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e5db313494
Restore the SIMD optimization for 4.19.38 LTS, 4.14.120 LTS, and 5.0 and newer kernels. This is accomplished by leveraging the fact that by definition dedicated kernel threads never need to concern themselves with saving and restoring the user FPU state. Therefore, they may use the FPU as long as we can guarantee user tasks always restore their FPU state before context switching back to user space. For the 5.0 and 5.1 kernels disabling preemption and local interrupts is sufficient to allow the FPU to be used. All non-kernel threads will restore the preserved user FPU state. For 5.2 and latter kernels the user FPU state restoration will be skipped if the kernel determines the registers have not changed. Therefore, for these kernels we need to perform the additional step of saving and restoring the FPU registers. Invalidating the per-cpu global tracking the FPU state would force a restore but that functionality is private to the core x86 FPU implementation and unavailable. In practice, restricting SIMD to kernel threads is not a major restriction for ZFS. The vast majority of SIMD operations are already performed by the IO pipeline. The remaining cases are relatively infrequent and can be handled by the generic code without significant impact. The two most noteworthy cases are: 1) Decrypting the wrapping key for an encrypted dataset, i.e. `zfs load-key`. All other encryption and decryption operations will use the SIMD optimized implementations. 2) Generating the payload checksums for a `zfs send` stream. In order to avoid making any changes to the higher layers of ZFS all of the `*_get_ops()` functions were updated to take in to consideration the calling context. This allows for the fastest implementation to be used as appropriate (see kfpu_allowed()). The only other notable instance of SIMD operations being used outside a kernel thread was at module load time. This code was moved in to a taskq in order to accommodate the new kernel thread restriction. Finally, a few other modifications were made in order to further harden this code and facilitate testing. They include updating each implementations operations structure to be declared as a constant. And allowing "cycle" to be set when selecting the preferred ops in the kernel as well as user space. Reviewed-by: Tony Hutter <hutter2@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #8754 Closes #8793 Closes #8965
1471 lines
40 KiB
C
1471 lines
40 KiB
C
/*
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* CDDL HEADER START
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
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* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
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* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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*
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* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
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* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
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* and limitations under the License.
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*
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* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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*/
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/*
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* AES provider for the Kernel Cryptographic Framework (KCF)
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*/
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#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/spi.h>
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#include <sys/crypto/icp.h>
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#include <modes/modes.h>
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#include <sys/modctl.h>
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#define _AES_IMPL
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#include <aes/aes_impl.h>
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#include <modes/gcm_impl.h>
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#define CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME "aes"
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extern struct mod_ops mod_cryptoops;
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/*
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* Module linkage information for the kernel.
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*/
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static struct modlcrypto modlcrypto = {
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&mod_cryptoops,
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"AES Kernel SW Provider"
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};
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static struct modlinkage modlinkage = {
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MODREV_1, { (void *)&modlcrypto, NULL }
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};
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/*
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* Mechanism info structure passed to KCF during registration.
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*/
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static crypto_mech_info_t aes_mech_info_tab[] = {
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/* AES_ECB */
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{SUN_CKM_AES_ECB, AES_ECB_MECH_INFO_TYPE,
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CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT_ATOMIC,
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AES_MIN_KEY_BYTES, AES_MAX_KEY_BYTES, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BYTES},
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/* AES_CBC */
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{SUN_CKM_AES_CBC, AES_CBC_MECH_INFO_TYPE,
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CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT_ATOMIC,
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AES_MIN_KEY_BYTES, AES_MAX_KEY_BYTES, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BYTES},
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/* AES_CTR */
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{SUN_CKM_AES_CTR, AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE,
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CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT_ATOMIC,
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AES_MIN_KEY_BYTES, AES_MAX_KEY_BYTES, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BYTES},
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/* AES_CCM */
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{SUN_CKM_AES_CCM, AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE,
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CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT_ATOMIC,
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AES_MIN_KEY_BYTES, AES_MAX_KEY_BYTES, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BYTES},
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/* AES_GCM */
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{SUN_CKM_AES_GCM, AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE,
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CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT_ATOMIC,
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AES_MIN_KEY_BYTES, AES_MAX_KEY_BYTES, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BYTES},
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/* AES_GMAC */
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{SUN_CKM_AES_GMAC, AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE,
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CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_ENCRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_FG_DECRYPT_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_MAC | CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_SIGN | CRYPTO_FG_SIGN_ATOMIC |
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CRYPTO_FG_VERIFY | CRYPTO_FG_VERIFY_ATOMIC,
