset, &out_data_1,
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&out_data_1_len, &out_data_2, block_size);
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/* copy block to where it belongs */
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if (out_data_1_len == block_size) {
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copy_block(lastp, out_data_1);
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} else {
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memcpy(out_data_1, lastp, out_data_1_len);
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if (out_data_2 != NULL) {
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memcpy(out_data_2,
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lastp + out_data_1_len,
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block_size - out_data_1_len);
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}
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}
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/* update offset */
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out->cd_offset += block_size;
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/* add ciphertext to the hash */
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GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_tmp, ctx->gcm_ghash, gops);
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/* Update pointer to next block of data to be processed. */
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if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len != 0) {
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datap += need;
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ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
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} else {
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datap += block_size;
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}
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remainder = (size_t)&data[length] - (size_t)datap;
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/* Incomplete last block. */
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if (remainder > 0 && remainder < block_size) {
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memcpy(ctx->gcm_remainder, datap, remainder);
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ctx->gcm_remainder_len = remainder;
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ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap;
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goto out;
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}
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ctx->gcm_copy_to = NULL;
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} while (remainder > 0);
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out:
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return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
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}
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int
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gcm_encrypt_final(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size,
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int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
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void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
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void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
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{
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(void) copy_block;
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#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
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if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE)
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return (gcm_encrypt_final_avx(ctx, out, block_size));
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#endif
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const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
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uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
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uint8_t *ghash, *macp = NULL;
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int i, rv;
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if (out->cd_length <
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(ctx->gcm_remainder_len + ctx->gcm_tag_len)) {
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return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
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}
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gops = gcm_impl_get_ops();
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ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash;
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if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
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uint64_t counter;
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uint8_t *tmpp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
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/*
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* Here is where we deal with data that is not a
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* multiple of the block size.
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*/
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/*
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* Increment counter.
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*/
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counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask);
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counter = htonll(counter + 1);
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counter &= counter_mask;
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ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter;
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encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb,
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(uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp);
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macp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
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memset(macp + ctx->gcm_remainder_len, 0,
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block_size - ctx->gcm_remainder_len);
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/* XOR with counter block */
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for (i = 0; i < ctx->gcm_remainder_len; i++) {
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macp[i] ^= tmpp[i];
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}
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/* add ciphertext to the hash */
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GHASH(ctx, macp, ghash, gops);
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ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
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}
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ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] =
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htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len));
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GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, ghash, gops);
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encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0,
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(uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0);
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xor_block((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, ghash);
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if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
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rv = crypto_put_output_data(macp, out, ctx->gcm_remainder_len);
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if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
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return (rv);
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}
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out->cd_offset += ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
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ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
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rv = crypto_put_output_data(ghash, out, ctx->gcm_tag_len);
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if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
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return (rv);
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out->cd_offset += ctx->gcm_tag_len;
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return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
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}
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/*
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* This will only deal with decrypting the last block of the input that
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* might not be a multiple of block length.
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*/
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static void
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gcm_decrypt_incomplete_block(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, size_t block_size, size_t index,
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int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
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void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
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{
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uint8_t *datap, *outp, *counterp;
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uint64_t counter;
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uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
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int i;
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/*
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* Increment counter.
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* Counter bits are confined to the bottom 32 bits
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*/
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counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask);
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counter = htonll(counter + 1);
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counter &= counter_mask;
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ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter;
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datap = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
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outp = &((ctx->gcm_pt_buf)[index]);
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counterp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
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/* authentication tag */
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memset((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp, 0, block_size);
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memcpy((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp, datap, ctx->gcm_remainder_len);
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/* add ciphertext to the hash */
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GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_tmp, ctx->gcm_ghash, gcm_impl_get_ops());
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/* decrypt remaining ciphertext */
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encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb, counterp);
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|
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/* XOR with counter block */
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for (i = 0; i < ctx->gcm_remainder_len; i++) {
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outp[i] = datap[i] ^ counterp[i];
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}
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}
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|
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int
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gcm_mode_decrypt_contiguous_blocks(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data, size_t length,
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crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size,
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int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
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void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
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void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
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{
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(void) out, (void) block_size, (void) encrypt_block, (void) copy_block,
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(void) xor_block;
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size_t new_len;
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uint8_t *new;
|
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|
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/*
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* Copy contiguous ciphertext input blocks to plaintext buffer.
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* Ciphertext will be decrypted in the final.
