diff --git a/COPYRIGHT b/COPYRIGHT index 6d01ffaa7..9b94f927f 100644 --- a/COPYRIGHT +++ b/COPYRIGHT @@ -23,7 +23,17 @@ approved for release under LLNL-CODE-403049. Unless otherwise noted, all files in this distribution are released under the Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL). -Exceptions are noted within the associated source files. See the file -OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE for more information. +Exceptions are noted within the associated source files. A few notable +exceptions and their respective licenses include: + +Skein Checksum Implementation: module/icp/algs/skein/THIRDPARTYLICENSE +AES Implementation: module/icp/asm-x86_64/aes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.gladman +AES Implementation: module/icp/asm-x86_64/aes/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl +PBKDF2 Implementation: lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl + +This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for use +in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/) + +See the file OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE for more information. Refer to the git commit log for authoritative copyright attribution. diff --git a/cmd/zfs/zfs_main.c b/cmd/zfs/zfs_main.c index ef131f9b5..b9b53f22b 100644 --- a/cmd/zfs/zfs_main.c +++ b/cmd/zfs/zfs_main.c @@ -7267,28 +7267,27 @@ zfs_do_change_key(int argc, char **argv) keystatus = zfs_prop_get_int(zhp, ZFS_PROP_KEYSTATUS); if (keystatus != ZFS_KEYSTATUS_AVAILABLE) { ret = zfs_crypto_load_key(zhp, B_FALSE, NULL); - if (ret != 0) - goto error; + if (ret != 0) { + nvlist_free(props); + zfs_close(zhp); + return (-1); + } } - /* refresh the properties so the new keystatus is visable */ + /* refresh the properties so the new keystatus is visible */ zfs_refresh_properties(zhp); } ret = zfs_crypto_rewrap(zhp, props, inheritkey); - if (ret != 0) - goto error; + if (ret != 0) { + nvlist_free(props); + zfs_close(zhp); + return (-1); + } nvlist_free(props); zfs_close(zhp); return (0); - -error: - if (props != NULL) - nvlist_free(props); - if (zhp != NULL) - zfs_close(zhp); - return (-1); } int diff --git a/cmd/zpool/zpool_main.c b/cmd/zpool/zpool_main.c index 3ffd13c8e..c61639cc2 100644 --- a/cmd/zpool/zpool_main.c +++ b/cmd/zpool/zpool_main.c @@ -8049,10 +8049,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) * 'freeze' is a vile debugging abomination, so we treat * it as such. */ - char buf[16384]; - int fd = open(ZFS_DEV, O_RDWR); - (void) strlcpy((void *)buf, argv[2], sizeof (buf)); - return (!!ioctl(fd, ZFS_IOC_POOL_FREEZE, buf)); + zfs_cmd_t zc = {"\0"}; + + (void) strlcpy(zc.zc_name, argv[2], sizeof (zc.zc_name)); + ret = zfs_ioctl(g_zfs, ZFS_IOC_POOL_FREEZE, &zc); + if (ret != 0) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + gettext("failed to freeze pool: %d\n"), errno); + ret = 1; + } + + log_history = 0; } else { (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("unrecognized " "command '%s'\n"), cmdname); diff --git a/cmd/ztest/ztest.c b/cmd/ztest/ztest.c index 5aa0c85f3..248d04fc4 100644 --- a/cmd/ztest/ztest.c +++ b/cmd/ztest/ztest.c @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ extern int zfs_abd_scatter_enabled; static ztest_shared_opts_t *ztest_shared_opts; static ztest_shared_opts_t ztest_opts; +static char *ztest_wkeydata = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345"; typedef struct ztest_shared_ds { uint64_t zd_seq; @@ -1180,6 +1181,42 @@ ztest_spa_prop_set_uint64(zpool_prop_t prop, uint64_t value) return (error); } +static int +ztest_dmu_objset_own(const char *name, dmu_objset_type_t type, + boolean_t readonly, boolean_t decrypt, void *tag, objset_t **osp) +{ + int err; + + err = dmu_objset_own(name, type, readonly, decrypt, tag, osp); + if (decrypt && err == EACCES) { + char ddname[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN]; + dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp; + nvlist_t *crypto_args = fnvlist_alloc(); + char *cp = NULL; + + /* spa_keystore_load_wkey() expects a dsl dir name */ + strcpy(ddname, name); + cp = strchr(ddname, '@'); + if (cp != NULL) + *cp = '\0'; + + fnvlist_add_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata", + (uint8_t *)ztest_wkeydata, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); + VERIFY0(dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(DCP_CMD_NONE, NULL, + crypto_args, &dcp)); + err = spa_keystore_load_wkey(ddname, dcp, B_FALSE); + dsl_crypto_params_free(dcp, B_FALSE); + fnvlist_free(crypto_args); + + if (err != 0) + return (err); + + err = dmu_objset_own(name, type, readonly, decrypt, tag, osp); + } + + return (err); +} + /* * Object and range lock mechanics @@ -1921,7 +1958,7 @@ ztest_replay_write(ztest_ds_t *zd, lr_write_t *lr, boolean_t byteswap) dmu_write(os, lr->lr_foid, offset, length, data, tx); } else { bcopy(data, abuf->b_data, length); - dmu_assign_arcbuf(db, offset, abuf, tx); + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf(db, offset, abuf, tx); } (void) ztest_log_write(zd, tx, lr); @@ -3532,11 +3569,57 @@ ztest_objset_create_cb(objset_t *os, void *arg, cred_t *cr, dmu_tx_t *tx) static int ztest_dataset_create(char *dsname) { - uint64_t zilset = ztest_random(100); - int err = dmu_objset_create(dsname, DMU_OST_OTHER, 0, NULL, - ztest_objset_create_cb, NULL); + int err; + uint64_t rand; + dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = NULL; - if (err || zilset < 80) + /* + * 50% of the time, we create encrypted datasets + * using a random cipher suite and a hard-coded + * wrapping key. + */ + rand = ztest_random(2); + if (rand != 0) { + nvlist_t *crypto_args = fnvlist_alloc(); + nvlist_t *props = fnvlist_alloc(); + + /* slight bias towards the default cipher suite */ + rand = ztest_random(ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS); + if (rand < ZIO_CRYPT_AES_128_CCM) + rand = ZIO_CRYPT_ON; + + fnvlist_add_uint64(props, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION), rand); + fnvlist_add_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata", + (uint8_t *)ztest_wkeydata, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); + + /* + * These parameters aren't really used by the kernel. They + * are simply stored so that userspace knows how to load + * the wrapping key. + */ + fnvlist_add_uint64(props, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), ZFS_KEYFORMAT_RAW); + fnvlist_add_string(props, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), "prompt"); + fnvlist_add_uint64(props, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 0ULL); + fnvlist_add_uint64(props, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 0ULL); + + VERIFY0(dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(DCP_CMD_NONE, props, + crypto_args, &dcp)); + + fnvlist_free(crypto_args); + fnvlist_free(props); + } + + err = dmu_objset_create(dsname, DMU_OST_OTHER, 0, dcp, + ztest_objset_create_cb, NULL); + dsl_crypto_params_free(dcp, !!err); + + rand = ztest_random(100); + if (err || rand < 80) return (err); if (ztest_opts.zo_verbose >= 5) @@ -3556,7 +3639,8 @@ ztest_objset_destroy_cb(const char *name, void *arg) /* * Verify that the dataset contains a directory object. */ - VERIFY0(dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_TRUE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os)); + VERIFY0(ztest_dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_TRUE, + B_TRUE, FTAG, &os)); error = dmu_object_info(os, ZTEST_DIROBJ, &doi); if (error != ENOENT) { /* We could have crashed in the middle of destroying it */ @@ -3640,11 +3724,12 @@ ztest_dmu_objset_create_destroy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) * (invoked from ztest_objset_destroy_cb()) should just throw it away. */ if (ztest_random(2) == 0 && - dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, + ztest_dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os) == 0) { ztest_zd_init(zdtmp, NULL, os); zil_replay(os, zdtmp, ztest_replay_vector); ztest_zd_fini(zdtmp); + txg_wait_synced(dmu_objset_pool(os), 0); dmu_objset_disown(os, B_TRUE, FTAG); } @@ -3659,8 +3744,8 @@ ztest_dmu_objset_create_destroy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) /* * Verify that the destroyed dataset is no longer in the namespace. */ - VERIFY3U(ENOENT, ==, dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_TRUE, B_TRUE, - FTAG, &os)); + VERIFY3U(ENOENT, ==, ztest_dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_TRUE, + B_TRUE, FTAG, &os)); /* * Verify that we can create a new dataset. @@ -3674,7 +3759,7 @@ ztest_dmu_objset_create_destroy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) fatal(0, "dmu_objset_create(%s) = %d", name, error); } - VERIFY0(dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, B_TRUE, + VERIFY0(ztest_dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os)); ztest_zd_init(zdtmp, NULL, os); @@ -3710,10 +3795,11 @@ ztest_dmu_objset_create_destroy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) /* * Verify that we cannot own an objset that is already owned. */ - VERIFY3U(EBUSY, ==, - dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os2)); + VERIFY3U(EBUSY, ==, ztest_dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, + B_FALSE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os2)); zil_close(zilog); + txg_wait_synced(spa_get_dsl(os->os_spa), 0); dmu_objset_disown(os, B_TRUE, FTAG); ztest_zd_fini(zdtmp); out: @@ -3868,7 +3954,7 @@ ztest_dsl_dataset_promote_busy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) fatal(0, "dmu_objset_create(%s) = %d", clone2name, error); } - error = dmu_objset_own(snap2name, DMU_OST_ANY, B_TRUE, B_TRUE, + error = ztest_dmu_objset_own(snap2name, DMU_OST_ANY, B_TRUE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os); if (error) fatal(0, "dmu_objset_own(%s) = %d", snap2name, error); @@ -4260,7 +4346,7 @@ ztest_dmu_read_write_zcopy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) * bigobj, at the tail of the nth chunk * * The chunk size is set equal to bigobj block size so that - * dmu_assign_arcbuf() can be tested for object updates. + * dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf() can be tested for object updates. */ /* @@ -4322,7 +4408,7 @@ ztest_dmu_read_write_zcopy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) /* * In iteration 5 (i == 5) use arcbufs * that don't match bigobj blksz to test - * dmu_assign_arcbuf() when it can't directly + * dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf() when it can't directly * assign an arcbuf to a dbuf. */ for (j = 0; j < s; j++) { @@ -4368,8 +4454,8 @@ ztest_dmu_read_write_zcopy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) /* * 50% of the time don't read objects in the 1st iteration to - * test dmu_assign_arcbuf() for the case when there're no - * existing dbufs for the specified offsets. + * test dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf() for the case when there are + * no existing dbufs for the specified offsets. */ if (i != 0 || ztest_random(2) != 0) { error = dmu_read(os, packobj, packoff, @@ -4414,12 +4500,12 @@ ztest_dmu_read_write_zcopy(ztest_ds_t *zd, uint64_t id) FTAG, &dbt, DMU_READ_NO_PREFETCH) == 0); } if (i != 5 || chunksize < (SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE * 2)) { - dmu_assign_arcbuf(bonus_db, off, + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf(bonus_db, off, bigbuf_arcbufs[j], tx); } else { - dmu_assign_arcbuf(bonus_db, off, + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf(bonus_db, off, bigbuf_arcbufs[2 * j], tx); - dmu_assign_arcbuf(bonus_db, + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf(bonus_db, off + chunksize / 2, bigbuf_arcbufs[2 * j + 1], tx); } @@ -6262,7 +6348,8 @@ ztest_dataset_open(int d) } ASSERT(error == 0 || error == EEXIST); - VERIFY0(dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, B_TRUE, zd, &os)); + VERIFY0(ztest_dmu_objset_own(name, DMU_OST_OTHER, B_FALSE, + B_TRUE, zd, &os)); (void) rw_unlock(&ztest_name_lock); ztest_zd_init(zd, ZTEST_GET_SHARED_DS(d), os); @@ -6303,6 +6390,7 @@ ztest_dataset_close(int d) ztest_ds_t *zd = &ztest_ds[d]; zil_close(zd->zd_zilog); + txg_wait_synced(spa_get_dsl(zd->zd_os->os_spa), 0); dmu_objset_disown(zd->zd_os, B_TRUE, zd); ztest_zd_fini(zd); @@ -6355,7 +6443,7 @@ ztest_run(ztest_shared_t *zs) ztest_spa = spa; dmu_objset_stats_t dds; - VERIFY0(dmu_objset_own(ztest_opts.zo_pool, + VERIFY0(ztest_dmu_objset_own(ztest_opts.zo_pool, DMU_OST_ANY, B_TRUE, B_TRUE, FTAG, &os)); dsl_pool_config_enter(dmu_objset_pool(os), FTAG); dmu_objset_fast_stat(os, &dds); @@ -6582,11 +6670,10 @@ ztest_freeze(void) VERIFY3U(0, ==, spa_open(ztest_opts.zo_pool, &spa, FTAG)); ASSERT(spa_freeze_txg(spa) == UINT64_MAX); VERIFY3U(0, ==, ztest_dataset_open(0)); - ztest_dataset_close(0); - spa->spa_debug = B_TRUE; ztest_spa = spa; txg_wait_synced(spa_get_dsl(spa), 0); + ztest_dataset_close(0); ztest_reguid(NULL, 0); spa_close(spa, FTAG); diff --git a/config/user-libssl.m4 b/config/user-libssl.m4 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b65a51400 --- /dev/null +++ b/config/user-libssl.