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AES_MIN_KEY_BYTES, AES_MAX_KEY_BYTES, CRYPTO_KEYSIZE_UNIT_IN_BYTES}
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};
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/* operations are in-place if the output buffer is NULL */
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#define AES_ARG_INPLACE(input, output) \
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if ((output) == NULL) \
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(output) = (input);
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static void aes_provider_status(crypto_provider_handle_t, uint_t *);
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static crypto_control_ops_t aes_control_ops = {
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aes_provider_status
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};
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static int aes_encrypt_init(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_mechanism_t *,
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crypto_key_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_decrypt_init(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_mechanism_t *,
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crypto_key_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_common_init(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_mechanism_t *,
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crypto_key_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t, boolean_t);
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static int aes_common_init_ctx(aes_ctx_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t *,
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crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, int, boolean_t);
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static int aes_encrypt_final(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_decrypt_final(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_encrypt(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_encrypt_update(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_encrypt_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t,
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crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_data_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_decrypt(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_decrypt_update(crypto_ctx_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_data_t *, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_decrypt_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t,
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crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_data_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static crypto_cipher_ops_t aes_cipher_ops = {
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.encrypt_init = aes_encrypt_init,
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.encrypt = aes_encrypt,
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.encrypt_update = aes_encrypt_update,
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.encrypt_final = aes_encrypt_final,
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.encrypt_atomic = aes_encrypt_atomic,
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.decrypt_init = aes_decrypt_init,
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.decrypt = aes_decrypt,
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.decrypt_update = aes_decrypt_update,
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.decrypt_final = aes_decrypt_final,
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.decrypt_atomic = aes_decrypt_atomic
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};
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static int aes_mac_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t,
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crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_mac_verify_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t, crypto_session_id_t,
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crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_data_t *, crypto_data_t *,
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crypto_spi_ctx_template_t, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static crypto_mac_ops_t aes_mac_ops = {
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.mac_init = NULL,
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.mac = NULL,
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.mac_update = NULL,
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.mac_final = NULL,
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.mac_atomic = aes_mac_atomic,
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.mac_verify_atomic = aes_mac_verify_atomic
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};
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static int aes_create_ctx_template(crypto_provider_handle_t,
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crypto_mechanism_t *, crypto_key_t *, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t *,
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size_t *, crypto_req_handle_t);
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static int aes_free_context(crypto_ctx_t *);
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static crypto_ctx_ops_t aes_ctx_ops = {
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.create_ctx_template = aes_create_ctx_template,
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.free_context = aes_free_context
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};
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static crypto_ops_t aes_crypto_ops = {{{{{
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&aes_control_ops,
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NULL,
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&aes_cipher_ops,
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&aes_mac_ops,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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&aes_ctx_ops
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}}}}};
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static crypto_provider_info_t aes_prov_info = {{{{
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CRYPTO_SPI_VERSION_1,
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"AES Software Provider",
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CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER,
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NULL,
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&aes_crypto_ops,
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sizeof (aes_mech_info_tab)/sizeof (crypto_mech_info_t),
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aes_mech_info_tab
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}}}};
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static crypto_kcf_provider_handle_t aes_prov_handle = 0;
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static crypto_data_t null_crypto_data = { CRYPTO_DATA_RAW };
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int
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aes_mod_init(void)
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{
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int ret;
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#if defined(_KERNEL)
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/*
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* Determine the fastest available implementation. The benchmarks
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* are run in dedicated kernel threads to allow Linux 5.0+ kernels
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* to use SIMD operations. If for some reason this isn't possible,
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* fallback to the generic implementations. See the comment in
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* include/linux/simd_x86.h for additional details. Additionally,
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* this has the benefit of allowing them to be run in parallel.