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*/
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if (length > 0) {
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new_len = ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len + length;
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new = vmem_alloc(new_len, KM_SLEEP);
|
|
if (new == NULL) {
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vmem_free(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
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ctx->gcm_pt_buf = NULL;
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return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
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}
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|
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if (ctx->gcm_pt_buf != NULL) {
|
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memcpy(new, ctx->gcm_pt_buf, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
|
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vmem_free(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
|
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} else {
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ASSERT0(ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
|
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}
|
|
|
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ctx->gcm_pt_buf = new;
|
|
ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len = new_len;
|
|
memcpy(&ctx->gcm_pt_buf[ctx->gcm_processed_data_len], data,
|
|
length);
|
|
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
gcm_decrypt_final(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size,
|
|
int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE)
|
|
return (gcm_decrypt_final_avx(ctx, out, block_size));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
|
|
size_t pt_len;
|
|
size_t remainder;
|
|
uint8_t *ghash;
|
|
uint8_t *blockp;
|
|
uint8_t *cbp;
|
|
uint64_t counter;
|
|
uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
|
|
int processed = 0, rv;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len == ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
|
|
|
|
gops = gcm_impl_get_ops();
|
|
pt_len = ctx->gcm_processed_data_len - ctx->gcm_tag_len;
|
|
ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash;
|
|
blockp = ctx->gcm_pt_buf;
|
|
remainder = pt_len;
|
|
while (remainder > 0) {
|
|
/* Incomplete last block */
|
|
if (remainder < block_size) {
|
|
memcpy(ctx->gcm_remainder, blockp, remainder);
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len = remainder;
|
|
/*
|
|
* not expecting anymore ciphertext, just
|
|
* compute plaintext for the remaining input
|
|
*/
|
|
gcm_decrypt_incomplete_block(ctx, block_size,
|
|
processed, encrypt_block, xor_block);
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* add ciphertext to the hash */
|
|
GHASH(ctx, blockp, ghash, gops);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment counter.
|
|
* Counter bits are confined to the bottom 32 bits
|
|
*/
|
|
counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask);
|
|
counter = htonll(counter + 1);
|
|
counter &= counter_mask;
|
|
ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter;
|
|
|
|
cbp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
|
|
encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb, cbp);
|
|
|
|
/* XOR with ciphertext */
|
|
xor_block(cbp, blockp);
|
|
|
|
processed += block_size;
|
|
blockp += block_size;
|
|
remainder -= block_size;
|
|
}
|
|
out:
|
|
ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(pt_len));
|
|
GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, ghash, gops);
|
|
encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0,
|
|
(uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0);
|
|
xor_block((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, ghash);
|
|
|
|
/* compare the input authentication tag with what we calculated */
|
|
if (memcmp(&ctx->gcm_pt_buf[pt_len], ghash, ctx->gcm_tag_len)) {
|
|
/* They don't match */
|
|
return (CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC);
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, out, pt_len);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
out->cd_offset += pt_len;
|
|
}
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
gcm_validate_args(CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *gcm_param)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t tag_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check the length of the authentication tag (in bits).
|
|
*/
|
|
tag_len = gcm_param->ulTagBits;
|
|
switch (tag_len) {
|
|
case 32:
|
|
case 64:
|
|
case 96:
|
|
case 104:
|
|
case 112:
|
|
case 120:
|
|
case 128:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gcm_param->ulIvLen == 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
gcm_format_initial_blocks(uchar_t *iv, ulong_t iv_len,
|
|
gcm_ctx_t *ctx, size_t block_size,
|
|
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
|
|
{
|
|
const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
|
|
uint8_t *cb;
|
|
ulong_t remainder = iv_len;
|
|
ulong_t processed = 0;
|
|
uint8_t *datap, *ghash;
|
|
uint64_t len_a_len_c[2];
|
|
|
|
gops = gcm_impl_get_ops();
|
|
ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash;
|
|
cb = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
|
|
if (iv_len == 12) {
|
|
memcpy(cb, iv, 12);
|
|
cb[12] = 0;
|
|
cb[13] = 0;
|
|
cb[14] = 0;
|
|
cb[15] = 1;
|
|
/* J0 will be used again in the final */
|
|
copy_block(cb, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* GHASH the IV */
|
|
do {
|
|
if (remainder < block_size) {
|
|
memset(cb, 0, block_size);
|
|
memcpy(cb, &(iv[processed]), remainder);
|
|
datap = (uint8_t *)cb;
|
|
remainder = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
datap = (uint8_t *)(&(iv[processed]));
|
|
processed += block_size;
|
|
remainder -= block_size;
|
|
}
|
|
GHASH(ctx, datap, ghash, gops);
|
|
} while (remainder > 0);
|
|
|
|
len_a_len_c[0] = 0;
|
|
len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(iv_len));
|
|
GHASH(ctx, len_a_len_c, ctx->gcm_J0, gops);
|
|
|
|
/* J0 will be used again in the final */
|
|
copy_block((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, (uint8_t *)cb);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
gcm_init(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
|
|
unsigned char *auth_data, size_t auth_data_len, size_t block_size,
|
|
int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
|
|
{
|
|
const gcm_impl_ops_t *gops;
|
|
uint8_t *ghash, *datap, *authp;
|
|
size_t remainder, processed;
|
|
|
|
/* encrypt zero block to get subkey H */
|
|
memset(ctx->gcm_H, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
|
|
encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_H,
|
|
(uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_H);
|
|
|
|
gcm_format_initial_blocks(iv, iv_len, ctx, block_size,
|
|
copy_block, xor_block);
|
|
|
|
gops = gcm_impl_get_ops();
|
|
authp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
|
|
ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash;
|
|
memset(authp, 0, block_size);
|
|
memset(ghash, 0, block_size);
|
|
|
|
processed = 0;
|
|
remainder = auth_data_len;
|
|
do {
|
|
if (remainder < block_size) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* There's not a block full of data, pad rest of
|
|
* buffer with zero
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (auth_data != NULL) {
|
|
memset(authp, 0, block_size);
|
|
memcpy(authp, &(auth_data[processed]),
|
|
remainder);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ASSERT0(remainder);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
datap = (uint8_t *)authp;
|
|
remainder = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
datap = (uint8_t *)(&(auth_data[processed]));
|
|
processed += block_size;
|
|
remainder -= block_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* add auth data to the hash */
|
|
GHASH(ctx, datap, ghash, gops);
|
|
|
|
} while (remainder > 0);
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The following function is called at encrypt or decrypt init time
|
|
* for AES GCM mode.