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +dnl # +dnl # Check for libssl. Used for userspace password derivation via PBKDF2. +dnl # +AC_DEFUN([ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_LIBSSL], [ + LIBSSL= + + AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/evp.h], [], [AC_MSG_FAILURE([ + *** evp.h missing, libssl-devel package required])]) + + AC_SUBST([LIBSSL], ["-lssl -lcrypto"]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBSSL], 1, [Define if you have libssl]) +]) diff --git a/config/user.m4 b/config/user.m4 index 21ff7143a..73f6433a2 100644 --- a/config/user.m4 +++ b/config/user.m4 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER], [ ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_LIBBLKID ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_LIBATTR ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_LIBUDEV + ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_LIBSSL ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_FRAME_LARGER_THAN ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_RUNSTATEDIR ZFS_AC_CONFIG_USER_MAKEDEV_IN_SYSMACROS diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 8d1a8c9f1..6dff03092 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([ tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/grow_pool/Makefile tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/grow_replicas/Makefile tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/history/Makefile + tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/Makefile tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/inheritance/Makefile tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/inuse/Makefile tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/large_files/Makefile diff --git a/contrib/dracut/90zfs/module-setup.sh.in b/contrib/dracut/90zfs/module-setup.sh.in index 71c81639b..0f85c2a25 100755 --- a/contrib/dracut/90zfs/module-setup.sh.in +++ b/contrib/dracut/90zfs/module-setup.sh.in @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ installkernel() { instmods znvpair instmods zavl instmods zunicode + instmods icp instmods spl instmods zlib_deflate instmods zlib_inflate diff --git a/include/sys/Makefile.am b/include/sys/Makefile.am index 22b647a1e..d3835ca29 100644 --- a/include/sys/Makefile.am +++ b/include/sys/Makefile.am @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ COMMON_H = \ $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/dsl_userhold.h \ $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/edonr.h \ $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/efi_partition.h \ + $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/hkdf.h \ $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/metaslab.h \ $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/metaslab_impl.h \ $(top_srcdir)/include/sys/mmp.h \ diff --git a/include/sys/arc_impl.h b/include/sys/arc_impl.h index 361468583..e39cf6a8f 100644 --- a/include/sys/arc_impl.h +++ b/include/sys/arc_impl.h @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct arc_callback { boolean_t acb_encrypted; boolean_t acb_compressed; boolean_t acb_noauth; + uint64_t acb_dsobj; zio_t *acb_zio_dummy; arc_callback_t *acb_next; }; diff --git a/include/sys/dmu.h b/include/sys/dmu.h index 60778289e..8a9291900 100644 --- a/include/sys/dmu.h +++ b/include/sys/dmu.h @@ -759,10 +759,13 @@ void dmu_tx_callback_register(dmu_tx_t *tx, dmu_tx_callback_func_t *dcb_func, * -1, the range from offset to end-of-file is freed. */ int dmu_free_range(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset, - uint64_t size, dmu_tx_t *tx); + uint64_t size, dmu_tx_t *tx); int dmu_free_long_range(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset, - uint64_t size); + uint64_t size); +int dmu_free_long_range_raw(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset, + uint64_t size); int dmu_free_long_object(objset_t *os, uint64_t object); +int dmu_free_long_object_raw(objset_t *os, uint64_t object); /* * Convenience functions. @@ -797,10 +800,11 @@ int dmu_write_uio_dnode(dnode_t *dn, struct uio *uio, uint64_t size, #endif struct arc_buf *dmu_request_arcbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, int size); void dmu_return_arcbuf(struct arc_buf *buf); -void dmu_assign_arcbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, uint64_t offset, struct arc_buf *buf, - dmu_tx_t *tx); -void dmu_assign_arcbuf_impl(dmu_buf_t *handle, struct arc_buf *buf, - dmu_tx_t *tx); +void dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dnode(dnode_t *dn, uint64_t offset, + struct arc_buf *buf, dmu_tx_t *tx); +void dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, uint64_t offset, + struct arc_buf *buf, dmu_tx_t *tx); +#define dmu_assign_arcbuf dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf void dmu_convert_to_raw(dmu_buf_t *handle, boolean_t byteorder, const uint8_t *salt, const uint8_t *iv, const uint8_t *mac, dmu_tx_t *tx); void dmu_copy_from_buf(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset, diff --git a/include/sys/hkdf.h b/include/sys/hkdf.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e0f7678c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/sys/hkdf.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. + * You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version + * 1.0 of the CDDL. + * + * A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this + * source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at + * http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _SYS_HKDF_H_ +#define _SYS_HKDF_H_ + +#include + +int hkdf_sha512(uint8_t *key_material, uint_t km_len, uint8_t *salt, + uint_t salt_len, uint8_t *info, uint_t info_len, uint8_t *output_key, + uint_t out_len); + +#endif /* _SYS_HKDF_H_ */ diff --git a/include/sys/zio_crypt.h b/include/sys/zio_crypt.h index 9ddfe4280..9cf9a17c2 100644 --- a/include/sys/zio_crypt.h +++ b/include/sys/zio_crypt.h @@ -32,18 +32,9 @@ struct zbookmark_phys; #define WRAPPING_KEY_LEN 32 #define WRAPPING_IV_LEN ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN -#define WRAPPING_MAC_LEN 16 - -#define SHA1_DIGEST_LEN 20 -#define SHA512_DIGEST_LEN 64 -#define SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN 64 - +#define WRAPPING_MAC_LEN ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN #define MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN 32 -#define L2ARC_DEFAULT_CRYPT ZIO_CRYPT_AES_256_CCM - -/* utility macros */ -#define BITS_TO_BYTES(x) ((x + NBBY - 1) / NBBY) -#define BYTES_TO_BITS(x) (x * NBBY) +#define SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN 64 typedef enum zio_crypt_type { ZC_TYPE_NONE = 0, @@ -133,7 +124,7 @@ int zio_crypt_do_indirect_mac_checksum(boolean_t generate, void *buf, int zio_crypt_do_indirect_mac_checksum_abd(boolean_t generate, abd_t *abd, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap, uint8_t *cksum); int zio_crypt_do_hmac(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint_t datalen, - uint8_t *digestbuf); + uint8_t *digestbuf, uint_t digestlen); int zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(zio_crypt_key_t *key, void *data, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap, uint8_t *portable_mac, uint8_t *local_mac); int zio_do_crypt_data(boolean_t encrypt, zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *salt, diff --git a/lib/libzfs/Makefile.am b/lib/libzfs/Makefile.am index 7389f002d..e5b2ce765 100644 --- a/lib/libzfs/Makefile.am +++ b/lib/libzfs/Makefile.am @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ USER_C = \ libzfs_util.c KERNEL_C = \ + algs/sha2/sha2.c \ zfeature_common.c \ zfs_comutil.c \ zfs_deleg.c \ @@ -52,15 +53,13 @@ nodist_libzfs_la_SOURCES = \ libzfs_la_LIBADD = \ $(top_builddir)/lib/libefi/libefi.la \ - $(top_builddir)/lib/libicp/libicp.la \ $(top_builddir)/lib/libnvpair/libnvpair.la \ $(top_builddir)/lib/libshare/libshare.la \ $(top_builddir)/lib/libtpool/libtpool.la \ $(top_builddir)/lib/libuutil/libuutil.la \ - $(top_builddir)/lib/libzpool/libzpool.la \ $(top_builddir)/lib/libzfs_core/libzfs_core.la -libzfs_la_LIBADD += -lm $(LIBBLKID) $(LIBUDEV) +libzfs_la_LIBADD += -lm $(LIBBLKID) $(LIBUDEV) $(LIBSSL) libzfs_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 2:0:0 EXTRA_DIST = $(libzfs_pc_DATA) $(USER_C) diff --git a/lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl b/lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a2c4adcbe --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ + + LICENSE ISSUES + ============== + + The OpenSSL toolkit stays under a dual license, i.e. both the conditions of + the OpenSSL License and the original SSLeay license apply to the toolkit. + See below for the actual license texts. Actually both licenses are BSD-style + Open Source licenses. In case of any license issues related to OpenSSL + please contact openssl-core@openssl.org. + + OpenSSL License + --------------- + +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + + Original SSLeay License + ----------------------- + +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + diff --git a/lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip b/lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a9125ea21 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libzfs/THIRDPARTYLICENSE.openssl.descrip @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +PBKDF2 IMPLEMENTATION diff --git a/lib/libzfs/libzfs_crypto.c b/lib/libzfs/libzfs_crypto.c index 8bd788074..b1fac2f62 100644 --- a/lib/libzfs/libzfs_crypto.c +++ b/lib/libzfs/libzfs_crypto.c @@ -20,11 +20,11 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include "libzfs_impl.h" #include "zfeature_common.h" @@ -437,139 +437,6 @@ error: return (ret); } -static int -pbkdf2(uint8_t *passphrase, size_t passphraselen, uint8_t *salt, - size_t saltlen, uint64_t iterations, uint8_t *output, - size_t outputlen) -{ - int ret; - uint64_t iter; - uint32_t blockptr, i; - uint16_t hmac_key_len; - uint8_t *hmac_key; - uint8_t block[SHA1_DIGEST_LEN * 2]; - uint8_t *hmacresult = block + SHA1_DIGEST_LEN; - crypto_mechanism_t mech; - crypto_key_t key; - crypto_data_t in_data, out_data; - crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl = NULL; - - /* initialize output */ - memset(output, 0, outputlen); - - /* initialize icp for use */ - icp_init(); - - /* HMAC key size is max(sizeof(uint32_t) + salt len, sha 256 len) */ - if (saltlen > SHA1_DIGEST_LEN) { - hmac_key_len = saltlen + sizeof (uint32_t); - } else { - hmac_key_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LEN; - } - - hmac_key = calloc(hmac_key_len, 1); - if (!hmac_key) { - ret = ENOMEM; - goto error; - } - - /* initialize sha 256 hmac mechanism */ - mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA1_HMAC); - mech.cm_param = NULL; - mech.cm_param_len = 0; - - /* initialize passphrase as a crypto key */ - key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; - key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(passphraselen); - key.ck_data = passphrase; - - /* - * initialize crypto data for the input data. length will change - * after the first iteration, so we will initialize it in the loop. - */ - in_data.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - in_data.cd_offset = 0; - in_data.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)hmac_key; - - /* initialize crypto data for the output data */ - out_data.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - out_data.cd_offset = 0; - out_data.cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LEN; - out_data.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)hmacresult; - out_data.cd_raw.iov_len = out_data.cd_length; - - /* initialize the context template */ - ret = crypto_create_ctx_template(&mech, &key, &tmpl, KM_SLEEP); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = EIO; - goto error; - } - - /* main loop */ - for (blockptr = 0; blockptr < outputlen; blockptr += SHA1_DIGEST_LEN) { - - /* - * for the first iteration, the HMAC key is the user-provided - * salt concatenated with the block index (1-indexed) - */ - i = htobe32(1 + (blockptr / SHA1_DIGEST_LEN)); - memmove(hmac_key, salt, saltlen); - memmove(hmac_key + saltlen, (uint8_t *)(&i), sizeof (uint32_t)); - - /* block initializes to zeroes (no XOR) */ - memset(block, 0, SHA1_DIGEST_LEN); - - for (iter = 0; iter < iterations; iter++) { - if (iter > 0) { - in_data.cd_length = SHA1_DIGEST_LEN; - in_data.cd_raw.iov_len = in_data.cd_length; - } else { - in_data.cd_length = saltlen + sizeof (uint32_t); - in_data.cd_raw.iov_len = in_data.cd_length; - } - - ret = crypto_mac(&mech, &in_data, &key, tmpl, - &out_data, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = EIO; - goto error; - } - - /* HMAC key now becomes the output of this iteration */ - memmove(hmac_key, hmacresult, SHA1_DIGEST_LEN); - - /* XOR this iteration's result with the current block */ - for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LEN; i++) { - block[i] ^= hmacresult[i]; - } - } - - /* - * compute length of this block, make sure we don't write - * beyond the end of the output, truncating if necessary - */ - if (blockptr + SHA1_DIGEST_LEN > outputlen) { - memmove(output + blockptr, block, outputlen - blockptr); - } else { - memmove(output + blockptr, block, SHA1_DIGEST_LEN); - } - } - - crypto_destroy_ctx_template(tmpl); - free(hmac_key); - icp_fini(); - - return (0); - -error: - crypto_destroy_ctx_template(tmpl); - if (hmac_key != NULL) - free(hmac_key); - icp_fini(); - - return (ret); -} - static int derive_key(libzfs_handle_t *hdl, zfs_keyformat_t format, uint64_t iters, uint8_t *key_material, size_t key_material_len, uint64_t salt, @@ -599,10 +466,12 @@ derive_key(libzfs_handle_t *hdl, zfs_keyformat_t format, uint64_t iters, break; case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE: salt = LE_64(salt); - ret = pbkdf2(key_material, strlen((char *)key_material), - ((uint8_t *)&salt), sizeof (uint64_t), iters, - key, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); - if (ret != 0) { + + ret = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1((char *)key_material, + strlen((char *)key_material), ((uint8_t *)&salt), + sizeof (uint64_t), iters, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN, key); + if (ret != 1) { + ret = EIO; zfs_error_aux(hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Failed to generate key from passphrase.")); goto error; @@ -1207,9 +1076,13 @@ try_again: ret = lzc_load_key(zhp->zfs_name, noop, key_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); if (ret != 0) { switch (ret) { + case EPERM: + zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, + "Permission denied.")); + break; case EINVAL: zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, - "Invalid parameters provided for %s."), + "Invalid parameters provided for dataset %s."), zfs_get_name(zhp)); break; case EEXIST: @@ -1318,6 +1191,10 @@ zfs_crypto_unload_key(zfs_handle_t *zhp) if (ret != 0) { switch (ret) { + case EPERM: + zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, + "Permission denied.")); + break; case ENOENT: zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Key already unloaded for '%s'."), @@ -1375,8 +1252,10 @@ zfs_crypto_verify_rewrap_nvlist(zfs_handle_t *zhp, nvlist_t *props, new_props = zfs_valid_proplist(zhp->zfs_hdl, zhp->zfs_type, props, zfs_prop_get_int(zhp, ZFS_PROP_ZONED), NULL, zhp->zpool_hdl, B_TRUE, errbuf); - if (new_props == NULL) + if (new_props == NULL) { + ret = EINVAL; goto error; + } *props_out = new_props; return (0); @@ -1475,6 +1354,13 @@ zfs_crypto_rewrap(zfs_handle_t *zhp, nvlist_t *raw_props, boolean_t inheritkey) ret = nvlist_add_uint64(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), keyformat); + if (ret != 0) { + zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, + dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Failed to " + "get existing keyformat " + "property.")); + goto error; + } } if (keylocation == NULL) { @@ -1578,6 +1464,10 @@ zfs_crypto_rewrap(zfs_handle_t *zhp, nvlist_t *raw_props, boolean_t inheritkey) ret = lzc_change_key(zhp->zfs_name, cmd, props, wkeydata, wkeylen); if (ret != 0) { switch (ret) { + case EPERM: + zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, + "Permission denied.")); + break; case EINVAL: zfs_error_aux(zhp->zfs_hdl, dgettext(TEXT_DOMAIN, "Invalid properties for key change.")); diff --git a/lib/libzfs/libzfs_sendrecv.c b/lib/libzfs/libzfs_sendrecv.c index 855a297c9..934da54e1 100644 --- a/lib/libzfs/libzfs_sendrecv.c +++ b/lib/libzfs/libzfs_sendrecv.c @@ -2657,6 +2657,13 @@ recv_fix_encryption_heirarchy(libzfs_handle_t *hdl, const char *destname, int err; nvpair_t *fselem = NULL; nvlist_t *stream_fss; + char *cp; + char top_zfs[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN]; + + (void) strcpy(top_zfs, destname); + cp = strrchr(top_zfs, '@'); + if (cp != NULL) + *cp = '\0'; VERIFY(0 == nvlist_lookup_nvlist(stream_nv, "fss", &stream_fss)); @@ -2758,9 +2765,11 @@ recv_fix_encryption_heirarchy(libzfs_handle_t *hdl, const char *destname, /* * If the dataset is not flagged as an encryption root and is * currently an encryption root, force it to inherit from its - * parent. + * parent. The root of a raw send should never be + * force-inherited. */ - if (!stream_encroot && is_encroot) { + if (!stream_encroot && is_encroot && + strcmp(top_zfs, fsname) != 0) { err = lzc_change_key(fsname, DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT, NULL, NULL, 0); if (err != 0) { diff --git a/lib/libzpool/Makefile.am b/lib/libzpool/Makefile.am index 133f1539a..95e249342 100644 --- a/lib/libzpool/Makefile.am +++ b/lib/libzpool/Makefile.am @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ KERNEL_C = \ dsl_destroy.c \ dsl_userhold.c \ edonr_zfs.c \ + hkdf.c \ fm.c \ gzip.c \ lzjb.c \ diff --git a/man/man8/zfs.8 b/man/man8/zfs.8 index 5b8f251d1..27c750d7e 100644 --- a/man/man8/zfs.8 +++ b/man/man8/zfs.8 @@ -2179,18 +2179,31 @@ and .Sy pbkdf2iters . After entering an encryption key, the created dataset will become an encryption root. Any descendant datasets will -inherit their encryption key from the encryption root, meaning that loading, -unloading, or changing the key for the encryption root will implicitly do the -same for all inheriting datasets. If this inheritence is not desired, simply -supply a new -.Sy encryption -and +inherit their encryption key from the encryption root by default, meaning that +loading, unloading, or changing the key for the encryption root will implicitly +do the same for all inheriting datasets. If this inheritance is not desired, +simply supply a .Sy keyformat when creating the child dataset or use .Nm zfs Cm change-key -to break the relationship. The one exception is that clones will always use -their origin's encryption key. Encryption root inheritence can be tracked via -the read-only +to break an existing relationship, creating a new encryption root on the child. +Note that the child's +.Sy keyformat +may match that of the parent while still creating a new encryption root, and +that changing the +.Sy encryption +property alone does not create a new encryption root; this would simply use a +different cipher suite with the same key as its encryption root. The one +exception is that clones will always use their origin's encryption key. +As a result of this exception, some encryption-related properties (namely +.Sy keystatus , +.Sy keyformat , +.Sy keylocation , +and +.Sy pbkdf2iters ) +do not inherit like other ZFS properties and instead use the value determined +by their encryption root. Encryption root inheritance can be tracked via the +read-only .Sy encryptionroot property. .Pp @@ -3165,7 +3178,10 @@ feature enabled. If the .Sy lz4_compress feature is active on the sending system, then the receiving system must have -that feature enabled as well. +that feature enabled as well. Datasets that are sent with this flag may not be +received as an encrypted dataset, since encrypted datasets cannot use the +.Sy embedded_data +feature. See .Xr zpool-features 5 for details on ZFS feature flags and the @@ -3248,7 +3264,10 @@ Include the dataset's properties in the stream. This flag is implicit when .Fl R is specified. -The receiving system must also support this feature. +The receiving system must also support this feature. Sends of encrypted datasets +must use +.Fl w +when using this flag. .It Fl v, -verbose Print verbose information about the stream package generated. This information includes a per-second report of how much data has been sent. @@ -3339,8 +3358,10 @@ feature enabled. If the .Sy lz4_compress feature is active on the sending system, then the receiving system must have -that feature enabled as well. Note that streams generated using this flag are -unable to be received into an encrypted dataset. +that feature enabled as well. Datasets that are sent with this flag may not be +received as an encrypted dataset, since encrypted datasets cannot use the +.Sy embedded_data +feature. See .Xr zpool-features 5 for details on ZFS feature flags and the @@ -3463,6 +3484,15 @@ is a special case because, even if is a read-only property and cannot be set, it's allowed to receive the send stream as a clone of the given snapshot. .Pp +Raw encrypted send streams (created with +.Nm zfs Cm send Fl w +) may only be received as is, and cannot be re-encrypted, decrypted, or +recompressed by the receive process. Unencrypted streams can be received as +encrypted datasets, either through inheritance or by specifying encryption +parameters with the +.Fl o +options. +.Pp The name of the snapshot .Pq and file system, if a full stream is received that this subcommand creates depends on the argument type and the use of the diff --git a/module/icp/algs/sha2/sha2.c b/module/icp/algs/sha2/sha2.c index 6f7971afd..05a2e6ad1 100644 --- a/module/icp/algs/sha2/sha2.c +++ b/module/icp/algs/sha2/sha2.c @@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ static void Encode(uint8_t *, uint32_t *, size_t); static void Encode64(uint8_t *, uint64_t *, size_t); -#if defined(__amd64) +/* userspace only supports the generic version */ +#if defined(__amd64) && defined(_KERNEL) #define SHA512Transform(ctx, in) SHA512TransformBlocks((ctx), (in), 1) #define SHA256Transform(ctx, in) SHA256TransformBlocks((ctx), (in), 1) @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ void SHA256TransformBlocks(SHA2_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t num); #else static void SHA256Transform(SHA2_CTX *, const uint8_t *); static void SHA512Transform(SHA2_CTX *, const uint8_t *); -#endif /* __amd64 */ +#endif /* __amd64 && _KERNEL */ static uint8_t PADDING[128] = { 0x80, /* all zeros */ }; @@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ static uint8_t PADDING[128] = { 0x80, /* all zeros */ }; #endif /* _BIG_ENDIAN */ -#if !defined(__amd64) +#if !defined(__amd64) || !defined(_KERNEL) /* SHA256 Transform */ static void @@ -600,7 +601,7 @@ SHA512Transform(SHA2_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *blk) ctx->state.s64[7] += h; } -#endif /* !__amd64 */ +#endif /* !__amd64 || !_KERNEL */ /* @@ -838,7 +839,7 @@ SHA2Update(SHA2_CTX *ctx, const void *inptr, size_t input_len) i = buf_len; } -#if !defined(__amd64) +#if !defined(__amd64) || !defined(_KERNEL) if (algotype <= SHA256_HMAC_GEN_MECH_INFO_TYPE) { for (; i + buf_limit - 1 < input_len; i += buf_limit) { SHA256Transform(ctx, &input[i]); @@ -866,7 +867,7 @@ SHA2Update(SHA2_CTX *ctx, const void *inptr, size_t input_len) i += block_count << 7; } } -#endif /* !__amd64 */ +#endif /* !__amd64 || !_KERNEL */ /* * general optimization: diff --git a/module/zfs/Makefile.in b/module/zfs/Makefile.in index 72f28a89d..606b0a47c 100644 --- a/module/zfs/Makefile.in +++ b/module/zfs/Makefile.in @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ $(MODULE)-objs += dsl_synctask.o $(MODULE)-objs += edonr_zfs.o $(MODULE)-objs += fm.o $(MODULE)-objs += gzip.o +$(MODULE)-objs += hkdf.o $(MODULE)-objs += lzjb.o $(MODULE)-objs += lz4.o $(MODULE)-objs += metaslab.o diff --git a/module/zfs/arc.c b/module/zfs/arc.c index 992e57ce6..6256fed2b 100644 --- a/module/zfs/arc.c +++ b/module/zfs/arc.c @@ -3155,13 +3155,14 @@ arc_buf_destroy_impl(arc_buf_t *buf) hdr->b_crypt_hdr.b_ebufcnt -= 1; /* - * if we have no more encrypted buffers and we've already + * If we have no more encrypted buffers and we've already * gotten a copy of the decrypted data we can free b_rabd to * save some space. */ if (hdr->b_crypt_hdr.b_ebufcnt == 0 && HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr) && - hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd != NULL) + hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd != NULL && !HDR_IO_IN_PROGRESS(hdr)) { arc_hdr_free_abd(hdr, B_TRUE); + } } arc_buf_t *lastbuf = arc_buf_remove(hdr, buf); @@ -3716,9 +3717,8 @@ arc_hdr_destroy(arc_buf_hdr_t *hdr) arc_hdr_free_abd(hdr, B_FALSE); } - if (HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr)) { + if (HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr)) arc_hdr_free_abd(hdr, B_TRUE); - } } ASSERT3P(hdr->b_hash_next, ==, NULL); @@ -5746,16 +5746,15 @@ arc_read_done(zio_t *zio) callback_cnt++; int error = arc_buf_alloc_impl(hdr, zio->io_spa, - zio->io_bookmark.zb_objset, acb->acb_private, - acb->acb_encrypted, acb->acb_compressed, acb->acb_noauth, - no_zio_error, &acb->acb_buf); + acb->acb_dsobj, acb->acb_private, acb->acb_encrypted, + acb->acb_compressed, acb->acb_noauth, no_zio_error, + &acb->acb_buf); /* - * assert non-speculative zios didn't fail because an + * Assert non-speculative zios didn't fail because an * encryption key wasn't loaded */ - ASSERT((zio->io_flags & ZIO_FLAG_SPECULATIVE) || - error == 0 || error != ENOENT); + ASSERT((zio->io_flags & ZIO_FLAG_SPECULATIVE) || error == 0); /* * If we failed to decrypt, report an error now (as the zio @@ -5778,10 +5777,8 @@ arc_read_done(zio_t *zio) } hdr->b_l1hdr.b_acb = NULL; arc_hdr_clear_flags(hdr, ARC_FLAG_IO_IN_PROGRESS); - if (callback_cnt == 0) { - ASSERT(HDR_PREFETCH(hdr) || HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr)); + if (callback_cnt == 0) ASSERT(hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd != NULL || HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr)); - } ASSERT(refcount_is_zero(&hdr->b_l1hdr.b_refcnt) || callback_list != NULL); @@ -5943,6 +5940,9 @@ top: acb->acb_done = done; acb->acb_private = private; acb->acb_compressed = compressed_read; + acb->acb_encrypted = encrypted_read; + acb->acb_noauth = noauth_read; + acb->acb_dsobj = zb->zb_objset; if (pio != NULL) acb->acb_zio_dummy = zio_null(pio, spa, NULL, NULL, NULL, zio_flags); @@ -5981,9 +5981,7 @@ top: rc = arc_buf_alloc_impl(hdr, spa, zb->zb_objset, private, encrypted_read, compressed_read, noauth_read, B_TRUE, &buf); - - ASSERT((zio_flags & ZIO_FLAG_SPECULATIVE) || - rc == 0 || rc != ENOENT); + ASSERT((zio_flags & ZIO_FLAG_SPECULATIVE) || rc == 0); } else if (*arc_flags & ARC_FLAG_PREFETCH && refcount_count(&hdr->b_l1hdr.b_refcnt) == 0) { arc_hdr_set_flags(hdr, ARC_FLAG_PREFETCH); @@ -6008,7 +6006,7 @@ top: uint64_t addr = 0; boolean_t devw = B_FALSE; uint64_t size; - void *hdr_abd; + abd_t *hdr_abd; /* * Gracefully handle a damaged logical block size as a @@ -6131,6 +6129,7 @@ top: acb->acb_compressed = compressed_read; acb->acb_encrypted = encrypted_read; acb->acb_noauth = noauth_read; + acb->acb_dsobj = zb->zb_objset; ASSERT3P(hdr->b_l1hdr.b_acb, ==, NULL); hdr->b_l1hdr.b_acb = acb; @@ -6698,6 +6697,9 @@ arc_write_ready(zio_t *zio) HDR_SET_PSIZE(hdr, psize); arc_hdr_set_compress(hdr, compress); + if (zio->io_error != 0 || psize == 0) + goto out; + /* * Fill the hdr with data. If the buffer is encrypted we have no choice * but to copy the data into b_radb. If the hdr is compressed, the data @@ -6713,6 +6715,7 @@ arc_write_ready(zio_t *zio) * the data into it; otherwise, we share the data directly if we can. */ if (ARC_BUF_ENCRYPTED(buf)) { + ASSERT3U(psize, >, 0); ASSERT(ARC_BUF_COMPRESSED(buf)); arc_hdr_alloc_abd(hdr, B_TRUE); abd_copy(hdr->b_crypt_hdr.b_rabd, zio->io_abd, psize); @@ -6745,6 +6748,7 @@ arc_write_ready(zio_t *zio) arc_share_buf(hdr, buf); } +out: arc_hdr_verify(hdr, bp); spl_fstrans_unmark(cookie); } @@ -7956,9 +7960,15 @@ l2arc_untransform(zio_t *zio, l2arc_read_callback_t *cb) */ ASSERT3U(BP_GET_TYPE(bp), !