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*/
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taskqid_t aes_id = taskq_dispatch(system_taskq, aes_impl_init,
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NULL, TQ_SLEEP);
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taskqid_t gcm_id = taskq_dispatch(system_taskq, gcm_impl_init,
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NULL, TQ_SLEEP);
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if (aes_id != TASKQID_INVALID) {
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taskq_wait_id(system_taskq, aes_id);
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} else {
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aes_impl_init(NULL);
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}
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if (gcm_id != TASKQID_INVALID) {
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taskq_wait_id(system_taskq, gcm_id);
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} else {
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gcm_impl_init(NULL);
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}
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#else
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aes_impl_init(NULL);
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gcm_impl_init(NULL);
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#endif
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if ((ret = mod_install(&modlinkage)) != 0)
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return (ret);
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/* Register with KCF. If the registration fails, remove the module. */
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if (crypto_register_provider(&aes_prov_info, &aes_prov_handle)) {
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(void) mod_remove(&modlinkage);
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return (EACCES);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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int
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aes_mod_fini(void)
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{
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/* Unregister from KCF if module is registered */
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if (aes_prov_handle != 0) {
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if (crypto_unregister_provider(aes_prov_handle))
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return (EBUSY);
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aes_prov_handle = 0;
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}
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return (mod_remove(&modlinkage));
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}
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static int
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aes_check_mech_param(crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, aes_ctx_t **ctx, int kmflag)
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{
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void *p = NULL;
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boolean_t param_required = B_TRUE;
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size_t param_len;
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void *(*alloc_fun)(int);
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int rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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switch (mechanism->cm_type) {
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case AES_ECB_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
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param_required = B_FALSE;
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alloc_fun = ecb_alloc_ctx;
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break;
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case AES_CBC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
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param_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
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alloc_fun = cbc_alloc_ctx;
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break;
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case AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
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param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS);
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alloc_fun = ctr_alloc_ctx;
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break;
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case AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
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param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_CCM_PARAMS);
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alloc_fun = ccm_alloc_ctx;
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break;
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case AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
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param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS);
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alloc_fun = gcm_alloc_ctx;
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break;
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case AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
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param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS);
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alloc_fun = gmac_alloc_ctx;
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break;
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default:
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rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID;
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return (rv);
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}
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if (param_required && mechanism->cm_param != NULL &&
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mechanism->cm_param_len != param_len) {
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rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
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}
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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p = (alloc_fun)(kmflag);
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*ctx = p;
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}
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return (rv);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize key schedules for AES
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*/
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static int
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init_keysched(crypto_key_t *key, void *newbie)
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{
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/*
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* Only keys by value are supported by this module.
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*/
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switch (key->ck_format) {
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case CRYPTO_KEY_RAW:
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if (key->ck_length < AES_MINBITS ||
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key->ck_length > AES_MAXBITS) {
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return (CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE_RANGE);
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}
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/* key length must be either 128, 192, or 256 */
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if ((key->ck_length & 63) != 0)
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return (CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE_RANGE);
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break;
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default:
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return (CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
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}
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aes_init_keysched(key->ck_data, key->ck_length, newbie);
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return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
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}
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/*
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* KCF software provider control entry points.
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*/
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/* ARGSUSED */
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static void
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aes_provider_status(crypto_provider_handle_t provider, uint_t *status)
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{
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*status = CRYPTO_PROVIDER_READY;
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}
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static int
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aes_encrypt_init(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
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crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template,
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crypto_req_handle_t req)
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{
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return (aes_common_init(ctx, mechanism, key, template, req, B_TRUE));
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}
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static int
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aes_decrypt_init(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
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crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template,
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crypto_req_handle_t req)
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{
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return (aes_common_init(ctx, mechanism, key, template, req, B_FALSE));
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}
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/*
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* KCF software provider encrypt entry points.
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*/
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static int
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aes_common_init(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
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crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template,
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crypto_req_handle_t req, boolean_t is_encrypt_init)
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{
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aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
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int rv;
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int kmflag;
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/*
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* Only keys by value are supported by this module.
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*/
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if (key->ck_format != CRYPTO_KEY_RAW) {
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return (CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT);
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}
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kmflag = crypto_kmflag(req);
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if ((rv = aes_check_mech_param(mechanism, &aes_ctx, kmflag))
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!= CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
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return (rv);
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rv = aes_common_init_ctx(aes_ctx, template, mechanism, key, kmflag,
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is_encrypt_init);
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if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
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crypto_free_mode_ctx(aes_ctx);
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return (rv);
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}
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ctx->cc_provider_private = aes_ctx;
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return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
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}
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static void
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aes_copy_block64(uint8_t *in, uint64_t *out)
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{
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if (IS_P2ALIGNED(in, sizeof (uint64_t))) {
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/* LINTED: pointer alignment */
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out[0] = *(uint64_t *)&in[0];
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/* LINTED: pointer alignment */
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out[1] = *(uint64_t *)&in[8];
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} else {
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uint8_t *iv8 = (uint8_t *)&out[0];
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AES_COPY_BLOCK(in, iv8);
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}
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}
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static int
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aes_encrypt(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *plaintext,
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crypto_data_t *ciphertext, crypto_req_handle_t req)
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{
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int ret = CRYPTO_FAILED;
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aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
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size_t saved_length, saved_offset, length_needed;
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ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL);
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aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
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/*
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* For block ciphers, plaintext must be a multiple of AES block size.