|
|
*
|
|
* Init the GCM context struct. Handle the cycle and avx implementations here.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
gcm_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
|
|
int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
|
|
{
|
|
int rv;
|
|
CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *gcm_param;
|
|
|
|
if (param != NULL) {
|
|
gcm_param = (CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *)(void *)param;
|
|
|
|
if ((rv = gcm_validate_args(gcm_param)) != 0) {
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_tag_len = gcm_param->ulTagBits;
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_tag_len >>= 3;
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_processed_data_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* these values are in bits */
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[0]
|
|
= htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(gcm_param->ulAADLen));
|
|
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_flags |= GCM_MODE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
if (GCM_IMPL_READ(icp_gcm_impl) != IMPL_CYCLE) {
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle the "cycle" implementation by creating avx and
|
|
* non-avx contexts alternately.
|
|
*/
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = gcm_toggle_avx();
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't handle byte swapped key schedules in the avx
|
|
* code path.
|
|
*/
|
|
aes_key_t *ks = (aes_key_t *)gcm_ctx->gcm_keysched;
|
|
if (ks->ops->needs_byteswap == B_TRUE) {
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Use the MOVBE and the BSWAP variants alternately. */
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE &&
|
|
zfs_movbe_available() == B_TRUE) {
|
|
(void) atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(
|
|
(volatile boolean_t *)&gcm_avx_can_use_movbe);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Allocate Htab memory as needed. */
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) {
|
|
size_t htab_len = gcm_simd_get_htab_size(gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx);
|
|
|
|
if (htab_len == 0) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len = htab_len;
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable =
|
|
(uint64_t *)kmem_alloc(htab_len, KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable == NULL) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) {
|
|
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
|
|
if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gcm_param->pIv, gcm_param->ulIvLen,
|
|
gcm_param->pAAD, gcm_param->ulAADLen, block_size,
|
|
encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) {
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx, gcm_param->pIv, gcm_param->ulIvLen,
|
|
gcm_param->pAAD, gcm_param->ulAADLen, block_size) != 0) {
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
|
|
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
gmac_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size,
|
|
int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *),
|
|
void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *))
|
|
{
|
|
int rv;
|
|
CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS *gmac_param;
|
|
|
|
if (param != NULL) {
|
|
gmac_param = (CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS *)(void *)param;
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_tag_len = CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(AES_GMAC_TAG_BITS);
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_processed_data_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* these values are in bits */
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[0]
|
|
= htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(gmac_param->ulAADLen));
|
|
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_flags |= GMAC_MODE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle the "cycle" implementation by creating avx and non avx
|
|
* contexts alternately.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (GCM_IMPL_READ(icp_gcm_impl) != IMPL_CYCLE) {
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX;
|
|
} else {
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = gcm_toggle_avx();
|
|
}
|
|
/* We don't handle byte swapped key schedules in the avx code path. */
|
|
aes_key_t *ks = (aes_key_t *)gcm_ctx->gcm_keysched;
|
|
if (ks->ops->needs_byteswap == B_TRUE) {
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx = B_FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Allocate Htab memory as needed. */
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) {
|
|
size_t htab_len = gcm_simd_get_htab_size(gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx);
|
|
|
|
if (htab_len == 0) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_htab_len = htab_len;
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable =
|
|
(uint64_t *)kmem_alloc(htab_len, KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_Htable == NULL) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Avx and non avx context initialization differs from here on. */
|
|
if (gcm_ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_FALSE) {
|
|
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
|
|
if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gmac_param->pIv, AES_GMAC_IV_LEN,
|
|
gmac_param->pAAD, gmac_param->ulAADLen, block_size,
|
|
encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) {
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx, gmac_param->pIv, AES_GMAC_IV_LEN,
|
|
gmac_param->pAAD, gmac_param->ulAADLen, block_size) != 0) {
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
|
|
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *
|
|
gcm_alloc_ctx(int kmflag)
|
|
{
|
|
gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if ((gcm_ctx = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (gcm_ctx_t), kmflag)) == NULL)
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_flags = GCM_MODE;
|
|
return (gcm_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *
|
|
gmac_alloc_ctx(int kmflag)
|
|
{
|
|
gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if ((gcm_ctx = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (gcm_ctx_t), kmflag)) == NULL)
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
gcm_ctx->gcm_flags = GMAC_MODE;
|
|
return (gcm_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* GCM implementation that contains the fastest methods */
|
|
static gcm_impl_ops_t gcm_fastest_impl = {
|
|
.name = "fastest"
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* All compiled in implementations */
|
|
static const gcm_impl_ops_t *gcm_all_impl[] = {
|
|
&gcm_generic_impl,
|
|
#if defined(__x86_64) && defined(HAVE_PCLMULQDQ)
|
|
&gcm_pclmulqdq_impl,
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Indicate that benchmark has been completed */
|
|
static boolean_t gcm_impl_initialized = B_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Hold all supported implementations */
|
|
static size_t gcm_supp_impl_cnt = 0;
|
|
static gcm_impl_ops_t *gcm_supp_impl[ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_all_impl)];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the GCM operations for encrypt/decrypt/key setup. When a
|
|
* SIMD implementation is not allowed in the current context, then
|
|
* fallback to the fastest generic implementation.