=, DMU_OT_INTENT_LOG); ASSERT(MUTEX_HELD(HDR_LOCK(hdr))); + ASSERT3P(hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd, !=, NULL); - /* If the data was encrypted, decrypt it now */ - if (HDR_ENCRYPTED(hdr)) { + /* + * If the data was encrypted, decrypt it now. Note that + * we must check the bp here and not the hdr, since the + * hdr does not have its encryption parameters updated + * until arc_read_done(). + */ + if (BP_IS_ENCRYPTED(bp)) { abd_t *eabd = arc_get_data_abd(hdr, arc_hdr_size(hdr), hdr); @@ -8084,7 +8094,16 @@ l2arc_read_done(zio_t *zio) */ abd_free(cb->l2rcb_abd); zio->io_size = zio->io_orig_size = arc_hdr_size(hdr); - zio->io_abd = zio->io_orig_abd = hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd; + + if (BP_IS_ENCRYPTED(&cb->l2rcb_bp) && + (cb->l2rcb_flags & ZIO_FLAG_RAW_ENCRYPT)) { + ASSERT(HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr)); + zio->io_abd = zio->io_orig_abd = + hdr->b_crypt_hdr.b_rabd; + } else { + ASSERT3P(hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd, !=, NULL); + zio->io_abd = zio->io_orig_abd = hdr->b_l1hdr.b_pabd; + } } ASSERT3P(zio->io_abd, !=, NULL); @@ -8321,7 +8340,7 @@ l2arc_apply_transforms(spa_t *spa, arc_buf_hdr_t *hdr, uint64_t asize, boolean_t bswap = (hdr->b_l1hdr.b_byteswap != DMU_BSWAP_NUMFUNCS); dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; uint8_t mac[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN] = { 0 }; - boolean_t no_crypt; + boolean_t no_crypt = B_FALSE; ASSERT((HDR_GET_COMPRESS(hdr) != ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF && !HDR_COMPRESSION_ENABLED(hdr)) || @@ -8333,6 +8352,15 @@ l2arc_apply_transforms(spa_t *spa, arc_buf_hdr_t *hdr, uint64_t asize, * and copy the data. This may be done to elimiate a depedency on a * shared buffer or to reallocate the buffer to match asize. */ + if (HDR_HAS_RABD(hdr) && asize != psize) { + ASSERT3U(size, ==, psize); + to_write = abd_alloc_for_io(asize, ismd); + abd_copy(to_write, hdr->b_crypt_hdr.b_rabd, size); + if (size != asize) + abd_zero_off(to_write, size, asize - size); + goto out; + } + if ((compress == ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF || HDR_COMPRESSION_ENABLED(hdr)) && !HDR_ENCRYPTED(hdr)) { ASSERT3U(size, ==, psize); @@ -8377,11 +8405,8 @@ l2arc_apply_transforms(spa_t *spa, arc_buf_hdr_t *hdr, uint64_t asize, if (ret != 0) goto error; - if (no_crypt) { - spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); - abd_free(eabd); - goto out; - } + if (no_crypt) + abd_copy(eabd, to_write, psize); if (psize != asize) abd_zero_off(eabd, psize, asize - psize); diff --git a/module/zfs/dbuf.c b/module/zfs/dbuf.c index 1ea4c757e..c954dec1b 100644 --- a/module/zfs/dbuf.c +++ b/module/zfs/dbuf.c @@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ dbuf_fix_old_data(dmu_buf_impl_t *db, uint64_t txg) * or (if there a no active holders) * just null out the current db_data pointer. */ - ASSERT(dr->dr_txg >= txg - 2); + ASSERT3U(dr->dr_txg, >=, txg - 2); if (db->db_blkid == DMU_BONUS_BLKID) { dnode_t *dn = DB_DNODE(db); int bonuslen = DN_SLOTS_TO_BONUSLEN(dn->dn_num_slots); @@ -2153,6 +2153,13 @@ dbuf_assign_arcbuf(dmu_buf_impl_t *db, arc_buf_t *buf, dmu_tx_t *tx) if (db->db_state == DB_CACHED && refcount_count(&db->db_holds) - 1 > db->db_dirtycnt) { + /* + * In practice, we will never have a case where we have an + * encrypted arc buffer while additional holds exist on the + * dbuf. We don't handle this here so we simply assert that + * fact instead. + */ + ASSERT(!arc_is_encrypted(buf)); mutex_exit(&db->db_mtx); (void) dbuf_dirty(db, tx); bcopy(buf->b_data, db->db.db_data, db->db.db_size); @@ -2168,6 +2175,8 @@ dbuf_assign_arcbuf(dmu_buf_impl_t *db, arc_buf_t *buf, dmu_tx_t *tx) ASSERT(db->db_buf != NULL); if (dr != NULL && dr->dr_txg == tx->tx_txg) { ASSERT(dr->dt.dl.dr_data == db->db_buf); + IMPLY(arc_is_encrypted(buf), dr->dt.dl.dr_raw); + if (!arc_released(db->db_buf)) { ASSERT(dr->dt.dl.dr_override_state == DR_OVERRIDDEN); @@ -3458,7 +3467,6 @@ dbuf_sync_leaf(dbuf_dirty_record_t *dr, dmu_tx_t *tx) dn->dn_type, psize, lsize, compress_type); } else if (compress_type != ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF) { ASSERT3U(type, ==, ARC_BUFC_DATA); - int lsize = arc_buf_lsize(*datap); *datap = arc_alloc_compressed_buf(os->os_spa, db, psize, lsize, compress_type); } else { diff --git a/module/zfs/dmu.c b/module/zfs/dmu.c index 1eb35b935..1aba0b133 100644 --- a/module/zfs/dmu.c +++ b/module/zfs/dmu.c @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ dmu_objset_zfs_unmounting(objset_t *os) static int dmu_free_long_range_impl(objset_t *os, dnode_t *dn, uint64_t offset, - uint64_t length) + uint64_t length, boolean_t raw) { uint64_t object_size; int err; @@ -844,6 +844,17 @@ dmu_free_long_range_impl(objset_t *os, dnode_t *dn, uint64_t offset, uint64_t, long_free_dirty_all_txgs, uint64_t, chunk_len, uint64_t, dmu_tx_get_txg(tx)); dnode_free_range(dn, chunk_begin, chunk_len, tx); + + /* if this is a raw free, mark the dirty record as such */ + if (raw) { + dbuf_dirty_record_t *dr = dn->dn_dbuf->db_last_dirty; + + while (dr != NULL && dr->dr_txg > tx->tx_txg) + dr = dr->dr_next; + if (dr != NULL && dr->dr_txg == tx->tx_txg) + dr->dt.dl.dr_raw = B_TRUE; + } + dmu_tx_commit(tx); length -= chunk_len; @@ -861,7 +872,7 @@ dmu_free_long_range(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, err = dnode_hold(os, object, FTAG, &dn); if (err != 0) return (err); - err = dmu_free_long_range_impl(os, dn, offset, length); + err = dmu_free_long_range_impl(os, dn, offset, length, B_FALSE); /* * It is important to zero out the maxblkid when freeing the entire @@ -876,8 +887,37 @@ dmu_free_long_range(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, return (err); } +/* + * This function is equivalent to dmu_free_long_range(), but also + * marks the new dirty record as a raw write. + */ int -dmu_free_long_object(objset_t *os, uint64_t object) +dmu_free_long_range_raw(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, + uint64_t offset, uint64_t length) +{ + dnode_t *dn; + int err; + + err = dnode_hold(os, object, FTAG, &dn); + if (err != 0) + return (err); + err = dmu_free_long_range_impl(os, dn, offset, length, B_TRUE); + + /* + * It is important to zero out the maxblkid when freeing the entire + * file, so that (a) subsequent calls to dmu_free_long_range_impl() + * will take the fast path, and (b) dnode_reallocate() can verify + * that the entire file has been freed. + */ + if (err == 0 && offset == 0 && length == DMU_OBJECT_END) + dn->dn_maxblkid = 0; + + dnode_rele(dn, FTAG); + return (err); +} + +static int +dmu_free_long_object_impl(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, boolean_t raw) { dmu_tx_t *tx; int err; @@ -893,6 +933,9 @@ dmu_free_long_object(objset_t *os, uint64_t object) err = dmu_tx_assign(tx, TXG_WAIT); if (err == 0) { err = dmu_object_free(os, object, tx); + if (err == 0 && raw) + VERIFY0(dmu_object_dirty_raw(os, object, tx)); + dmu_tx_commit(tx); } else { dmu_tx_abort(tx); @@ -901,6 +944,19 @@ dmu_free_long_object(objset_t *os, uint64_t object) return (err); } +int +dmu_free_long_object(objset_t *os, uint64_t object) +{ + return (dmu_free_long_object_impl(os, object, B_FALSE)); +} + +int +dmu_free_long_object_raw(objset_t *os, uint64_t object) +{ + return (dmu_free_long_object_impl(os, object, B_TRUE)); +} + + int dmu_free_range(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size, dmu_tx_t *tx) @@ -1486,13 +1542,6 @@ dmu_return_arcbuf(arc_buf_t *buf) arc_buf_destroy(buf, FTAG); } -void -dmu_assign_arcbuf_impl(dmu_buf_t *handle, arc_buf_t *buf, dmu_tx_t *tx) -{ - dmu_buf_impl_t *db = (dmu_buf_impl_t *)handle; - dbuf_assign_arcbuf(db, buf, tx); -} - void dmu_convert_to_raw(dmu_buf_t *handle, boolean_t byteorder, const uint8_t *salt, const uint8_t *iv, const uint8_t *mac, dmu_tx_t *tx) @@ -1569,22 +1618,19 @@ dmu_copy_from_buf(objset_t *os, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset, * dmu_write(). */ void -dmu_assign_arcbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, uint64_t offset, arc_buf_t *buf, +dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dnode(dnode_t *dn, uint64_t offset, arc_buf_t *buf, dmu_tx_t *tx) { - dmu_buf_impl_t *dbuf = (dmu_buf_impl_t *)handle; - dnode_t *dn; dmu_buf_impl_t *db; + objset_t *os = dn->dn_objset; + uint64_t object = dn->dn_object; uint32_t blksz = (uint32_t)arc_buf_lsize(buf); uint64_t blkid; - DB_DNODE_ENTER(dbuf); - dn = DB_DNODE(dbuf); rw_enter(&dn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_READER); blkid = dbuf_whichblock(dn, 0, offset); VERIFY((db = dbuf_hold(dn, blkid, FTAG)) != NULL); rw_exit(&dn->dn_struct_rwlock); - DB_DNODE_EXIT(dbuf); /* * We can only assign if the offset is aligned, the arc buf is the @@ -1594,19 +1640,10 @@ dmu_assign_arcbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, uint64_t offset, arc_buf_t *buf, dbuf_assign_arcbuf(db, buf, tx); dbuf_rele(db, FTAG); } else { - objset_t *os; - uint64_t object; - /* compressed bufs must always be assignable to their dbuf */ ASSERT3U(arc_get_compression(buf), ==, ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF); ASSERT(!(buf->b_flags & ARC_BUF_FLAG_COMPRESSED)); - DB_DNODE_ENTER(dbuf); - dn = DB_DNODE(dbuf); - os = dn->dn_objset; - object = dn->dn_object; - DB_DNODE_EXIT(dbuf); - dbuf_rele(db, FTAG); dmu_write(os, object, offset, blksz, buf->b_data, tx); dmu_return_arcbuf(buf); @@ -1614,6 +1651,17 @@ dmu_assign_arcbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, uint64_t offset, arc_buf_t *buf, } } +void +dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf(dmu_buf_t *handle, uint64_t offset, arc_buf_t *buf, + dmu_tx_t *tx) +{ + dmu_buf_impl_t *dbuf = (dmu_buf_impl_t *)handle; + + DB_DNODE_ENTER(dbuf); + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dnode(DB_DNODE(dbuf), offset, buf, tx); + DB_DNODE_EXIT(dbuf); +} + typedef struct { dbuf_dirty_record_t *dsa_dr; dmu_sync_cb_t *dsa_done; @@ -2424,7 +2472,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_buf_rele_array); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_prefetch); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_free_range); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_free_long_range); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_free_long_range_raw); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_free_long_object); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_free_long_object_raw); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_read); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_read_by_dnode); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_write); @@ -2443,7 +2493,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_write_policy); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_sync); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_request_arcbuf); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_return_arcbuf); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_assign_arcbuf); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dnode); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_buf_hold); EXPORT_SYMBOL(dmu_ot); diff --git a/module/zfs/dmu_objset.c b/module/zfs/dmu_objset.c index 4445121a0..609e43fe8 100644 --- a/module/zfs/dmu_objset.c +++ b/module/zfs/dmu_objset.c @@ -706,7 +706,9 @@ dmu_objset_own(const char *name, dmu_objset_type_t type, dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); - if (dmu_objset_userobjspace_upgradable(*osp)) + /* user accounting requires the dataset to be decrypted */ + if (dmu_objset_userobjspace_upgradable(*osp) && + (ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj == 0 || decrypt)) dmu_objset_userobjspace_upgrade(*osp); return (0); @@ -932,7 +934,7 @@ dmu_objset_create_impl_dnstats(spa_t *spa, dsl_dataset_t *ds, blkptr_t *bp, if (blksz == 0) blksz = DNODE_BLOCK_SIZE; - if (blksz == 0) + if (ibs == 0) ibs = DN_MAX_INDBLKSHIFT; if (ds != NULL) @@ -1096,7 +1098,7 @@ dmu_objset_create_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) } /* - * The doca_userfunc() will write out some data that needs to be + * The doca_userfunc() may write out some data that needs to be * encrypted if the dataset is encrypted (specifically the root * directory). This data must be written out before the encryption * key mapping is removed by dsl_dataset_rele_flags(). Force the @@ -1107,10 +1109,14 @@ dmu_objset_create_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) dsl_dataset_t *tmpds = NULL; boolean_t need_sync_done = B_FALSE; + mutex_enter(&ds->ds_lock); + ds->ds_owner = FTAG; + mutex_exit(&ds->ds_lock); + rzio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED); - tmpds = txg_list_remove(&dp->dp_dirty_datasets, tx->tx_txg); + tmpds = txg_list_remove_this(&dp->dp_dirty_datasets, ds, + tx->tx_txg); if (tmpds != NULL) { - ASSERT3P(ds, ==, tmpds); dsl_dataset_sync(ds, rzio, tx); need_sync_done = B_TRUE; } @@ -1120,9 +1126,9 @@ dmu_objset_create_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) taskq_wait(dp->dp_sync_taskq); rzio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED); - tmpds = txg_list_remove(&dp->dp_dirty_datasets, tx->tx_txg); + tmpds = txg_list_remove_this(&dp->dp_dirty_datasets, ds, + tx->tx_txg); if (tmpds != NULL) { - ASSERT3P(ds, ==, tmpds); dmu_buf_rele(ds->ds_dbuf, ds); dsl_dataset_sync(ds, rzio, tx); } @@ -1130,6 +1136,10 @@ dmu_objset_create_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) if (need_sync_done) dsl_dataset_sync_done(ds, tx); + + mutex_enter(&ds->ds_lock); + ds->ds_owner = NULL; + mutex_exit(&ds->ds_lock); } spa_history_log_internal_ds(ds, "create", tx, ""); @@ -1336,6 +1346,7 @@ dmu_objset_upgrade_stop(objset_t *os) mutex_exit(&os->os_upgrade_lock); taskq_cancel_id(os->os_spa->spa_upgrade_taskq, id); + txg_wait_synced(os->os_spa->spa_dsl_pool, 0); } else { mutex_exit(&os->os_upgrade_lock); } diff --git a/module/zfs/dmu_send.c b/module/zfs/dmu_send.c index c63ab43e1..cc6b97d53 100644 --- a/module/zfs/dmu_send.c +++ b/module/zfs/dmu_send.c @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ dump_dnode(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp, uint64_t object, dnode_phys_t *dnp) { struct drr_object *drro = &(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_object); - int bonuslen = P2ROUNDUP(dnp->dn_bonuslen, 8); + int bonuslen; if (object < dsp->dsa_resume_object) { /* @@ -558,6 +558,8 @@ dump_dnode(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp, uint64_t object, drro->drr_blksz > SPA_OLD_MAXBLOCKSIZE) drro->drr_blksz = SPA_OLD_MAXBLOCKSIZE; + bonuslen = P2ROUNDUP(dnp->dn_bonuslen, 8); + if ((dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW)) { ASSERT(BP_IS_ENCRYPTED(bp)); @@ -571,7 +573,7 @@ dump_dnode(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp, uint64_t object, /* * Since we encrypt the entire bonus area, the (raw) part - * beyond the the bonuslen is actually nonzero, so we need + * beyond the bonuslen is actually nonzero, so we need * to send it. */ if (bonuslen != 0) { @@ -2062,7 +2064,8 @@ dmu_recv_resume_begin_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_flags |= DS_FLAG_INCONSISTENT; rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG); - ASSERT(!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))); + ASSERT(!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds)) || + drba->drba_cookie->drc_raw); rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG); drba->drba_cookie->drc_ds = ds; @@ -2590,7 +2593,11 @@ receive_freeobjects(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, else if (err != 0) return (err); - err = dmu_free_long_object(rwa->os, obj); + if (rwa->raw) + err = dmu_free_long_object_raw(rwa->os, obj); + else + err = dmu_free_long_object(rwa->os, obj); + if (err != 0) return (err); @@ -2606,9 +2613,9 @@ noinline static int receive_write(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, struct drr_write *drrw, arc_buf_t *abuf) { - dmu_tx_t *tx; - dmu_buf_t *bonus; int err; + dmu_tx_t *tx; + dnode_t *dn; if (drrw->drr_offset + drrw->drr_logical_size < drrw->drr_offset || !DMU_OT_IS_VALID(drrw->drr_type)) @@ -2633,7 +2640,6 @@ receive_write(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, struct drr_write *drrw, return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); tx = dmu_tx_create(rwa->os); - dmu_tx_hold_write(tx, drrw->drr_object, drrw->drr_offset, drrw->drr_logical_size); err = dmu_tx_assign(tx, TXG_WAIT); @@ -2653,10 +2659,9 @@ receive_write(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, struct drr_write *drrw, DRR_WRITE_PAYLOAD_SIZE(drrw)); } - /* use the bonus buf to look up the dnode in dmu_assign_arcbuf */ - if (dmu_bonus_hold(rwa->os, drrw->drr_object, FTAG, &bonus) != 0) - return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); - dmu_assign_arcbuf(bonus, drrw->drr_offset, abuf, tx); + VERIFY0(dnode_hold(rwa->os, drrw->drr_object, FTAG, &dn)); + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dnode(dn, drrw->drr_offset, abuf, tx); + dnode_rele(dn, FTAG); /* * Note: If the receive fails, we want the resume stream to start @@ -2666,7 +2671,6 @@ receive_write(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, struct drr_write *drrw, */ save_resume_state(rwa, drrw->drr_object, drrw->drr_offset, tx); dmu_tx_commit(tx); - dmu_buf_rele(bonus, FTAG); return (0); } @@ -2765,6 +2769,8 @@ receive_write_embedded(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); if (drrwe->drr_compression >= ZIO_COMPRESS_FUNCTIONS) return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); + if (rwa->raw) + return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); if (drrwe->drr_object > rwa->max_object) rwa->max_object = drrwe->drr_object; @@ -2839,7 +2845,7 @@ receive_spill(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, struct drr_spill *drrs, if (db_spill->db_size < drrs->drr_length) VERIFY(0 == dbuf_spill_set_blksz(db_spill, drrs->drr_length, tx)); - dmu_assign_arcbuf_impl(db_spill, abuf, tx); + dbuf_assign_arcbuf((dmu_buf_impl_t *)db_spill, abuf, tx); dmu_buf_rele(db, FTAG); dmu_buf_rele(db_spill, FTAG); @@ -2864,8 +2870,13 @@ receive_free(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, struct drr_free *drrf) if (drrf->drr_object > rwa->max_object) rwa->max_object = drrf->drr_object; - err = dmu_free_long_range(rwa->os, drrf->drr_object, - drrf->drr_offset, drrf->drr_length); + if (rwa->raw) { + err = dmu_free_long_range_raw(rwa->os, drrf->drr_object, + drrf->drr_offset, drrf->drr_length); + } else { + err = dmu_free_long_range(rwa->os, drrf->drr_object, + drrf->drr_offset, drrf->drr_length); + } return (err); } @@ -2948,6 +2959,7 @@ receive_object_range(struct receive_writer_arg *rwa, static void dmu_recv_cleanup_ds(dmu_recv_cookie_t *drc) { + dsl_dataset_t *ds = drc->drc_ds; ds_hold_flags_t dsflags = (drc->drc_raw) ? 0 : DS_HOLD_FLAG_DECRYPT; /* @@ -2957,14 +2969,17 @@ dmu_recv_cleanup_ds(dmu_recv_cookie_t *drc) * that the user accounting code will not attempt to do anything * after we stopped receiving the dataset. */ - txg_wait_synced(drc->drc_ds->ds_dir->dd_pool, 0); + txg_wait_synced(ds->ds_dir->dd_pool, 0); - if (drc->drc_resumable) { - dsl_dataset_disown(drc->drc_ds, dsflags, dmu_recv_tag); + rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG); + if (drc->drc_resumable && !BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))) { + rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG); + dsl_dataset_disown(ds, dsflags, dmu_recv_tag); } else { char name[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN]; - dsl_dataset_name(drc->drc_ds, name); - dsl_dataset_disown(drc->drc_ds, dsflags, dmu_recv_tag); + rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG); + dsl_dataset_name(ds, name); + dsl_dataset_disown(ds, dsflags, dmu_recv_tag); (void) dsl_destroy_head(name); } } diff --git a/module/zfs/dmu_traverse.c b/module/zfs/dmu_traverse.c index a6c27b4be..268d82ce4 100644 --- a/module/zfs/dmu_traverse.c +++ b/module/zfs/dmu_traverse.c @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ traverse_prefetch_metadata(traverse_data_t *td, const blkptr_t *bp, const zbookmark_phys_t *zb) { arc_flags_t flags = ARC_FLAG_NOWAIT | ARC_FLAG_PREFETCH; - int zio_flags = ZIO_FLAG_CANFAIL; + int zio_flags = ZIO_FLAG_CANFAIL | ZIO_FLAG_SPECULATIVE; if (!(td->td_flags & TRAVERSE_PREFETCH_METADATA)) return; diff --git a/module/zfs/dsl_crypt.c b/module/zfs/dsl_crypt.c index af46dd753..a71142682 100644 --- a/module/zfs/dsl_crypt.c +++ b/module/zfs/dsl_crypt.c @@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ dsl_wrapping_key_free(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey) if (wkey->wk_key.ck_data) { bzero(wkey->wk_key.ck_data, - BITS_TO_BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length)); + CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length)); kmem_free(wkey->wk_key.ck_data, - BITS_TO_BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length)); + CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length)); } refcount_destroy(&wkey->wk_refcnt); @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ dsl_wrapping_key_create(uint8_t *wkeydata, zfs_keyformat_t keyformat, } wkey->wk_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; - wkey->wk_key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); + wkey->wk_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); bcopy(wkeydata, wkey->wk_key.ck_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); /* initialize the rest of the struct */ @@ -433,7 +433,6 @@ dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation) int ret = 0; dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL; dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL; - dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL; uint64_t rddobj; /* hold the dsl dir */ @@ -472,16 +471,12 @@ dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation) goto out; } - if (wkey != NULL) - dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); return (0); out: - if (wkey != NULL) - dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); if (dd != NULL) dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); if (dp != NULL) @@ -728,6 +723,7 @@ spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dcp->cp_wkey; dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL; + uint64_t keyformat, salt, iters; /* * We don't validate the wrapping key's keyformat, salt, or iters @@ -762,8 +758,36 @@ spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, if (ret != 0) goto error; + /* initialize the wkey encryption parameters from the DSL Crypto Key */ + ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &keyformat); + if (ret != 0) + goto error; + + ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt); + if (ret != 0) + goto error; + + ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters); + if (ret != 0) + goto error; + + ASSERT3U(keyformat, <, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS); + ASSERT3U(keyformat, !=, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE); + IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters != 0); + IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt != 0); + IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters == 0); + IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt == 0); + + wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat; + wkey->wk_salt = salt; + wkey->wk_iters = iters; + /* - * At this point we have verified the key. We can simply cleanup and + * At this point we have verified the wkey and confirmed that it can + * be used to decrypt a DSL Crypto Key. We can simply cleanup and * return if this is all the user wanted to do. */ if (noop) @@ -1326,10 +1350,12 @@ spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj, return; } - /* stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root */ + /* + * Stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root + * or if this dd is a clone. + */ VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj)); - - if (curr_rddobj != rddobj) { + if (curr_rddobj != rddobj || dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) { dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); return; } @@ -1355,7 +1381,7 @@ spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj, zc = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_cursor_t), KM_SLEEP); za = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_attribute_t), KM_SLEEP); - /* Recurse into all child and clone dsl dirs. */ + /* Recurse into all child dsl dirs. */ for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset, dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_child_dir_zapobj); zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0; @@ -1365,20 +1391,6 @@ spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj, } zap_cursor_fini(zc); - for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset, - dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_clones); - zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0; - zap_cursor_advance(zc)) { - dsl_dataset_t *clone; - - VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, - za->za_first_integer, FTAG, &clone)); - spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, - clone->ds_dir->dd_object, new_rddobj, wkey, tx); - dsl_dataset_rele(clone, FTAG); - } - zap_cursor_fini(zc); - kmem_free(za, sizeof (zap_attribute_t)); kmem_free(zc, sizeof (zap_cursor_t)); @@ -1831,6 +1843,8 @@ dsl_dataset_create_crypt_sync(uint64_t dsobj, dsl_dir_t *dd, wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object; } + ASSERT3P(wkey, !