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mirror_zfs/include/os/linux/zfs/sys/policy.h

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Add `zfs allow` and `zfs unallow` support ZFS allows for specific permissions to be delegated to normal users with the `zfs allow` and `zfs unallow` commands. In addition, non- privileged users should be able to run all of the following commands: * zpool [list | iostat | status | get] * zfs [list | get] Historically this functionality was not available on Linux. In order to add it the secpolicy_* functions needed to be implemented and mapped to the equivalent Linux capability. Only then could the permissions on the `/dev/zfs` be relaxed and the internal ZFS permission checks used. Even with this change some limitations remain. Under Linux only the root user is allowed to modify the namespace (unless it's a private namespace). This means the mount, mountpoint, canmount, unmount, and remount delegations cannot be supported with the existing code. It may be possible to add this functionality in the future. This functionality was validated with the cli_user and delegation test cases from the ZFS Test Suite. These tests exhaustively verify each of the supported permissions which can be delegated and ensures only an authorized user can perform it. Two minor bug fixes were required for test-running.py. First, the Timer() object cannot be safely created in a `try:` block when there is an unconditional `finally` block which references it. Second, when running as a normal user also check for scripts using the both the .ksh and .sh suffixes. Finally, existing users who are simulating delegations by setting group permissions on the /dev/zfs device should revert that customization when updating to a version with this change. Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tony Hutter <hutter2@llnl.gov> Closes #362 Closes #434 Closes #4100 Closes #4394 Closes #4410 Closes #4487
2016-06-07 19:16:52 +03:00
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
* and limitations under the License.
*
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* Copyright 2015, Joyent, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2016, Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_POLICY_H
#define _SYS_POLICY_H
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/cred.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/xvattr.h>
#include <sys/zpl.h>
int secpolicy_nfs(const cred_t *);
int secpolicy_sys_config(const cred_t *, boolean_t);
int secpolicy_vnode_access2(const cred_t *, struct inode *,
uid_t, mode_t, mode_t);
int secpolicy_vnode_any_access(const cred_t *, struct inode *, uid_t);
int secpolicy_vnode_chown(const cred_t *, uid_t);
int secpolicy_vnode_create_gid(const cred_t *);
int secpolicy_vnode_remove(const cred_t *);
int secpolicy_vnode_setdac(const cred_t *, uid_t);
int secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(const cred_t *, boolean_t);
int secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(const cred_t *, gid_t);
int secpolicy_zinject(const cred_t *);
int secpolicy_zfs(const cred_t *);
filesystem_limit/snapshot_limit is incorrectly enforced against root The filesystem_limit and snapshot_limit properties limit the number of filesystems or snapshots that can be created below this dataset. According to the manpage, "The limit is not enforced if the user is allowed to change the limit." Two types of users are allowed to change the limit: 1. Those that have been delegated the `filesystem_limit` or `snapshot_limit` permission, e.g. with `zfs allow USER filesystem_limit DATASET`. This works properly. 2. A user with elevated system privileges (e.g. root). This does not work - the root user will incorrectly get an error when trying to create a snapshot/filesystem, if it exceeds the `_limit` property. The problem is that `priv_policy_ns()` does not work if the `cred_t` is not that of the current process. This happens when `dsl_enforce_ds_ss_limits()` is called in syncing context (as part of a sync task's check func) to determine the permissions of the corresponding user process. This commit fixes the issue by passing the `task_struct` (typedef'ed as a `proc_t`) to syncing context, and then using `has_capability()` to determine if that process is privileged. Note that we still need to pass the `cred_t` to syncing context so that we can check if the user was delegated this permission with `zfs allow`. This problem only impacts Linux. Wrappers are added to FreeBSD but it continues to use `priv_check_cred()`, which works on arbitrary `cred_t`. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Closes #8226 Closes #10545
2020-07-12 03:18:02 +03:00
int secpolicy_zfs_proc(const cred_t *, proc_t *);