|
|
*/
|
|
const gcm_impl_ops_t *
|
|
gcm_impl_get_ops(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!kfpu_allowed())
|
|
return (&gcm_generic_impl);
|
|
|
|
const gcm_impl_ops_t *ops = NULL;
|
|
const uint32_t impl = GCM_IMPL_READ(icp_gcm_impl);
|
|
|
|
switch (impl) {
|
|
case IMPL_FASTEST:
|
|
ASSERT(gcm_impl_initialized);
|
|
ops = &gcm_fastest_impl;
|
|
break;
|
|
case IMPL_CYCLE:
|
|
/* Cycle through supported implementations */
|
|
ASSERT(gcm_impl_initialized);
|
|
ASSERT3U(gcm_supp_impl_cnt, >, 0);
|
|
static size_t cycle_impl_idx = 0;
|
|
size_t idx = (++cycle_impl_idx) % gcm_supp_impl_cnt;
|
|
ops = gcm_supp_impl[idx];
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
case IMPL_AVX:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure that we return a valid implementation while
|
|
* switching to the avx implementation since there still
|
|
* may be unfinished non-avx contexts around.
|
|
*/
|
|
ops = &gcm_generic_impl;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
ASSERT3U(impl, <, gcm_supp_impl_cnt);
|
|
ASSERT3U(gcm_supp_impl_cnt, >, 0);
|
|
if (impl < ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_all_impl))
|
|
ops = gcm_supp_impl[impl];
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3P(ops, !=, NULL);
|
|
|
|
return (ops);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize all supported implementations.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
gcm_impl_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
gcm_impl_ops_t *curr_impl;
|
|
int i, c;
|
|
|
|
/* Move supported implementations into gcm_supp_impls */
|
|
for (i = 0, c = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_all_impl); i++) {
|
|
curr_impl = (gcm_impl_ops_t *)gcm_all_impl[i];
|
|
|
|
if (curr_impl->is_supported())
|
|
gcm_supp_impl[c++] = (gcm_impl_ops_t *)curr_impl;
|
|
}
|
|
gcm_supp_impl_cnt = c;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the fastest implementation given the assumption that the
|
|
* hardware accelerated version is the fastest.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(__x86_64) && defined(HAVE_PCLMULQDQ)
|
|
if (gcm_pclmulqdq_impl.is_supported()) {
|
|
memcpy(&gcm_fastest_impl, &gcm_pclmulqdq_impl,
|
|
sizeof (gcm_fastest_impl));
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(&gcm_fastest_impl, &gcm_generic_impl,
|
|
sizeof (gcm_fastest_impl));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(gcm_fastest_impl.name, "fastest", GCM_IMPL_NAME_MAX);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use the avx implementation if it's available and the implementation
|
|
* hasn't changed from its default value of fastest on module load.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (gcm_avx_will_work()) {
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_MOVBE
|
|
if (zfs_movbe_available() == B_TRUE) {
|
|
atomic_swap_32(&gcm_avx_can_use_movbe, B_TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (GCM_IMPL_READ(user_sel_impl) == IMPL_FASTEST) {
|
|
gcm_set_avx(B_TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Finish initialization */
|
|
atomic_swap_32(&icp_gcm_impl, user_sel_impl);
|
|
gcm_impl_initialized = B_TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct {
|
|
const char *name;
|
|
uint32_t sel;
|
|
} gcm_impl_opts[] = {
|
|
{ "cycle", IMPL_CYCLE },
|
|
{ "fastest", IMPL_FASTEST },
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
{ "avx", IMPL_AVX },
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Function sets desired gcm implementation.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we are called before init(), user preference will be saved in
|
|
* user_sel_impl, and applied in later init() call. This occurs when module
|
|
* parameter is specified on module load. Otherwise, directly update
|
|
* icp_gcm_impl.