=, NULL); + /* Create or clone the DSL crypto key and activate the feature */ dd->dd_crypto_obj = dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(crypt, wkey, tx); VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object, @@ -2191,6 +2205,7 @@ dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t **nvl_out) uint64_t rddobj; nvlist_t *nvl = NULL; uint64_t dckobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj; + dsl_dir_t *rdd = NULL; dsl_pool_t *dp = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool; objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset; uint64_t crypt = 0, guid = 0, format = 0, iters = 0, salt = 0; @@ -2209,10 +2224,6 @@ dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t **nvl_out) goto error; /* lookup values from the DSL Crypto Key */ - ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj); - if (ret != 0) - goto error; - ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, &crypt); if (ret != 0) @@ -2242,24 +2253,43 @@ dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t **nvl_out) if (ret != 0) goto error; - /* lookup wrapping key properties */ - ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dckobj, - zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format); + /* + * Lookup wrapping key properties. An early version of the code did + * not correctly add these values to the wrapping key or the DSL + * Crypto Key on disk for non encryption roots, so to be safe we + * always take the slightly circuitous route of looking it up from + * the encryption root's key. + */ + ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj); if (ret != 0) goto error; + dsl_pool_config_enter(dp, FTAG); + + ret = dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, rddobj, NULL, FTAG, &rdd); + if (ret != 0) + goto error_unlock; + + ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj, + zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format); + if (ret != 0) + goto error_unlock; + if (format == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) { - ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dckobj, + ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters); if (ret != 0) - goto error; + goto error_unlock; - ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dckobj, + ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt); if (ret != 0) - goto error; + goto error_unlock; } + dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG); + dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG); + fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, crypt); fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, guid); VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, @@ -2285,7 +2315,11 @@ dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t **nvl_out) *nvl_out = nvl; return (0); +error_unlock: + dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG); error: + if (rdd != NULL) + dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG); nvlist_free(nvl); *nvl_out = NULL; @@ -2488,7 +2522,8 @@ spa_do_crypt_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, abd_t *abd, goto error; /* perform the hmac */ - ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen, digestbuf); + ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen, + digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); if (ret != 0) goto error; @@ -2604,8 +2639,7 @@ error: abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen); } - if (dck != NULL) - spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); + spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); return (ret); } diff --git a/module/zfs/hkdf.c b/module/zfs/hkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..14265472d --- /dev/null +++ b/module/zfs/hkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. + * You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version + * 1.0 of the CDDL. + * + * A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this + * source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at + * http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +static int +hkdf_sha512_extract(uint8_t *salt, uint_t salt_len, uint8_t *key_material, + uint_t km_len, uint8_t *out_buf) +{ + int ret; + crypto_mechanism_t mech; + crypto_key_t key; + crypto_data_t input_cd, output_cd; + + /* initialize HMAC mechanism */ + mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA512_HMAC); + mech.cm_param = NULL; + mech.cm_param_len = 0; + + /* initialize the salt as a crypto key */ + key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; + key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(salt_len); + key.ck_data = salt; + + /* initialize crypto data for the input and output data */ + input_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; + input_cd.cd_offset = 0; + input_cd.cd_length = km_len; + input_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)key_material; + input_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = input_cd.cd_length; + + output_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; + output_cd.cd_offset = 0; + output_cd.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; + output_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)out_buf; + output_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = output_cd.cd_length; + + ret = crypto_mac(&mech, &input_cd, &key, NULL, &output_cd, NULL); + if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (SET_ERROR(EIO)); + + return (0); +} + +static int +hkdf_sha512_expand(uint8_t *extract_key, uint8_t *info, uint_t info_len, + uint8_t *out_buf, uint_t out_len) +{ + int ret; + crypto_mechanism_t mech; + crypto_context_t ctx; + crypto_key_t key; + crypto_data_t T_cd, info_cd, c_cd; + uint_t i, T_len = 0, pos = 0; + uint8_t c; + uint_t N = (out_len + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) / SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; + uint8_t T[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + if (N > 255) + return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); + + /* initialize HMAC mechanism */ + mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA512_HMAC); + mech.cm_param = NULL; + mech.cm_param_len = 0; + + /* initialize the salt as a crypto key */ + key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; + key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); + key.ck_data = extract_key; + + /* initialize crypto data for the input and output data */ + T_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; + T_cd.cd_offset = 0; + T_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)T; + + c_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; + c_cd.cd_offset = 0; + c_cd.cd_length = 1; + c_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)&c; + c_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = c_cd.cd_length; + + info_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; + info_cd.cd_offset = 0; + info_cd.cd_length = info_len; + info_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)info; + info_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = info_cd.cd_length; + + for (i = 1; i <= N; i++) { + c = i; + + T_cd.cd_length = T_len; + T_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = T_cd.cd_length; + + ret = crypto_mac_init(&mech, &key, NULL, &ctx, NULL); + if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (SET_ERROR(EIO)); + + ret = crypto_mac_update(ctx, &T_cd, NULL); + if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (SET_ERROR(EIO)); + + ret = crypto_mac_update(ctx, &info_cd, NULL); + if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (SET_ERROR(EIO)); + + ret = crypto_mac_update(ctx, &c_cd, NULL); + if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (SET_ERROR(EIO)); + + T_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; + T_cd.cd_length = T_len; + T_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = T_cd.cd_length; + + ret = crypto_mac_final(ctx, &T_cd, NULL); + if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (SET_ERROR(EIO)); + + bcopy(T, out_buf + pos, + (i != N) ? SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH : (out_len - pos)); + pos += SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; + } + + return (0); +} + +/* + * HKDF is designed to be a relatively fast function for deriving keys from a + * master key + a salt. We use this function to generate new encryption keys + * so as to avoid hitting the cryptographic limits of the underlying + * encryption modes. Note that, for the sake of deriving encryption keys, the + * info parameter is called the "salt" everywhere else in the code. + */ +int +hkdf_sha512(uint8_t *key_material, uint_t km_len, uint8_t *salt, + uint_t salt_len, uint8_t *info, uint_t info_len, uint8_t *output_key, + uint_t out_len) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t extract_key[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + ret = hkdf_sha512_extract(salt, salt_len, key_material, km_len, + extract_key); + if (ret != 0) + return (ret); + + ret = hkdf_sha512_expand(extract_key, info, info_len, output_key, + out_len); + if (ret != 0) + return (ret); + + return (0); +} diff --git a/module/zfs/metaslab.c b/module/zfs/metaslab.c index 5e413c065..01e5234c7 100644 --- a/module/zfs/metaslab.c +++ b/module/zfs/metaslab.c @@ -1937,7 +1937,8 @@ metaslab_passivate(metaslab_t *msp, uint64_t weight) * this metaslab again. In that case, it had better be empty, * or we would be leaving space on the table. */ - ASSERT(size >= SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE || + ASSERT(!WEIGHT_IS_SPACEBASED(msp->ms_weight) || + size >= SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE || range_tree_space(msp->ms_tree) == 0); ASSERT0(weight & METASLAB_ACTIVE_MASK); diff --git a/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c b/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c index 62241a46b..85dd4a049 100644 --- a/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c +++ b/module/zfs/zfs_vnops.c @@ -841,8 +841,8 @@ zfs_write(struct inode *ip, uio_t *uio, int ioflag, cred_t *cr) xuio_stat_wbuf_copied(); } else { ASSERT(xuio || tx_bytes == max_blksz); - dmu_assign_arcbuf(sa_get_db(zp->z_sa_hdl), - woff, abuf, tx); + dmu_assign_arcbuf_by_dbuf( + sa_get_db(zp->z_sa_hdl), woff, abuf, tx); } ASSERT(tx_bytes <= uio->uio_resid); uioskip(uio, tx_bytes); diff --git a/module/zfs/zil.c b/module/zfs/zil.c index f15e8cddb..e90e583ae 100644 --- a/module/zfs/zil.c +++ b/module/zfs/zil.c @@ -2115,6 +2115,21 @@ zil_suspend(const char *osname, void **cookiep) return (0); } + /* + * The ZIL has work to do. Ensure that the associated encryption + * key will remain mapped while we are committing the log by + * grabbing a reference to it. If the key isn't loaded we have no + * choice but to return an error until the wrapping key is loaded. + */ + if (os->os_encrypted && spa_keystore_create_mapping(os->os_spa, + dmu_objset_ds(os), FTAG) != 0) { + zilog->zl_suspend--; + mutex_exit(&zilog->zl_lock); + dsl_dataset_long_rele(dmu_objset_ds(os), suspend_tag); + dsl_dataset_rele(dmu_objset_ds(os), suspend_tag); + return (SET_ERROR(EBUSY)); + } + zilog->zl_suspending = B_TRUE; mutex_exit(&zilog->zl_lock); @@ -2127,6 +2142,20 @@ zil_suspend(const char *osname, void **cookiep) cv_broadcast(&zilog->zl_cv_suspend); mutex_exit(&zilog->zl_lock); + if (os->os_encrypted) { + /* + * Encrypted datasets need to wait for all data to be + * synced out before removing the mapping. + * + * XXX: Depending on the number of datasets with + * outstanding ZIL data on a given log device, this + * might cause spa_offline_log() to take a long time. + */ + txg_wait_synced(zilog->zl_dmu_pool, zilog->zl_destroy_txg); + VERIFY0(spa_keystore_remove_mapping(os->os_spa, + dmu_objset_id(os), FTAG)); + } + if (cookiep == NULL) zil_resume(os); else diff --git a/module/zfs/zio.c b/module/zfs/zio.c index 057a1405f..508011a86 100644 --- a/module/zfs/zio.c +++ b/module/zfs/zio.c @@ -2518,13 +2518,14 @@ zio_write_gang_block(zio_t *pio) zp.zp_checksum = gio->io_prop.zp_checksum; zp.zp_compress = ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF; - zp.zp_encrypt = gio->io_prop.zp_encrypt; zp.zp_type = DMU_OT_NONE; zp.zp_level = 0; zp.zp_copies = gio->io_prop.zp_copies; zp.zp_dedup = B_FALSE; zp.zp_dedup_verify = B_FALSE; zp.zp_nopwrite = B_FALSE; + zp.zp_encrypt = gio->io_prop.zp_encrypt; + zp.zp_byteorder = gio->io_prop.zp_byteorder; bzero(zp.zp_salt, ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN); bzero(zp.zp_iv, ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN); bzero(zp.zp_mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); diff --git a/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c b/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c index 8fcf51550..5ffa1e8b0 100644 --- a/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c +++ b/module/zfs/zio_crypt.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * This file is responsible for handling all of the details of generating @@ -198,176 +199,6 @@ zio_crypt_info_t zio_crypt_table[ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS] = { {SUN_CKM_AES_GCM, ZC_TYPE_GCM, 32, "aes-256-gcm"} }; -static int -hkdf_sha512_extract(uint8_t *salt, uint_t salt_len, uint8_t *key_material, - uint_t km_len, uint8_t *out_buf) -{ - int ret; - crypto_mechanism_t mech; - crypto_key_t key; - crypto_data_t input_cd, output_cd; - - /* initialize HMAC mechanism */ - mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA512_HMAC); - mech.cm_param = NULL; - mech.cm_param_len = 0; - - /* initialize the salt as a crypto key */ - key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; - key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(salt_len); - key.ck_data = salt; - - /* initialize crypto data for the input and output data */ - input_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - input_cd.cd_offset = 0; - input_cd.cd_length = km_len; - input_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)key_material; - input_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = input_cd.cd_length; - - output_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - output_cd.cd_offset = 0; - output_cd.