|
|
* This test is only valid for ciphers whose blocksize is a power of 2.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (((aes_ctx->ac_flags & (CTR_MODE|CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE))
|
|
== 0) && (plaintext->cd_length & (AES_BLOCK_LEN - 1)) != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
|
|
AES_ARG_INPLACE(plaintext, ciphertext);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to just return the length needed to store the output.
|
|
* We should not destroy the context for the following case.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
case CCM_MODE:
|
|
length_needed = plaintext->cd_length + aes_ctx->ac_mac_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case GCM_MODE:
|
|
length_needed = plaintext->cd_length + aes_ctx->ac_tag_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case GMAC_MODE:
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
length_needed = aes_ctx->ac_tag_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
length_needed = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ciphertext->cd_length < length_needed) {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = length_needed;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_length = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
saved_offset = ciphertext->cd_offset;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an update on the specified input data.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = aes_encrypt_update(ctx, plaintext, ciphertext, req);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For CCM mode, aes_ccm_encrypt_final() will take care of any
|
|
* left-over unprocessed data, and compute the MAC
|
|
*/
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & CCM_MODE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* ccm_encrypt_final() will compute the MAC and append
|
|
* it to existing ciphertext. So, need to adjust the left over
|
|
* length value accordingly
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* order of following 2 lines MUST not be reversed */
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = saved_length - ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
ret = ccm_encrypt_final((ccm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, ciphertext,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (plaintext != ciphertext) {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length =
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
} else if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* gcm_encrypt_final() will compute the MAC and append
|
|
* it to existing ciphertext. So, need to adjust the left over
|
|
* length value accordingly
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* order of following 2 lines MUST not be reversed */
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = saved_length - ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
ret = gcm_encrypt_final((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, ciphertext,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_copy_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (plaintext != ciphertext) {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length =
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
(void) aes_free_context(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_decrypt(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *ciphertext,
|
|
crypto_data_t *plaintext, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = CRYPTO_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
|
|
off_t saved_offset;
|
|
size_t saved_length, length_needed;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL);
|
|
aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For block ciphers, plaintext must be a multiple of AES block size.
|
|
* This test is only valid for ciphers whose blocksize is a power of 2.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (((aes_ctx->ac_flags & (CTR_MODE|CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE))
|
|
== 0) && (ciphertext->cd_length & (AES_BLOCK_LEN - 1)) != 0) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AES_ARG_INPLACE(ciphertext, plaintext);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return length needed to store the output.
|
|
* Do not destroy context when plaintext buffer is too small.
|
|
*
|
|
* CCM: plaintext is MAC len smaller than cipher text
|
|
* GCM: plaintext is TAG len smaller than cipher text
|
|
* GMAC: plaintext length must be zero
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
case CCM_MODE:
|
|
length_needed = aes_ctx->ac_processed_data_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case GCM_MODE:
|
|
length_needed = ciphertext->cd_length - aes_ctx->ac_tag_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case GMAC_MODE:
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
length_needed = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
length_needed = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length < length_needed) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = length_needed;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_offset = plaintext->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an update on the specified input data.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = aes_decrypt_update(ctx, ciphertext, plaintext, req);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & CCM_MODE) {
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_processed_data_len == aes_ctx->ac_data_len);
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_processed_mac_len == aes_ctx->ac_mac_len);
|
|
|
|
/* order of following 2 lines MUST not be reversed */
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length - plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
ret = ccm_decrypt_final((ccm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, plaintext,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_copy_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (plaintext != ciphertext) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
} else if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
/* order of following 2 lines MUST not be reversed */
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length - plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
ret = gcm_decrypt_final((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, plaintext,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (plaintext != ciphertext) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
(void) aes_free_context(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_encrypt_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *plaintext,
|
|
crypto_data_t *ciphertext, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
off_t saved_offset;
|
|
size_t saved_length, out_len;
|
|
int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL);
|
|
aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
|
|
|
|
AES_ARG_INPLACE(plaintext, ciphertext);
|
|
|
|
/* compute number of bytes that will hold the ciphertext */
|
|
out_len = aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len;
|
|
out_len += plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
out_len &= ~(AES_BLOCK_LEN - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* return length needed to store the output */
|
|
if (ciphertext->cd_length < out_len) {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = out_len;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_offset = ciphertext->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do the AES update on the specified input data.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (plaintext->cd_format) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_iov(ctx->cc_provider_private,
|
|
plaintext, ciphertext, aes_encrypt_contiguous_blocks,
|
|
aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_uio(ctx->cc_provider_private,
|
|
plaintext, ciphertext, aes_encrypt_contiguous_blocks,
|
|
aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since AES counter mode is a stream cipher, we call
|
|
* ctr_mode_final() to pick up any remaining bytes.