|
|
*
|
|
* @val Name of gcm implementation to use
|
|
* @param Unused.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
gcm_impl_set(const char *val)
|
|
{
|
|
int err = -EINVAL;
|
|
char req_name[GCM_IMPL_NAME_MAX];
|
|
uint32_t impl = GCM_IMPL_READ(user_sel_impl);
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
/* sanitize input */
|
|
i = strnlen(val, GCM_IMPL_NAME_MAX);
|
|
if (i == 0 || i >= GCM_IMPL_NAME_MAX)
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(req_name, val, GCM_IMPL_NAME_MAX);
|
|
while (i > 0 && isspace(req_name[i-1]))
|
|
i--;
|
|
req_name[i] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* Check mandatory options */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_impl_opts); i++) {
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
/* Ignore avx implementation if it won't work. */
|
|
if (gcm_impl_opts[i].sel == IMPL_AVX && !gcm_avx_will_work()) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (strcmp(req_name, gcm_impl_opts[i].name) == 0) {
|
|
impl = gcm_impl_opts[i].sel;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check all supported impl if init() was already called */
|
|
if (err != 0 && gcm_impl_initialized) {
|
|
/* check all supported implementations */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < gcm_supp_impl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
if (strcmp(req_name, gcm_supp_impl[i]->name) == 0) {
|
|
impl = i;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use the avx implementation if available and the requested one is
|
|
* avx or fastest.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (gcm_avx_will_work() == B_TRUE &&
|
|
(impl == IMPL_AVX || impl == IMPL_FASTEST)) {
|
|
gcm_set_avx(B_TRUE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
gcm_set_avx(B_FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (err == 0) {
|
|
if (gcm_impl_initialized)
|
|
atomic_swap_32(&icp_gcm_impl, impl);
|
|
else
|
|
atomic_swap_32(&user_sel_impl, impl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(_KERNEL) && defined(__linux__)
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
icp_gcm_impl_set(const char *val, zfs_kernel_param_t *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
return (gcm_impl_set(val));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
icp_gcm_impl_get(char *buffer, zfs_kernel_param_t *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, cnt = 0;
|
|
char *fmt;
|
|
const uint32_t impl = GCM_IMPL_READ(icp_gcm_impl);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(gcm_impl_initialized);
|
|
|
|
/* list mandatory options */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_impl_opts); i++) {
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
/* Ignore avx implementation if it won't work. */
|
|
if (gcm_impl_opts[i].sel == IMPL_AVX && !gcm_avx_will_work()) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
fmt = (impl == gcm_impl_opts[i].sel) ? "[%s] " : "%s ";
|
|
cnt += sprintf(buffer + cnt, fmt, gcm_impl_opts[i].name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* list all supported implementations */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < gcm_supp_impl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
fmt = (i == impl) ? "[%s] " : "%s ";
|
|
cnt += sprintf(buffer + cnt, fmt, gcm_supp_impl[i]->name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (cnt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module_param_call(icp_gcm_impl, icp_gcm_impl_set, icp_gcm_impl_get,
|
|
NULL, 0644);
|
|
MODULE_PARM_DESC(icp_gcm_impl, "Select gcm implementation.");
|
|
#endif /* defined(__KERNEL) */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM
|
|
#define GCM_BLOCK_LEN 16
|
|
/*
|
|
* The openssl asm routines are 6x aggregated and need that many bytes
|
|
* at minimum.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES (GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 6)
|
|
#define GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES (GCM_BLOCK_LEN * 6 * 3)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure the chunk size is reasonable since we are allocating a
|
|
* GCM_AVX_MAX_CHUNK_SIZEd buffer and disabling preemption and interrupts.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define GCM_AVX_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE \
|
|
(((128*1024)/GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES)
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the FPU registers since they hold sensitive internal state. */
|
|
#define clear_fpu_regs() clear_fpu_regs_avx()
|
|
#define GHASH_AVX(ctx, in, len) \
|
|
gcm_ghash_avx((ctx)->gcm_ghash, (const uint64_t *)(ctx)->gcm_Htable, \
|
|
in, len)
|
|
|
|
#define gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx) gcm_incr_counter_block_by(ctx, 1)
|
|
|
|
/* Get the chunk size module parameter. */
|
|
#define GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ *(volatile uint32_t *) &gcm_avx_chunk_size
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Module parameter: number of bytes to process at once while owning the FPU.
|
|
* Rounded down to the next GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES byte boundary and is
|
|
* ensured to be greater or equal than GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES.