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; - output_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)out_buf; - output_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = output_cd.cd_length; - - ret = crypto_mac(&mech, &input_cd, &key, NULL, &output_cd, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = SET_ERROR(EIO); - goto error; - } - - return (0); - -error: - return (ret); -} - -static int -hkdf_sha512_expand(uint8_t *extract_key, uint8_t *info, uint_t info_len, - uint8_t *out_buf, uint_t out_len) -{ - int ret; - crypto_mechanism_t mech; - crypto_context_t ctx; - crypto_key_t key; - crypto_data_t T_cd, info_cd, c_cd; - uint_t i, T_len = 0, pos = 0; - uint8_t c; - uint_t N = (out_len + SHA512_DIGEST_LEN) / SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; - uint8_t T[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; - - if (N > 255) - return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); - - /* initialize HMAC mechanism */ - mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA512_HMAC); - mech.cm_param = NULL; - mech.cm_param_len = 0; - - /* initialize the salt as a crypto key */ - key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; - key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(SHA512_DIGEST_LEN); - key.ck_data = extract_key; - - /* initialize crypto data for the input and output data */ - T_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - T_cd.cd_offset = 0; - T_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)T; - - c_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - c_cd.cd_offset = 0; - c_cd.cd_length = 1; - c_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)&c; - c_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = c_cd.cd_length; - - info_cd.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; - info_cd.cd_offset = 0; - info_cd.cd_length = info_len; - info_cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)info; - info_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = info_cd.cd_length; - - for (i = 1; i <= N; i++) { - c = i; - - T_cd.cd_length = T_len; - T_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = T_cd.cd_length; - - ret = crypto_mac_init(&mech, &key, NULL, &ctx, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = SET_ERROR(EIO); - goto error; - } - - ret = crypto_mac_update(ctx, &T_cd, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = SET_ERROR(EIO); - goto error; - } - - ret = crypto_mac_update(ctx, &info_cd, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = SET_ERROR(EIO); - goto error; - } - - ret = crypto_mac_update(ctx, &c_cd, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = SET_ERROR(EIO); - goto error; - } - - T_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; - T_cd.cd_length = T_len; - T_cd.cd_raw.iov_len = T_cd.cd_length; - - ret = crypto_mac_final(ctx, &T_cd, NULL); - if (ret != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) { - ret = SET_ERROR(EIO); - goto error; - } - - bcopy(T, out_buf + pos, - (i != N) ? SHA512_DIGEST_LEN : (out_len - pos)); - pos += SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; - } - - return (0); - -error: - return (ret); -} - -/* - * HKDF is designed to be a relatively fast function for deriving keys from a - * master key + a salt. We use this function to generate new encryption keys - * so as to avoid hitting the cryptographic limits of the underlying - * encryption modes. Note that, for the sake of deriving encryption keys, the - * info parameter is called the "salt" everywhere else in the code. - */ -static int -hkdf_sha512(uint8_t *key_material, uint_t km_len, uint8_t *salt, - uint_t salt_len, uint8_t *info, uint_t info_len, uint8_t *output_key, - uint_t out_len) -{ - int ret; - uint8_t extract_key[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; - - ret = hkdf_sha512_extract(salt, salt_len, key_material, km_len, - extract_key); - if (ret != 0) - goto error; - - ret = hkdf_sha512_expand(extract_key, info, info_len, output_key, - out_len); - if (ret != 0) - goto error; - - return (0); - -error: - return (ret); -} - void zio_crypt_key_destroy(zio_crypt_key_t *key) { @@ -421,11 +252,11 @@ zio_crypt_key_init(uint64_t crypt, zio_crypt_key_t *key) /* initialize keys for the ICP */ key->zk_current_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; key->zk_current_key.ck_data = key->zk_current_keydata; - key->zk_current_key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(keydata_len); + key->zk_current_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(keydata_len); key->zk_hmac_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; key->zk_hmac_key.ck_data = &key->zk_hmac_key; - key->zk_hmac_key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN); + key->zk_hmac_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN); /* * Initialize the crypto templates. It's ok if this fails because @@ -588,10 +419,10 @@ zio_do_crypt_uio(boolean_t encrypt, uint64_t crypt, crypto_key_t *key, mech.cm_param_len = sizeof (CK_AES_CCM_PARAMS); } else { gcmp.ulIvLen = ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN; - gcmp.ulIvBits = BYTES_TO_BITS(ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN); + gcmp.ulIvBits = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN); gcmp.ulAADLen = auth_len; gcmp.pAAD = authbuf; - gcmp.ulTagBits = BYTES_TO_BITS(maclen); + gcmp.ulTagBits = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(maclen); gcmp.pIv = ivbuf; mech.cm_param = (char *)(&gcmp); @@ -748,11 +579,11 @@ zio_crypt_key_unwrap(crypto_key_t *cwkey, uint64_t crypt, uint64_t guid, /* initialize keys for ICP */ key->zk_current_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; key->zk_current_key.ck_data = key->zk_current_keydata; - key->zk_current_key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(keydata_len); + key->zk_current_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(keydata_len); key->zk_hmac_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; key->zk_hmac_key.ck_data = key->zk_hmac_keydata; - key->zk_hmac_key.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN); + key->zk_hmac_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN); /* * Initialize the crypto templates. It's ok if this fails because @@ -801,12 +632,14 @@ error: int zio_crypt_do_hmac(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint_t datalen, - uint8_t *digestbuf) + uint8_t *digestbuf, uint_t digestlen) { int ret; crypto_mechanism_t mech; crypto_data_t in_data, digest_data; - uint8_t raw_digestbuf[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; + uint8_t raw_digestbuf[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + ASSERT3U(digestlen, <=, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* initialize sha512-hmac mechanism and crypto data */ mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA512_HMAC); @@ -822,7 +655,7 @@ zio_crypt_do_hmac(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint_t datalen, digest_data.cd_format = CRYPTO_DATA_RAW; digest_data.cd_offset = 0; - digest_data.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; + digest_data.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; digest_data.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)raw_digestbuf; digest_data.cd_raw.iov_len = digest_data.cd_length; @@ -834,12 +667,12 @@ zio_crypt_do_hmac(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint_t datalen, goto error; } - bcopy(raw_digestbuf, digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); + bcopy(raw_digestbuf, digestbuf, digestlen); return (0); error: - bzero(digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); + bzero(digestbuf, digestlen); return (ret); } @@ -848,9 +681,10 @@ zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint_t datalen, uint8_t *ivbuf, uint8_t *salt) { int ret; - uint8_t digestbuf[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; + uint8_t digestbuf[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(key, data, datalen, digestbuf); + ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(key, data, datalen, + digestbuf, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (ret != 0) return (ret); @@ -1212,8 +1046,8 @@ zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(zio_crypt_key_t *key, void *data, uint_t datalen, objset_phys_t *osp = data; uint64_t intval; boolean_t le_bswap = (should_bswap == ZFS_HOST_BYTEORDER); - uint8_t raw_portable_mac[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; - uint8_t raw_local_mac[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; + uint8_t raw_portable_mac[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + uint8_t raw_local_mac[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* initialize HMAC mechanism */ mech.cm_type = crypto_mech2id(SUN_CKM_SHA512_HMAC); @@ -1267,7 +1101,7 @@ zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(zio_crypt_key_t *key, void *data, uint_t datalen, goto error; /* store the final digest in a temporary buffer and copy what we need */ - cd.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; + cd.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)raw_portable_mac; cd.cd_raw.iov_len = cd.cd_length; @@ -1284,7 +1118,7 @@ zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(zio_crypt_key_t *key, void *data, uint_t datalen, * objects are not present, the local MAC is zeroed out. */ if (osp->os_userused_dnode.dn_type == DMU_OT_NONE && - osp->os_userused_dnode.dn_type == DMU_OT_NONE) { + osp->os_groupused_dnode.dn_type == DMU_OT_NONE) { bzero(local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN); return (0); } @@ -1326,7 +1160,7 @@ zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(zio_crypt_key_t *key, void *data, uint_t datalen, goto error; /* store the final digest in a temporary buffer and copy what we need */ - cd.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LEN; + cd.cd_length = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; cd.cd_raw.iov_base = (char *)raw_local_mac; cd.cd_raw.iov_len = cd.cd_length; @@ -1367,7 +1201,7 @@ zio_crypt_do_indirect_mac_checksum(boolean_t generate, void *buf, blkptr_t *bp; int i, epb = datalen >> SPA_BLKPTRSHIFT; SHA2_CTX ctx; - uint8_t digestbuf[SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; + uint8_t digestbuf[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* checksum all of the MACs from the layer below */ SHA2Init(SHA512, &ctx); @@ -1417,8 +1251,8 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_zil(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, boolean_t *no_crypt) { int ret; - uint64_t txtype; - uint_t nr_src, nr_dst, lr_len, crypt_len; + uint64_t txtype, lr_len; + uint_t nr_src, nr_dst, crypt_len; uint_t aad_len = 0, nr_iovecs = 0, total_len = 0; iovec_t *src_iovecs = NULL, *dst_iovecs = NULL; uint8_t *src, *dst, *slrp, *dlrp, *blkend, *aadp; @@ -1468,7 +1302,7 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_zil(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, /* allocate the iovec arrays */ if (nr_src != 0) { src_iovecs = kmem_alloc(nr_src * sizeof (iovec_t), KM_SLEEP); - if (!src_iovecs) { + if (src_iovecs == NULL) { ret = SET_ERROR(ENOMEM); goto error; } @@ -1476,7 +1310,7 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_zil(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, if (nr_dst != 0) { dst_iovecs = kmem_alloc(nr_dst * sizeof (iovec_t), KM_SLEEP); - if (!dst_iovecs) { + if (dst_iovecs == NULL) { ret = SET_ERROR(ENOMEM); goto error; } @@ -1515,6 +1349,9 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_zil(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, aadp += sizeof (lr_t); aad_len += sizeof (lr_t); + ASSERT3P(src_iovecs, !=, NULL); + ASSERT3P(dst_iovecs, !=, NULL); + /* * If this is a TX_WRITE record we want to encrypt everything * except the bp if exists. If the bp does exist we want to @@ -1655,7 +1492,7 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_dnode(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, if (nr_src != 0) { src_iovecs = kmem_alloc(nr_src * sizeof (iovec_t), KM_SLEEP); - if (!src_iovecs) { + if (src_iovecs == NULL) { ret = SET_ERROR(ENOMEM); goto error; } @@ -1663,7 +1500,7 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_dnode(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, if (nr_dst != 0) { dst_iovecs = kmem_alloc(nr_dst * sizeof (iovec_t), KM_SLEEP); - if (!dst_iovecs) { + if (dst_iovecs == NULL) { ret = SET_ERROR(ENOMEM); goto error; } @@ -1729,6 +1566,10 @@ zio_crypt_init_uios_dnode(boolean_t encrypt, uint8_t *plainbuf, if (dnp->dn_type != DMU_OT_NONE && DMU_OT_IS_ENCRYPTED(dnp->dn_bonustype) && dnp->dn_bonuslen != 0) { + ASSERT3U(nr_iovecs, <, nr_src); + ASSERT3U(nr_iovecs, <, nr_dst); + ASSERT3P(src_iovecs, !=, NULL); + ASSERT3P(dst_iovecs, !=, NULL); src_iovecs[nr_iovecs].iov_base = DN_BONUS(dnp); src_iovecs[nr_iovecs].iov_len = crypt_len; dst_iovecs[nr_iovecs].iov_base = DN_BONUS(&ddnp[i]); @@ -1942,7 +1783,7 @@ zio_do_crypt_data(boolean_t encrypt, zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *salt, tmp_ckey.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; tmp_ckey.ck_data = enc_keydata; - tmp_ckey.ck_length = BYTES_TO_BITS(keydata_len); + tmp_ckey.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(keydata_len); ckey = &tmp_ckey; tmpl = NULL; diff --git a/rpm/generic/zfs.spec.in b/rpm/generic/zfs.spec.in index 3f11c2a50..14f2929c6 100644 --- a/rpm/generic/zfs.spec.in +++ b/rpm/generic/zfs.spec.in @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ BuildRequires: libuuid-devel BuildRequires: libblkid-devel BuildRequires: libudev-devel BuildRequires: libattr-devel +BuildRequires: openssl-devel +Requires: openssl %endif %if 0%{?