2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
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/*
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* CDDL HEADER START
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
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* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
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* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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*
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* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
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* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
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* and limitations under the License.
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*
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* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
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2018-02-08 19:35:09 +03:00
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* Copyright (c) 2012, 2017 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
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2017-05-19 22:33:11 +03:00
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* Copyright (c) 2017 Datto Inc.
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2017-06-27 02:56:09 +03:00
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* Copyright 2017 RackTop Systems.
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2017-10-26 22:26:09 +03:00
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* Copyright (c) 2017 Open-E, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
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*/
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#ifndef _LIBZFS_CORE_H
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#define _LIBZFS_CORE_H
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#include <libnvpair.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/fs/zfs.h>
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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int libzfs_core_init(void);
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void libzfs_core_fini(void);
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2017-01-23 20:49:57 +03:00
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/*
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* NB: this type should be kept binary compatible with dmu_objset_type_t.
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*/
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enum lzc_dataset_type {
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LZC_DATSET_TYPE_ZFS = 2,
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LZC_DATSET_TYPE_ZVOL
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};
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OpenZFS 7614, 9064 - zfs device evacuation/removal
OpenZFS 7614 - zfs device evacuation/removal
OpenZFS 9064 - remove_mirror should wait for device removal to complete
This project allows top-level vdevs to be removed from the storage pool
with "zpool remove", reducing the total amount of storage in the pool.
This operation copies all allocated regions of the device to be removed
onto other devices, recording the mapping from old to new location.
After the removal is complete, read and free operations to the removed
(now "indirect") vdev must be remapped and performed at the new location
on disk. The indirect mapping table is kept in memory whenever the pool
is loaded, so there is minimal performance overhead when doing operations
on the indirect vdev.
The size of the in-memory mapping table will be reduced when its entries
become "obsolete" because they are no longer used by any block pointers
in the pool. An entry becomes obsolete when all the blocks that use
it are freed. An entry can also become obsolete when all the snapshots
that reference it are deleted, and the block pointers that reference it
have been "remapped" in all filesystems/zvols (and clones). Whenever an
indirect block is written, all the block pointers in it will be "remapped"
to their new (concrete) locations if possible. This process can be
accelerated by using the "zfs remap" command to proactively rewrite all
indirect blocks that reference indirect (removed) vdevs.
Note that when a device is removed, we do not verify the checksum of
the data that is copied. This makes the process much faster, but if it
were used on redundant vdevs (i.e. mirror or raidz vdevs), it would be
possible to copy the wrong data, when we have the correct data on e.g.
the other side of the mirror.
At the moment, only mirrors and simple top-level vdevs can be removed
and no removal is allowed if any of the top-level vdevs are raidz.
Porting Notes:
* Avoid zero-sized kmem_alloc() in vdev_compact_children().
The device evacuation code adds a dependency that
vdev_compact_children() be able to properly empty the vdev_child
array by setting it to NULL and zeroing vdev_children. Under Linux,
kmem_alloc() and related functions return a sentinel pointer rather
than NULL for zero-sized allocations.
* Remove comment regarding "mpt" driver where zfs_remove_max_segment
is initialized to SPA_MAXBLOCKSIZE.
Change zfs_condense_indirect_commit_entry_delay_ticks to
zfs_condense_indirect_commit_entry_delay_ms for consistency with
most other tunables in which delays are specified in ms.
* ZTS changes:
Use set_tunable rather than mdb
Use zpool sync as appropriate
Use sync_pool instead of sync
Kill jobs during test_removal_with_operation to allow unmount/export
Don't add non-disk names such as "mirror" or "raidz" to $DISKS
Use $TEST_BASE_DIR instead of /tmp
Increase HZ from 100 to 1000 which is more common on Linux
removal_multiple_indirection.ksh
Reduce iterations in order to not time out on the code
coverage builders.
removal_resume_export:
Functionally, the test case is correct but there exists a race
where the kernel thread hasn't been fully started yet and is
not visible. Wait for up to 1 second for the removal thread
to be started before giving up on it. Also, increase the
amount of data copied in order that the removal not finish
before the export has a chance to fail.
* MMP compatibility, the concept of concrete versus non-concrete devices
has slightly changed the semantics of vdev_writeable(). Update
mmp_random_leaf_impl() accordingly.
* Updated dbuf_remap() to handle the org.zfsonlinux:large_dnode pool
feature which is not supported by OpenZFS.
* Added support for new vdev removal tracepoints.
* Test cases removal_with_zdb and removal_condense_export have been
intentionally disabled. When run manually they pass as intended,
but when running in the automated test environment they produce
unreliable results on the latest Fedora release.