|
|
*/
|
|
static uint32_t gcm_avx_chunk_size =
|
|
((32 * 1024) / GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES;
|
|
|
|
extern void clear_fpu_regs_avx(void);
|
|
extern void gcm_xor_avx(const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst);
|
|
extern void aes_encrypt_intel(const uint32_t rk[], int nr,
|
|
const uint32_t pt[4], uint32_t ct[4]);
|
|
|
|
extern void gcm_init_htab_avx(uint64_t *Htable, const uint64_t H[2]);
|
|
extern void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t ghash[2], const uint64_t *Htable,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
|
|
|
|
extern size_t aesni_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
|
|
const void *, uint64_t *, uint64_t *);
|
|
|
|
extern size_t aesni_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
|
|
const void *, uint64_t *, uint64_t *);
|
|
|
|
static inline boolean_t
|
|
gcm_avx_will_work(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Avx should imply aes-ni and pclmulqdq, but make sure anyhow. */
|
|
return (kfpu_allowed() &&
|
|
zfs_avx_available() && zfs_aes_available() &&
|
|
zfs_pclmulqdq_available());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
gcm_set_avx(boolean_t val)
|
|
{
|
|
if (gcm_avx_will_work() == B_TRUE) {
|
|
atomic_swap_32(&gcm_use_avx, val);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline boolean_t
|
|
gcm_toggle_avx(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (gcm_avx_will_work() == B_TRUE) {
|
|
return (atomic_toggle_boolean_nv(&GCM_IMPL_USE_AVX));
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (B_FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline size_t
|
|
gcm_simd_get_htab_size(boolean_t simd_mode)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (simd_mode) {
|
|
case B_TRUE:
|
|
return (2 * 6 * 2 * sizeof (uint64_t));
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear sensitive data in the context.
|
|
*
|
|
* ctx->gcm_remainder may contain a plaintext remainder. ctx->gcm_H and
|
|
* ctx->gcm_Htable contain the hash sub key which protects authentication.
|
|
*
|
|
* Although extremely unlikely, ctx->gcm_J0 and ctx->gcm_tmp could be used for
|
|
* a known plaintext attack, they consists of the IV and the first and last
|
|
* counter respectively. If they should be cleared is debatable.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void
|
|
gcm_clear_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
memset(ctx->gcm_remainder, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_remainder));
|
|
memset(ctx->gcm_H, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
|
|
memset(ctx->gcm_J0, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
|
|
memset(ctx->gcm_tmp, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_tmp));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Increment the GCM counter block by n. */
|
|
static inline void
|
|
gcm_incr_counter_block_by(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, int n)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL);
|
|
uint64_t counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask);
|
|
|
|
counter = htonll(counter + n);
|
|
counter &= counter_mask;
|
|
ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt multiple blocks of data in GCM mode.
|
|
* This is done in gcm_avx_chunk_size chunks, utilizing AVX assembler routines
|
|
* if possible. While processing a chunk the FPU is "locked".
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data,
|
|
size_t length, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t bleft = length;
|
|
size_t need = 0;
|
|
size_t done = 0;
|
|
uint8_t *datap = (uint8_t *)data;
|
|
size_t chunk_size = (size_t)GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ;
|
|
const aes_key_t *key = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched);
|
|
uint64_t *ghash = ctx->gcm_ghash;
|
|
uint64_t *cb = ctx->gcm_cb;
|
|
uint8_t *ct_buf = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
|
|
int rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(block_size == GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the last call left an incomplete block, try to fill
|
|
* it first.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
need = block_size - ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
|
|
if (length < need) {
|
|
/* Accumulate bytes here and return. */
|
|
memcpy((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder +
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len, datap, length);
|
|
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len += length;
|
|
if (ctx->gcm_copy_to == NULL) {
|
|
ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap;
|
|
}
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Complete incomplete block. */
|
|
memcpy((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder +
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len, datap, need);
|
|
|
|
ctx->gcm_copy_to = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a buffer to encrypt to if there is enough input. */
|
|
if (bleft >= GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES) {
|
|
ct_buf = vmem_alloc(chunk_size, KM_SLEEP);
|
|
if (ct_buf == NULL) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we completed an incomplete block, encrypt and write it out. */
|
|
if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr,
|
|
(const uint32_t *)cb, (uint32_t *)tmp);
|
|
|
|
gcm_xor_avx((const uint8_t *) ctx->gcm_remainder, tmp);
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, tmp, block_size);
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(tmp, out, block_size);
|
|
out->cd_offset += block_size;
|
|
gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
|
|
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size;
|
|
bleft -= need;
|
|
datap += need;
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do the bulk encryption in chunk_size blocks. */
|
|
for (; bleft >= chunk_size; bleft -= chunk_size) {
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
done = aesni_gcm_encrypt(
|
|
datap, ct_buf, chunk_size, key, cb, ghash);
|
|
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
if (done != chunk_size) {
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
|
|
goto out_nofpu;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(ct_buf, out, chunk_size);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto out_nofpu;
|
|
}
|
|