_systemd} Requires(post): systemd @@ -183,7 +185,7 @@ Requires: fio Requires: acl Requires: sudo Requires: sysstat -Requires: rng-tools +Requires: rng-tools %description test This package contains test infrastructure and support scripts for diff --git a/scripts/zloop.sh b/scripts/zloop.sh index f285d6a25..3139bd42b 100755 --- a/scripts/zloop.sh +++ b/scripts/zloop.sh @@ -146,6 +146,15 @@ function store_core fi } +rngdpid="" +function on_exit +{ + if [ -n "$rngdpid" ]; then + kill -9 "$rngdpid" + fi +} +trap on_exit EXIT + # parse arguments # expected format: zloop [-t timeout] [-c coredir] [-- extra ztest args] coredir=$DEFAULTCOREDIR @@ -191,6 +200,9 @@ or_die rm -f ztest.history or_die rm -f ztest.ddt or_die rm -f ztest.cores +# start rngd in the background so we don't run out of entropy +or_die read -r rngdpid < <(rngd -f -r /dev/urandom & echo $!) + ztrc=0 # ztest return value foundcrashes=0 # number of crashes found so far starttime=$(date +%s) diff --git a/tests/runfiles/linux.run b/tests/runfiles/linux.run index d425406b7..47ddc6bc3 100644 --- a/tests/runfiles/linux.run +++ b/tests/runfiles/linux.run @@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ tests = ['history_001_pos', 'history_002_pos', 'history_003_pos', 'history_007_pos', 'history_008_pos', 'history_009_pos', 'history_010_pos'] +[tests/functional/hkdf] +tests = ['run_hkdf_test'] + [tests/functional/inheritance] tests = ['inherit_001_pos'] pre = diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/include/commands.cfg b/tests/zfs-tests/include/commands.cfg index d9f36dda3..e2d0c4162 100644 --- a/tests/zfs-tests/include/commands.cfg +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/include/commands.cfg @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ export SYSTEM_FILES='arp attr basename bc + blkid blockdev bunzip2 bzcat diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/Makefile.am b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/Makefile.am index d68f254ef..dc4bf51b4 100644 --- a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/Makefile.am @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SUBDIRS = \ grow_pool \ grow_replicas \ history \ + hkdf \ inheritance \ inuse \ large_files \ diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/cli_root/zpool_create/zpool_create_008_pos.ksh b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/cli_root/zpool_create/zpool_create_008_pos.ksh index 2e31af3c2..df16da992 100755 --- a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/cli_root/zpool_create/zpool_create_008_pos.ksh +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/cli_root/zpool_create/zpool_create_008_pos.ksh @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ verify_runnable "global" +if is_linux; then + # Versions of libblkid older than 2.27.0 will not always detect member + # devices of a pool, therefore skip this test case for old versions. + currentver="$(blkid -v | tr ',' ' ' | awk '/libblkid/ { print $6 }')" + requiredver="2.27.0" + + if [ "$(printf "$requiredver\n$currentver" | sort -V | head -n1)" == \ + "$currentver" ] && [ "$currentver" != "$requiredver" ]; then + log_unsupported "libblkid ($currentver) may not detect pools" + fi +fi + function cleanup { if [[ $exported_pool == true ]]; then diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/.gitignore b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000..828e33d84 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +hkdf_test diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/Makefile.am b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 000000000..37fe2ed2c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +include $(top_srcdir)/config/Rules.am +AM_CPPFLAGS += -I$(top_srcdir)/include +AM_CPPFLAGS += -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/libspl/include +LDADD = $(top_srcdir)/lib/libicp/libicp.la +LDADD += $(top_srcdir)/lib/libzpool/libzpool.la + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = subdir-objects + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf + +dist_pkgdata_SCRIPTS = \ + setup.ksh \ + cleanup.ksh \ + run_hkdf_test.ksh + +pkgexecdir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf + +pkgexec_PROGRAMS = \ + hkdf_test + +hkdf_test_SOURCES = hkdf_test.c diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/cleanup.ksh b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/cleanup.ksh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..2bdca1950 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/cleanup.ksh @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#!/bin/ksh + +# +# This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. +# You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version +# 1.0 of the CDDL. +# +# A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this +# source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at +# http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2017 by Datto Inc. All rights reserved. +# + +. $STF_SUITE/include/libtest.shlib + +verify_runnable "global" + +log_pass diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/hkdf_test.c b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/hkdf_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd23da332 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/hkdf_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. + * You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version + * 1.0 of the CDDL. + * + * A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this + * source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at + * http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define NELEMS(x) (sizeof (x) / sizeof ((x)[0])) + +/* + * Byte arrays are given as char pointers so that they + * can be specified as strings. + */ +typedef struct hkdf_tv { + /* test vector input values */ + char *ikm; + uint_t ikm_len; + char *salt; + uint_t salt_len; + char *info; + uint_t info_len; + uint_t okm_len; + + /* expected output */ + char *okm; +} hkdf_tv_t; + +/* + * XXX Neither NIST nor IETF has published official test + * vectors for testing HKDF with SHA512. The following + * vectors should be updated if these are ever published. + * The current vectors were taken from: + * https://www.kullo.net/blog/hkdf-sha-512-test-vectors/ + */ +static hkdf_tv_t test_vectors[] = { + { + .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b" + "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b" + "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b", + .ikm_len = 22, + .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c", + .salt_len = 13, + .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" + "\xf8\xf9", + .info_len = 10, + .okm_len = 42, + .okm = "\x83\x23\x90\x08\x6c\xda\x71\xfb" + "\x47\x62\x5b\xb5\xce\xb1\x68\xe4" + "\xc8\xe2\x6a\x1a\x16\xed\x34\xd9" + "\xfc\x7f\xe9\x2c\x14\x81\x57\x93" + "\x38\xda\x36\x2c\xb8\xd9\xf9\x25" + "\xd7\xcb", + }, + { + .ikm = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" + "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17" + "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" + "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27" + "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f" + "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37" + "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f" + "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47" + "\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f", + .ikm_len = 80, + .salt = "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67" + "\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f" + "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77" + "\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f" + "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87" + "\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f" + "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97" + "\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f" + "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7" + "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf", + .salt_len = 80, + .info = "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7" + "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf" + "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7" + "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7" + "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf" + "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7" + "\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef" + "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" + "\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff", + .info_len = 80, + .okm_len = 42, + .okm = "\xce\x6c\x97\x19\x28\x05\xb3\x46" + "\xe6\x16\x1e\x82\x1e\xd1\x65\x67" + "\x3b\x84\xf4\x00\xa2\xb5\x14\xb2" + "\xfe\x23\xd8\x4c\xd1\x89\xdd\xf1" + "\xb6\x95\xb4\x8c\xbd\x1c\x83\x88" + "\x44\x11\x37\xb3\xce\x28\xf1\x6a" + "\xa6\x4b\xa3\x3b\xa4\x66\xb2\x4d" + "\xf6\xcf\xcb\x02\x1e\xcf\xf2\x35" + "\xf6\xa2\x05\x6c\xe3\xaf\x1d\xe4" + "\x4d\x57\x20\x97\xa8\x50\x5d\x9e" + "\x7a\x93", + }, + { + .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b" + "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b" + "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b", + .ikm_len = 22, + .salt = NULL, + .salt_len = 0, + .info = NULL, + .info_len = 0, + .okm_len = 42, + .okm = "\xf5\xfa\x02\xb1\x82\x98\xa7\x2a" + "\x8c\x23\x89\x8a\x87\x03\x47\x2c" + "\x6e\xb1\x79\xdc\x20\x4c\x03\x42" + "\x5c\x97\x0e\x3b\x16\x4b\xf9\x0f" + "\xff\x22\xd0\x48\x36\xd0\xe2\x34" + "\x3b\xac", + }, + { + .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b" + "\x0b\x0b\x0b", + .ikm_len = 11, + .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c", + .salt_len = 13, + .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7" + "\xf8\xf9", + .info_len = 10, + .okm_len = 42, + .okm = "\x74\x13\xe8\x99\x7e\x02\x06\x10" + "\xfb\xf6\x82\x3f\x2c\xe1\x4b\xff" + "\x01\x87\x5d\xb1\xca\x55\xf6\x8c" + "\xfc\xf3\x95\x4d\xc8\xaf\xf5\x35" + "\x59\xbd\x5e\x30\x28\xb0\x80\xf7" + "\xc0\x68", + }, + { + .ikm = "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c" + "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c" + "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c", + .ikm_len = 22, + .salt = NULL, + .salt_len = 0, + .info = NULL, + .info_len = 0, + .okm_len = 42, + .okm = "\x14\x07\xd4\x60\x13\xd9\x8b\xc6" + "\xde\xce\xfc\xfe\xe5\x5f\x0f\x90" + "\xb0\xc7\xf6\x3d\x68\xeb\x1a\x80" + "\xea\xf0\x7e\x95\x3c\xfc\x0a\x3a" + "\x52\x40\xa1\x55\xd6\xe4\xda\xa9" + "\x65\xbb", + }, +}; + +static void +hexdump(char *str, uint8_t *src, uint_t len) +{ + int i; + + printf("\t%s\t", str); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + printf("%02x", src[i] & 0xff); + } + printf("\n"); +} + +static int +run_test(int i, hkdf_tv_t *tv) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t okey[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + printf("TEST %d:\t", i); + + ret = hkdf_sha512((uint8_t *)tv->ikm, tv->ikm_len, (uint8_t *)tv->salt, + tv->salt_len, (uint8_t *)tv->info, tv->info_len, okey, tv->okm_len); + if (ret != 0) { + printf("HKDF failed with error code %d\n", ret); + return (ret); + } + + if (bcmp(okey, tv->okm, tv->okm_len) != 0) { + printf("Output Mismatch\n"); + hexdump("Expected:", (uint8_t *)tv->okm, tv->okm_len); + hexdump("Actual: ", okey, tv->okm_len); + return (1); + } + + printf("Passed\n"); + + return (0); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret, i; + + icp_init(); + + for (i = 0; i < NELEMS(test_vectors); i++) { + ret = run_test(i, &test_vectors[i]); + if (ret != 0) + break; + } + + icp_fini(); + + if (ret == 0) { + printf("All tests passed successfully.\n"); + return (0); + } else { + printf("Test failed.\n"); + return (1); + } +} diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/run_hkdf_test.ksh b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/run_hkdf_test.ksh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..5fde0b837 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/run_hkdf_test.ksh @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +#!/bin/ksh + +# +# This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. +# You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version +# 1.0 of the CDDL. +# +# A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this +# source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at +# http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2017 by Datto Inc. All rights reserved. +# + +. $STF_SUITE/include/libtest.shlib + +# +# DESCRIPTION: +# Call the hkdf_test tool to test ZFS's HKDF implementation against +# a few test vectors. +# + +log_assert "Run the tests for the HKDF algorithm." + +log_must $STF_SUITE/tests/functional/hkdf/hkdf_test + +log_pass "HKDF tests pass." diff --git a/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/setup.ksh b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/setup.ksh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..2bdca1950 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/zfs-tests/tests/functional/hkdf/setup.ksh @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#!/bin/ksh + +# +# This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the +# Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. +# You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version +# 1.0 of the CDDL. +# +# A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this +# source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at +# http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. +# + +# +# Copyright (c) 2017 by Datto Inc. All rights reserved. +# + +. $STF_SUITE/include/libtest.shlib + +verify_runnable "global" + +log_pass