They may work better once the upstream pool import refectoring is
merged into ZoL at which point they will be re-enabled.
Authored by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Reece <alex@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Wilson <george.wilson@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: John Kennedy <john.kennedy@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Prakash Surya <prakash.surya@delphix.com>
Reviewed by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com>
Reviewed by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com>
Reviewed by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Approved by: Garrett D'Amore <garrett@damore.org>
Ported-by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com>
OpenZFS-issue: https://www.illumos.org/issues/7614
OpenZFS-commit: https://github.com/openzfs/openzfs/commit/f539f1eb
Closes #6900
2016-09-22 19:30:13 +03:00
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int lzc_remap(const char *fsname);
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2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
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int lzc_snapshot(nvlist_t *, nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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int lzc_create(const char *, enum lzc_dataset_type, nvlist_t *, uint8_t *,
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uint_t);
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2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
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int lzc_clone(const char *, const char *, nvlist_t *);
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2017-06-27 02:56:09 +03:00
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int lzc_promote(const char *, char *, int);
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2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
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int lzc_destroy_snaps(nvlist_t *, boolean_t, nvlist_t **);
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int lzc_bookmark(nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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int lzc_get_bookmarks(const char *, nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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int lzc_destroy_bookmarks(nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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int lzc_load_key(const char *, boolean_t, uint8_t *, uint_t);
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int lzc_unload_key(const char *);
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int lzc_change_key(const char *, uint64_t, nvlist_t *, uint8_t *, uint_t);
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2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
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2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
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int lzc_snaprange_space(const char *, const char *, uint64_t *);
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2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
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2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
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int lzc_hold(nvlist_t *, int, nvlist_t **);
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int lzc_release(nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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int lzc_get_holds(const char *, nvlist_t **);
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2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
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2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
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enum lzc_send_flags {
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2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
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LZC_SEND_FLAG_EMBED_DATA = 1 << 0,
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2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
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LZC_SEND_FLAG_LARGE_BLOCK = 1 << 1,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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LZC_SEND_FLAG_COMPRESS = 1 << 2,
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LZC_SEND_FLAG_RAW = 1 << 3,
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2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
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};
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int lzc_send(const char *, const char *, int, enum lzc_send_flags);
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2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
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int lzc_send_resume(const char *, const char *, int,
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enum lzc_send_flags, uint64_t, uint64_t);
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2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
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int lzc_send_space(const char *, const char *, enum lzc_send_flags, uint64_t *);
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2016-06-16 20:01:33 +03:00
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struct dmu_replay_record;
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Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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int lzc_receive(const char *, nvlist_t *, const char *, boolean_t, boolean_t,
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int);
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int lzc_receive_resumable(const char *, nvlist_t *, const char *, boolean_t,
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2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
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boolean_t, int);
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2016-06-16 20:01:33 +03:00
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int lzc_receive_with_header(const char *, nvlist_t *, const char *, boolean_t,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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boolean_t, boolean_t, int, const struct dmu_replay_record *);
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2016-06-10 03:04:12 +03:00
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int lzc_receive_one(const char *, nvlist_t *, const char *, boolean_t,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t, boolean_t, int, const struct dmu_replay_record *, int,
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|
|
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uint64_t *, uint64_t *, uint64_t *, nvlist_t **);
|
2017-05-10 02:21:09 +03:00
|
|
|
int lzc_receive_with_cmdprops(const char *, nvlist_t *, nvlist_t *,
|
2017-10-13 20:09:04 +03:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *, uint_t, const char *, boolean_t, boolean_t, boolean_t, int,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
const struct dmu_replay_record *, int, uint64_t *, uint64_t *,
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|
|
|
uint64_t *, nvlist_t **);
|
2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
boolean_t lzc_exists(const char *);
|
2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
|
|
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2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
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int lzc_rollback(const char *, char *, int);
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2017-03-11 21:26:47 +03:00
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int lzc_rollback_to(const char *, const char *);
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2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
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2018-02-08 19:35:09 +03:00
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int lzc_channel_program(const char *, const char *, uint64_t,
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uint64_t, nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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int lzc_channel_program_nosync(const char *, const char *, uint64_t,
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uint64_t, nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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2018-02-08 19:16:23 +03:00
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2017-05-19 22:33:11 +03:00
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int lzc_sync(const char *, nvlist_t *, nvlist_t **);
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2017-10-26 22:26:09 +03:00
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int lzc_reopen(const char *, boolean_t);
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2017-05-19 22:33:11 +03:00
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2016-12-17 01:11:29 +03:00
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int lzc_pool_checkpoint(const char *);
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int lzc_pool_checkpoint_discard(const char *);
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2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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#endif
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#endif /* _LIBZFS_CORE_H */
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