out->cd_offset += chunk_size;
|
|
datap += chunk_size;
|
|
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += chunk_size;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check if we are already done. */
|
|
if (bleft == 0) {
|
|
goto out_nofpu;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Bulk encrypt the remaining data. */
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
if (bleft >= GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES) {
|
|
done = aesni_gcm_encrypt(datap, ct_buf, bleft, key, cb, ghash);
|
|
if (done == 0) {
|
|
rv = CRYPTO_FAILED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(ct_buf, out, done);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
out->cd_offset += done;
|
|
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += done;
|
|
datap += done;
|
|
bleft -= done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
/* Less than GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES remain, operate on blocks. */
|
|
while (bleft > 0) {
|
|
if (bleft < block_size) {
|
|
memcpy(ctx->gcm_remainder, datap, bleft);
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len = bleft;
|
|
ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Encrypt, hash and write out. */
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr,
|
|
(const uint32_t *)cb, (uint32_t *)tmp);
|
|
|
|
gcm_xor_avx(datap, tmp);
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, tmp, block_size);
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(tmp, out, block_size);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
out->cd_offset += block_size;
|
|
gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
|
|
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size;
|
|
datap += block_size;
|
|
bleft -= block_size;
|
|
}
|
|
out:
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
out_nofpu:
|
|
if (ct_buf != NULL) {
|
|
vmem_free(ct_buf, chunk_size);
|
|
}
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Finalize the encryption: Zero fill, encrypt, hash and write out an eventual
|
|
* incomplete last block. Encrypt the ICB. Calculate the tag and write it out.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
gcm_encrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t *ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash;
|
|
uint32_t *J0 = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_J0;
|
|
uint8_t *remainder = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
|
|
size_t rem_len = ctx->gcm_remainder_len;
|
|
const void *keysched = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched)->encr_ks.ks32;
|
|
int aes_rounds = ((aes_key_t *)keysched)->nr;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(block_size == GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (out->cd_length < (rem_len + ctx->gcm_tag_len)) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
/* Pad last incomplete block with zeros, encrypt and hash. */
|
|
if (rem_len > 0) {
|
|
uint8_t *tmp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
|
|
const uint32_t *cb = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
|
|
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(keysched, aes_rounds, cb, (uint32_t *)tmp);
|
|
memset(remainder + rem_len, 0, block_size - rem_len);
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < rem_len; i++) {
|
|
remainder[i] ^= tmp[i];
|
|
}
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, remainder, block_size);
|
|
ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += rem_len;
|
|
/* No need to increment counter_block, it's the last block. */
|
|
}
|
|
/* Finish tag. */
|
|
ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] =
|
|
htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len));
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, (const uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, block_size);
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(keysched, aes_rounds, J0, J0);
|
|
|
|
gcm_xor_avx((uint8_t *)J0, ghash);
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
|
|
/* Output remainder. */
|
|
if (rem_len > 0) {
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(remainder, out, rem_len);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
out->cd_offset += rem_len;
|
|
ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0;
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(ghash, out, ctx->gcm_tag_len);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
|
|
out->cd_offset += ctx->gcm_tag_len;
|
|
/* Clear sensitive data in the context before returning. */
|
|
gcm_clear_ctx(ctx);
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Finalize decryption: We just have accumulated crypto text, so now we
|
|
* decrypt it here inplace.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
gcm_decrypt_final_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size)
|
|
{
|
|
ASSERT3U(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len, ==, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
|
|
ASSERT3U(block_size, ==, 16);
|
|
|
|
size_t chunk_size = (size_t)GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ;
|
|
size_t pt_len = ctx->gcm_processed_data_len - ctx->gcm_tag_len;
|
|
uint8_t *datap = ctx->gcm_pt_buf;
|
|
const aes_key_t *key = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched);
|
|
uint32_t *cb = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
|
|
uint64_t *ghash = ctx->gcm_ghash;
|
|
uint32_t *tmp = (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
|
|
int rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
size_t bleft, done;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Decrypt in chunks of gcm_avx_chunk_size, which is asserted to be
|
|
* greater or equal than GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES, and a multiple of
|
|
* GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (bleft = pt_len; bleft >= chunk_size; bleft -= chunk_size) {
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
done = aesni_gcm_decrypt(datap, datap, chunk_size,
|
|
(const void *)key, ctx->gcm_cb, ghash);
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
if (done != chunk_size) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
datap += done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decrypt remainder, which is less than chunk size, in one go. */
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
