ZIL claiming should not start user accounting

Currently, ZIL claiming dirties objsets which causes
dsl_pool_sync() to attempt to perform user accounting on
them. This causes problems for encrypted datasets that were
raw received before the system went offline since they
cannot perform user accounting until they have their keys
loaded. This triggers an ASSERT in zio_encrypt(). Since
encryption was added, the code now depends on the fact that
data should only be written when objsets are owned. This
patch adds a check in dmu_objset_do_userquota_updates()
to ensure that useraccounting is only done when the objsets
are actually owned for write. As part of this work, the
zfsvfs and zvol code was updated so that it no longer lies
about owning objsets readonly.

Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #6916 
Closes #7163
This commit is contained in:
Tom Caputi
2018-02-20 19:27:31 -05:00
committed by Brian Behlendorf
parent cbce581353
commit 163a8c28dd
5 changed files with 44 additions and 38 deletions
+19 -24
View File
@@ -1136,21 +1136,16 @@ zfsvfs_init(zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs, objset_t *os)
}
int
zfsvfs_create(const char *osname, zfsvfs_t **zfvp)
zfsvfs_create(const char *osname, boolean_t readonly, zfsvfs_t **zfvp)
{
objset_t *os;
zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs;
int error;
boolean_t ro = (readonly || (strchr(osname, '@') != NULL));
zfsvfs = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (zfsvfs_t), KM_SLEEP);
/*
* We claim to always be readonly so we can open snapshots;
* other ZPL code will prevent us from writing to snapshots.
*/
error = dmu_objset_own(osname, DMU_OST_ZFS, B_TRUE, B_TRUE,
zfsvfs, &os);
error = dmu_objset_own(osname, DMU_OST_ZFS, ro, B_TRUE, zfsvfs, &os);
if (error != 0) {
kmem_free(zfsvfs, sizeof (zfsvfs_t));
return (error);
@@ -1209,14 +1204,6 @@ zfsvfs_setup(zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs, boolean_t mounting)
int error;
boolean_t readonly = zfs_is_readonly(zfsvfs);
/*
* Check for a bad on-disk format version now since we
* lied about owning the dataset readonly before.
*/
if (!readonly &&
dmu_objset_incompatible_encryption_version(zfsvfs->z_os))
return (SET_ERROR(EROFS));
error = zfs_register_callbacks(zfsvfs->z_vfs);
if (error)
return (error);
@@ -1786,24 +1773,30 @@ zfs_domount(struct super_block *sb, zfs_mnt_t *zm, int silent)
struct inode *root_inode;
uint64_t recordsize;
int error = 0;
zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs;
zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs = NULL;
vfs_t *vfs = NULL;
ASSERT(zm);
ASSERT(osname);
error = zfsvfs_create(osname, &zfsvfs);
error = zfsvfs_parse_options(zm->mnt_data, &vfs);
if (error)
return (error);
error = zfsvfs_parse_options(zm->mnt_data, &zfsvfs->z_vfs);
if (error)
error = zfsvfs_create(osname, vfs->vfs_readonly, &zfsvfs);
if (error) {
zfsvfs_vfs_free(vfs);
goto out;
}
if ((error = dsl_prop_get_integer(osname, "recordsize",
&recordsize, NULL)))
&recordsize, NULL))) {
zfsvfs_vfs_free(vfs);
goto out;
}
zfsvfs->z_vfs->vfs_data = zfsvfs;
vfs->vfs_data = zfsvfs;
zfsvfs->z_vfs = vfs;
zfsvfs->z_sb = sb;
sb->s_fs_info = zfsvfs;
sb->s_magic = ZFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
@@ -1875,8 +1868,10 @@ zfs_domount(struct super_block *sb, zfs_mnt_t *zm, int silent)
zfsvfs->z_arc_prune = arc_add_prune_callback(zpl_prune_sb, sb);
out:
if (error) {
dmu_objset_disown(zfsvfs->z_os, B_TRUE, zfsvfs);
zfsvfs_free(zfsvfs);
if (zfsvfs != NULL) {
dmu_objset_disown(zfsvfs->z_os, B_TRUE, zfsvfs);
zfsvfs_free(zfsvfs);
}
/*
* make sure we don't have dangling sb->s_fs_info which
* zfs_preumount will use.