|
|
* It is an internal function that does not destroy
|
|
* the context like *normal* final routines.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((aes_ctx->ac_flags & CTR_MODE) && (aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len > 0)) {
|
|
ret = ctr_mode_final((ctr_ctx_t *)aes_ctx,
|
|
ciphertext, aes_encrypt_block);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (plaintext != ciphertext)
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length =
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_decrypt_update(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *ciphertext,
|
|
crypto_data_t *plaintext, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
off_t saved_offset;
|
|
size_t saved_length, out_len;
|
|
int ret = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL);
|
|
aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
|
|
|
|
AES_ARG_INPLACE(ciphertext, plaintext);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute number of bytes that will hold the plaintext.
|
|
* This is not necessary for CCM, GCM, and GMAC since these
|
|
* mechanisms never return plaintext for update operations.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((aes_ctx->ac_flags & (CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) == 0) {
|
|
out_len = aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len;
|
|
out_len += ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
out_len &= ~(AES_BLOCK_LEN - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* return length needed to store the output */
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length < out_len) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = out_len;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_offset = plaintext->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE))
|
|
gcm_set_kmflag((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, crypto_kmflag(req));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do the AES update on the specified input data.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (ciphertext->cd_format) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_iov(ctx->cc_provider_private,
|
|
ciphertext, plaintext, aes_decrypt_contiguous_blocks,
|
|
aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_uio(ctx->cc_provider_private,
|
|
ciphertext, plaintext, aes_decrypt_contiguous_blocks,
|
|
aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since AES counter mode is a stream cipher, we call
|
|
* ctr_mode_final() to pick up any remaining bytes.
|
|
* It is an internal function that does not destroy
|
|
* the context like *normal* final routines.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((aes_ctx->ac_flags & CTR_MODE) && (aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len > 0)) {
|
|
ret = ctr_mode_final((ctr_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, plaintext,
|
|
aes_encrypt_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE)
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (ciphertext != plaintext)
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_encrypt_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *data,
|
|
crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL);
|
|
aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
|
|
|
|
if (data->cd_format != CRYPTO_DATA_RAW &&
|
|
data->cd_format != CRYPTO_DATA_UIO) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & CTR_MODE) {
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
ret = ctr_mode_final((ctr_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, data,
|
|
aes_encrypt_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & CCM_MODE) {
|
|
ret = ccm_encrypt_final((ccm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, data,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
size_t saved_offset = data->cd_offset;
|
|
|
|
ret = gcm_encrypt_final((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, data,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_copy_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
data->cd_length = data->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
data->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* There must be no unprocessed plaintext.
|
|
* This happens if the length of the last data is
|
|
* not a multiple of the AES block length.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
}
|
|
data->cd_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(void) aes_free_context(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_decrypt_final(crypto_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *data,
|
|
crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
off_t saved_offset;
|
|
size_t saved_length;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(ctx->cc_provider_private != NULL);
|
|
aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
|
|
|
|
if (data->cd_format != CRYPTO_DATA_RAW &&
|
|
data->cd_format != CRYPTO_DATA_UIO) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* There must be no unprocessed ciphertext.