Add `zfs allow` and `zfs unallow` support ZFS allows for specific permissions to be delegated to normal users with the `zfs allow` and `zfs unallow` commands. In addition, non- privileged users should be able to run all of the following commands: * zpool [list | iostat | status | get] * zfs [list | get] Historically this functionality was not available on Linux. In order to add it the secpolicy_* functions needed to be implemented and mapped to the equivalent Linux capability. Only then could the permissions on the `/dev/zfs` be relaxed and the internal ZFS permission checks used. Even with this change some limitations remain. Under Linux only the root user is allowed to modify the namespace (unless it's a private namespace). This means the mount, mountpoint, canmount, unmount, and remount delegations cannot be supported with the existing code. It may be possible to add this functionality in the future. This functionality was validated with the cli_user and delegation test cases from the ZFS Test Suite. These tests exhaustively verify each of the supported permissions which can be delegated and ensures only an authorized user can perform it. Two minor bug fixes were required for test-running.py. First, the Timer() object cannot be safely created in a `try:` block when there is an unconditional `finally` block which references it. Second, when running as a normal user also check for scripts using the both the .ksh and .sh suffixes. Finally, existing users who are simulating delegations by setting group permissions on the /dev/zfs device should revert that customization when updating to a version with this change. Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tony Hutter <hutter2@llnl.gov> Closes #362 Closes #434 Closes #4100 Closes #4394 Closes #4410 Closes #4487
2016-06-07 19:16:52 +03:00
void secpolicy_setid_clear(vattr_t *, cred_t *);
int secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct inode *, vattr_t *,
const vattr_t *, cred_t *);
Add zfs_file_* interface, remove vnodes Provide a common zfs_file_* interface which can be implemented on all platforms to perform normal file access from either the kernel module or the libzpool library. This allows all non-portable vnode_t usage in the common code to be replaced by the new portable zfs_file_t. The associated vnode and kobj compatibility functions, types, and macros have been removed from the SPL. Moving forward, vnodes should only be used in platform specific code when provided by the native operating system. Reviewed-by: Sean Eric Fagan <sef@ixsystems.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Igor Kozhukhov <igor@dilos.org> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Matt Macy <mmacy@FreeBSD.org> Closes #9556
2019-11-21 20:32:57 +03:00
int secpolicy_xvattr(xvattr_t *, uid_t, cred_t *, mode_t);
Add `zfs allow` and `zfs unallow` support ZFS allows for specific permissions to be delegated to normal users with the `zfs allow` and `zfs unallow` commands. In addition, non- privileged users should be able to run all of the following commands: * zpool [list | iostat | status | get] * zfs [list | get] Historically this functionality was not available on Linux. In order to add it the secpolicy_* functions needed to be implemented and mapped to the equivalent Linux capability. Only then could the permissions on the `/dev/zfs` be relaxed and the internal ZFS permission checks used. Even with this change some limitations remain. Under Linux only the root user is allowed to modify the namespace (unless it's a private namespace). This means the mount, mountpoint, canmount, unmount, and remount delegations cannot be supported with the existing code. It may be possible to add this functionality in the future. This functionality was validated with the cli_user and delegation test cases from the ZFS Test Suite. These tests exhaustively verify each of the supported permissions which can be delegated and ensures only an authorized user can perform it. Two minor bug fixes were required for test-running.py. First, the Timer() object cannot be safely created in a `try:` block when there is an unconditional `finally` block which references it. Second, when running as a normal user also check for scripts using the both the .ksh and .sh suffixes. Finally, existing users who are simulating delegations by setting group permissions on the /dev/zfs device should revert that customization when updating to a version with this change. Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tony Hutter <hutter2@llnl.gov> Closes #362 Closes #434 Closes #4100 Closes #4394 Closes #4410 Closes #4487
2016-06-07 19:16:52 +03:00
int secpolicy_vnode_setattr(cred_t *, struct inode *, struct vattr *,
const struct vattr *, int, int (void *, int, cred_t *), void *);
int secpolicy_basic_link(const cred_t *);
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#endif /* _SYS_POLICY_H */
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