if (bleft >= GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) {
|
|
done = aesni_gcm_decrypt(datap, datap, bleft,
|
|
(const void *)key, ctx->gcm_cb, ghash);
|
|
if (done == 0) {
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
return (CRYPTO_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
datap += done;
|
|
bleft -= done;
|
|
}
|
|
ASSERT(bleft < GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now less than GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES bytes remain,
|
|
* decrypt them block by block.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (bleft > 0) {
|
|
/* Incomplete last block. */
|
|
if (bleft < block_size) {
|
|
uint8_t *lastb = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder;
|
|
|
|
memset(lastb, 0, block_size);
|
|
memcpy(lastb, datap, bleft);
|
|
/* The GCM processing. */
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, lastb, block_size);
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr, cb, tmp);
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < bleft; i++) {
|
|
datap[i] = lastb[i] ^ ((uint8_t *)tmp)[i];
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* The GCM processing. */
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, datap, block_size);
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr, cb, tmp);
|
|
gcm_xor_avx((uint8_t *)tmp, datap);
|
|
gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
|
|
|
|
datap += block_size;
|
|
bleft -= block_size;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decryption done, finish the tag. */
|
|
ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(pt_len));
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, block_size);
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(key->encr_ks.ks32, key->nr, (uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_J0,
|
|
(uint32_t *)ctx->gcm_J0);
|
|
|
|
gcm_xor_avx((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, (uint8_t *)ghash);
|
|
|
|
/* We are done with the FPU, restore its state. */
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
|
|
/* Compare the input authentication tag with what we calculated. */
|
|
if (memcmp(&ctx->gcm_pt_buf[pt_len], ghash, ctx->gcm_tag_len)) {
|
|
/* They don't match. */
|
|
return (CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC);
|
|
}
|
|
rv = crypto_put_output_data(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, out, pt_len);
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
out->cd_offset += pt_len;
|
|
gcm_clear_ctx(ctx);
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize the GCM params H, Htabtle and the counter block. Save the
|
|
* initial counter block.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
gcm_init_avx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
|
|
unsigned char *auth_data, size_t auth_data_len, size_t block_size)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t *cb = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb;
|
|
uint64_t *H = ctx->gcm_H;
|
|
const void *keysched = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched)->encr_ks.ks32;
|
|
int aes_rounds = ((aes_key_t *)ctx->gcm_keysched)->nr;
|
|
uint8_t *datap = auth_data;
|
|
size_t chunk_size = (size_t)GCM_CHUNK_SIZE_READ;
|
|
size_t bleft;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(block_size == GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* Init H (encrypt zero block) and create the initial counter block. */
|
|
memset(ctx->gcm_ghash, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_ghash));
|
|
memset(H, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
aes_encrypt_intel(keysched, aes_rounds,
|
|
(const uint32_t *)H, (uint32_t *)H);
|
|
|
|
gcm_init_htab_avx(ctx->gcm_Htable, H);
|
|
|
|
if (iv_len == 12) {
|
|
memcpy(cb, iv, 12);
|
|
cb[12] = 0;
|
|
cb[13] = 0;
|
|
cb[14] = 0;
|
|
cb[15] = 1;
|
|
/* We need the ICB later. */
|
|
memcpy(ctx->gcm_J0, cb, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Most consumers use 12 byte IVs, so it's OK to use the
|
|
* original routines for other IV sizes, just avoid nesting
|
|
* kfpu_begin calls.
|
|
*/
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
gcm_format_initial_blocks(iv, iv_len, ctx, block_size,
|
|
aes_copy_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Openssl post increments the counter, adjust for that. */
|
|
gcm_incr_counter_block(ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Ghash AAD in chunk_size blocks. */
|
|
for (bleft = auth_data_len; bleft >= chunk_size; bleft -= chunk_size) {
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, datap, chunk_size);
|
|
datap += chunk_size;
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
kfpu_begin();
|
|
}
|
|
/* Ghash the remainder and handle possible incomplete GCM block. */
|
|
if (bleft > 0) {
|
|
size_t incomp = bleft % block_size;
|
|
|
|
bleft -= incomp;
|
|
if (bleft > 0) {
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, datap, bleft);
|
|
datap += bleft;
|
|
}
|
|
if (incomp > 0) {
|
|
/* Zero pad and hash incomplete last block. */
|
|
uint8_t *authp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp;
|
|
|
|
memset(authp, 0, block_size);
|
|
memcpy(authp, datap, incomp);
|
|
GHASH_AVX(ctx, authp, block_size);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
clear_fpu_regs();
|
|
kfpu_end();
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(_KERNEL)
|
|
static int
|
|
icp_gcm_avx_set_chunk_size(const char *buf, zfs_kernel_param_t *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long val;
|
|
char val_rounded[16];
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
error = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
val = (val / GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES) * GCM_AVX_MIN_DECRYPT_BYTES;
|
|
|
|
if (val < GCM_AVX_MIN_ENCRYPT_BYTES || val > GCM_AVX_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE)
|
|
return (-EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(val_rounded, 16, "%u", (uint32_t)val);
|
|
error = param_set_uint(val_rounded, kp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
module_param_call(icp_gcm_avx_chunk_size, icp_gcm_avx_set_chunk_size,
|
|
param_get_uint, &gcm_avx_chunk_size, 0644);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_PARM_DESC(icp_gcm_avx_chunk_size,
|
|
"How many bytes to process while owning the FPU");
|
|
|
|
#endif /* defined(__KERNEL) */
|
|
#endif /* ifdef CAN_USE_GCM_ASM */
|