|
|
* This happens if the length of the last ciphertext is
|
|
* not a multiple of the AES block length.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
if ((aes_ctx->ac_flags & CTR_MODE) == 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
else {
|
|
ret = ctr_mode_final((ctr_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, data,
|
|
aes_encrypt_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE)
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & CCM_MODE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is where all the plaintext is returned, make sure
|
|
* the plaintext buffer is big enough
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t pt_len = aes_ctx->ac_data_len;
|
|
if (data->cd_length < pt_len) {
|
|
data->cd_length = pt_len;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_processed_data_len == pt_len);
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_processed_mac_len == aes_ctx->ac_mac_len);
|
|
saved_offset = data->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = data->cd_length;
|
|
ret = ccm_decrypt_final((ccm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, data,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_copy_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
data->cd_length = data->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
data->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & (GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is where all the plaintext is returned, make sure
|
|
* the plaintext buffer is big enough
|
|
*/
|
|
gcm_ctx_t *ctx = (gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx;
|
|
size_t pt_len = ctx->gcm_processed_data_len - ctx->gcm_tag_len;
|
|
|
|
if (data->cd_length < pt_len) {
|
|
data->cd_length = pt_len;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_offset = data->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = data->cd_length;
|
|
ret = gcm_decrypt_final((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, data,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
data->cd_length = data->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
data->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((aes_ctx->ac_flags & (CTR_MODE|CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) == 0) {
|
|
data->cd_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(void) aes_free_context(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_encrypt_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
|
|
crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
|
|
crypto_key_t *key, crypto_data_t *plaintext, crypto_data_t *ciphertext,
|
|
crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
aes_ctx_t aes_ctx; /* on the stack */
|
|
off_t saved_offset;
|
|
size_t saved_length;
|
|
size_t length_needed;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
AES_ARG_INPLACE(plaintext, ciphertext);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* CTR, CCM, GCM, and GMAC modes do not require that plaintext
|
|
* be a multiple of AES block size.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (mechanism->cm_type) {
|
|
case AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
case AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
case AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
case AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
if ((plaintext->cd_length & (AES_BLOCK_LEN - 1)) != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = aes_check_mech_param(mechanism, NULL, 0)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
bzero(&aes_ctx, sizeof (aes_ctx_t));
|
|
|
|
ret = aes_common_init_ctx(&aes_ctx, template, mechanism, key,
|
|
crypto_kmflag(req), B_TRUE);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
switch (mechanism->cm_type) {
|
|
case AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
length_needed = plaintext->cd_length + aes_ctx.ac_mac_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
/* FALLTHRU */
|
|
case AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
length_needed = plaintext->cd_length + aes_ctx.ac_tag_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
length_needed = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* return size of buffer needed to store output */
|
|
if (ciphertext->cd_length < length_needed) {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = length_needed;
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_offset = ciphertext->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an update on the specified input data.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (plaintext->cd_format) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_iov(&aes_ctx, plaintext, ciphertext,
|
|
aes_encrypt_contiguous_blocks, aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_uio(&aes_ctx, plaintext, ciphertext,
|
|
aes_encrypt_contiguous_blocks, aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_type == AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE) {
|
|
ret = ccm_encrypt_final((ccm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx,
|
|
ciphertext, AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
} else if (mechanism->cm_type == AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_type == AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE) {
|
|
ret = gcm_encrypt_final((gcm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx,
|
|
ciphertext, AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block,
|
|
aes_copy_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
} else if (mechanism->cm_type == AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE) {
|
|
if (aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
ret = ctr_mode_final((ctr_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx,
|
|
ciphertext, aes_encrypt_block);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (plaintext != ciphertext) {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length =
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ciphertext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphertext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (aes_ctx.ac_flags & PROVIDER_OWNS_KEY_SCHEDULE) {
|
|
bzero(aes_ctx.ac_keysched, aes_ctx.ac_keysched_len);
|
|
kmem_free(aes_ctx.ac_keysched, aes_ctx.ac_keysched_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_decrypt_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
|
|
crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
|
|
crypto_key_t *key, crypto_data_t *ciphertext, crypto_data_t *plaintext,
|
|
crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
aes_ctx_t aes_ctx; /* on the stack */
|
|
off_t saved_offset;
|
|
size_t saved_length;
|
|
size_t length_needed;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
AES_ARG_INPLACE(ciphertext, plaintext);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* CCM, GCM, CTR, and GMAC modes do not require that ciphertext
|
|
* be a multiple of AES block size.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (mechanism->cm_type) {
|
|
case AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
case AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
case AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
case AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
if ((ciphertext->cd_length & (AES_BLOCK_LEN - 1)) != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = aes_check_mech_param(mechanism, NULL, 0)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
bzero(&aes_ctx, sizeof (aes_ctx_t));
|
|
|
|
ret = aes_common_init_ctx(&aes_ctx, template, mechanism, key,
|
|
crypto_kmflag(req), B_FALSE);
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
switch (mechanism->cm_type) {
|
|
case AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
length_needed = aes_ctx.ac_data_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
length_needed = ciphertext->cd_length - aes_ctx.ac_tag_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length != 0)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
length_needed = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
length_needed = ciphertext->cd_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* return size of buffer needed to store output */
|
|
if (plaintext->cd_length < length_needed) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = length_needed;
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
saved_offset = plaintext->cd_offset;
|
|
saved_length = plaintext->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_type == AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_type == AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE)
|
|
gcm_set_kmflag((gcm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx, crypto_kmflag(req));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do an update on the specified input data.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (ciphertext->cd_format) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_iov(&aes_ctx, ciphertext, plaintext,
|
|
aes_decrypt_contiguous_blocks, aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO:
|
|
ret = crypto_update_uio(&aes_ctx, ciphertext, plaintext,
|
|
aes_decrypt_contiguous_blocks, aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_type == AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE) {
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_processed_data_len
|
|
== aes_ctx.ac_data_len);
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_processed_mac_len
|
|
== aes_ctx.ac_mac_len);
|
|
ret = ccm_decrypt_final((ccm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx,
|
|
plaintext, AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block,
|
|
aes_copy_block, aes_xor_block);
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
if ((ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) &&
|
|
(ciphertext != plaintext)) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mechanism->cm_type == AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_type == AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE) {
|
|
ret = gcm_decrypt_final((gcm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx,
|
|
plaintext, AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
if ((ret == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) &&
|
|
(ciphertext != plaintext)) {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (mechanism->cm_type != AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE) {
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len == 0);
|
|
if (ciphertext != plaintext)
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (aes_ctx.ac_remainder_len > 0) {
|
|
ret = ctr_mode_final((ctr_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx,
|
|
plaintext, aes_encrypt_block);
|
|
if (ret == CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE)
|
|
ret = CRYPTO_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
|
|
if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ciphertext != plaintext)
|
|
plaintext->cd_length =
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset - saved_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
plaintext->cd_length = saved_length;
|
|
}
|
|
plaintext->cd_offset = saved_offset;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (aes_ctx.ac_flags & PROVIDER_OWNS_KEY_SCHEDULE) {
|
|
bzero(aes_ctx.ac_keysched, aes_ctx.ac_keysched_len);
|
|
kmem_free(aes_ctx.ac_keysched, aes_ctx.ac_keysched_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (aes_ctx.ac_flags & CCM_MODE) {
|
|
if (aes_ctx.ac_pt_buf != NULL) {
|
|
vmem_free(aes_ctx.ac_pt_buf, aes_ctx.ac_data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (aes_ctx.ac_flags & (GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
|
|
if (((gcm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx)->gcm_pt_buf != NULL) {
|
|
vmem_free(((gcm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx)->gcm_pt_buf,
|
|
((gcm_ctx_t *)&aes_ctx)->gcm_pt_buf_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* KCF software provider context template entry points.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_create_ctx_template(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
|
|
crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_key_t *key,
|
|
crypto_spi_ctx_template_t *tmpl, size_t *tmpl_size, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
void *keysched;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_type != AES_ECB_MECH_INFO_TYPE &&
|
|
mechanism->cm_type != AES_CBC_MECH_INFO_TYPE &&
|
|
mechanism->cm_type != AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE &&
|
|
mechanism->cm_type != AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE &&
|
|
mechanism->cm_type != AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE &&
|
|
mechanism->cm_type != AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
if ((keysched = aes_alloc_keysched(&size,
|
|
crypto_kmflag(req))) == NULL) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize key schedule. Key length information is stored
|
|
* in the key.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((rv = init_keysched(key, keysched)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
bzero(keysched, size);
|
|
kmem_free(keysched, size);
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*tmpl = keysched;
|
|
*tmpl_size = size;
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_free_context(crypto_ctx_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx = ctx->cc_provider_private;
|
|
|
|
if (aes_ctx != NULL) {
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & PROVIDER_OWNS_KEY_SCHEDULE) {
|
|
ASSERT(aes_ctx->ac_keysched_len != 0);
|
|
bzero(aes_ctx->ac_keysched, aes_ctx->ac_keysched_len);
|
|
kmem_free(aes_ctx->ac_keysched,
|
|
aes_ctx->ac_keysched_len);
|
|
}
|
|
crypto_free_mode_ctx(aes_ctx);
|
|
ctx->cc_provider_private = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_common_init_ctx(aes_ctx_t *aes_ctx, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t *template,
|
|
crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism, crypto_key_t *key, int kmflag,
|
|
boolean_t is_encrypt_init)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
|
|
void *keysched;
|
|
size_t size = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (template == NULL) {
|
|
if ((keysched = aes_alloc_keysched(&size, kmflag)) == NULL)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize key schedule.
|
|
* Key length is stored in the key.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((rv = init_keysched(key, keysched)) != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
kmem_free(keysched, size);
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aes_ctx->ac_flags |= PROVIDER_OWNS_KEY_SCHEDULE;
|
|
aes_ctx->ac_keysched_len = size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
keysched = template;
|
|
}
|
|
aes_ctx->ac_keysched = keysched;
|
|
|
|
switch (mechanism->cm_type) {
|
|
case AES_CBC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
rv = cbc_init_ctx((cbc_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, mechanism->cm_param,
|
|
mechanism->cm_param_len, AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_copy_block64);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_CTR_MECH_INFO_TYPE: {
|
|
CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS *pp;
|
|
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS)) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
pp = (CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS *)(void *)mechanism->cm_param;
|
|
rv = ctr_init_ctx((ctr_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, pp->ulCounterBits,
|
|
pp->cb, aes_copy_block);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case AES_CCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (CK_AES_CCM_PARAMS)) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
rv = ccm_init_ctx((ccm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, mechanism->cm_param,
|
|
kmflag, is_encrypt_init, AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS)) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
rv = gcm_init_ctx((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, mechanism->cm_param,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_copy_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
if (mechanism->cm_param == NULL ||
|
|
mechanism->cm_param_len != sizeof (CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS)) {
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
}
|
|
rv = gmac_init_ctx((gcm_ctx_t *)aes_ctx, mechanism->cm_param,
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN, aes_encrypt_block, aes_copy_block,
|
|
aes_xor_block);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AES_ECB_MECH_INFO_TYPE:
|
|
aes_ctx->ac_flags |= ECB_MODE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (aes_ctx->ac_flags & PROVIDER_OWNS_KEY_SCHEDULE) {
|
|
bzero(keysched, size);
|
|
kmem_free(keysched, size);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
process_gmac_mech(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data,
|
|
CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *gcm_params)
|
|
{
|
|
/* LINTED: pointer alignment */
|
|
CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS *params = (CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS *)mech->cm_param;
|
|
|
|
if (mech->cm_type != AES_GMAC_MECH_INFO_TYPE)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
if (mech->cm_param_len != sizeof (CK_AES_GMAC_PARAMS))
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
if (params->pIv == NULL)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
gcm_params->pIv = params->pIv;
|
|
gcm_params->ulIvLen = AES_GMAC_IV_LEN;
|
|
gcm_params->ulTagBits = AES_GMAC_TAG_BITS;
|
|
|
|
if (data == NULL)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
if (data->cd_format != CRYPTO_DATA_RAW)
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
gcm_params->pAAD = (uchar_t *)data->cd_raw.iov_base;
|
|
gcm_params->ulAADLen = data->cd_length;
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_mac_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
|
|
crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
|
|
crypto_key_t *key, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *mac,
|
|
crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS gcm_params;
|
|
crypto_mechanism_t gcm_mech;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
if ((rv = process_gmac_mech(mechanism, data, &gcm_params))
|
|
!= CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
|
|
gcm_mech.cm_type = AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE;
|
|
gcm_mech.cm_param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS);
|
|
gcm_mech.cm_param = (char *)&gcm_params;
|
|
|
|
return (aes_encrypt_atomic(provider, session_id, &gcm_mech,
|
|
key, &null_crypto_data, mac, template, req));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
aes_mac_verify_atomic(crypto_provider_handle_t provider,
|
|
crypto_session_id_t session_id, crypto_mechanism_t *mechanism,
|
|
crypto_key_t *key, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_data_t *mac,
|
|
crypto_spi_ctx_template_t template, crypto_req_handle_t req)
|
|
{
|
|
CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS gcm_params;
|
|
crypto_mechanism_t gcm_mech;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
if ((rv = process_gmac_mech(mechanism, data, &gcm_params))
|
|
!= CRYPTO_SUCCESS)
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
|
|
gcm_mech.cm_type = AES_GCM_MECH_INFO_TYPE;
|
|
gcm_mech.cm_param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS);
|
|
gcm_mech.cm_param = (char *)&gcm_params;
|
|
|
|
return (aes_decrypt_atomic(provider, session_id, &gcm_mech,
|
|
key, mac, &null_crypto_data, template, req));
|
|
}
|