2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* CDDL HEADER START
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
|
|
|
|
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
|
|
|
|
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
|
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|
|
* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
|
|
|
|
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
|
|
|
|
* and limitations under the License.
|
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|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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|
|
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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|
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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|
|
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2005, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
|
2011-10-16 10:41:05 +04:00
|
|
|
* Copyright 2011 Nexenta Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
2016-06-09 21:18:16 +03:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2011, 2015 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
|
2015-04-01 16:07:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2014, Joyent, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* Copyright 2014 HybridCluster. All rights reserved.
|
2016-06-09 21:46:42 +03:00
|
|
|
* Copyright 2016 RackTop Systems.
|
2014-03-22 13:07:14 +04:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2016 Actifio, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
2011-10-16 10:41:05 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dmu.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dmu_impl.h>
|
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|
|
#include <sys/dmu_tx.h>
|
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|
|
#include <sys/dbuf.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dnode.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dmu_traverse.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_dataset.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_dir.h>
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_prop.h>
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_pool.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_synctask.h>
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/spa_impl.h>
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/zfs_ioctl.h>
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|
|
|
#include <sys/zap.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/zio_checksum.h>
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/zfs_znode.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <zfs_fletcher.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/avl.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/ddt.h>
|
2010-08-27 01:24:34 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/zfs_onexit.h>
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/dmu_send.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_destroy.h>
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/blkptr.h>
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/dsl_bookmark.h>
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/zfeature.h>
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/bqueue.h>
|
2014-03-22 13:07:14 +04:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/zvol.h>
|
2016-06-07 19:16:52 +03:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/policy.h>
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Set this tunable to TRUE to replace corrupt data with 0x2f5baddb10c */
|
|
|
|
int zfs_send_corrupt_data = B_FALSE;
|
2018-04-09 05:41:15 +03:00
|
|
|
int zfs_send_queue_length = SPA_MAXBLOCKSIZE;
|
2016-06-09 21:46:42 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Set this tunable to FALSE to disable setting of DRR_FLAG_FREERECORDS */
|
|
|
|
int zfs_send_set_freerecords_bit = B_TRUE;
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Set this tunable to FALSE is disable sending unmodified spill blocks. */
|
|
|
|
int zfs_send_unmodified_spill_blocks = B_TRUE;
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-26 21:43:21 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Use this to override the recordsize calculation for fast zfs send estimates.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned long zfs_override_estimate_recordsize = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
#define BP_SPAN(datablkszsec, indblkshift, level) \
|
|
|
|
(((uint64_t)datablkszsec) << (SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT + \
|
|
|
|
(level) * (indblkshift - SPA_BLKPTRSHIFT)))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct send_thread_arg {
|
|
|
|
bqueue_t q;
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *ds; /* Dataset to traverse */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t fromtxg; /* Traverse from this txg */
|
|
|
|
int flags; /* flags to pass to traverse_dataset */
|
|
|
|
int error_code;
|
|
|
|
boolean_t cancel;
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
zbookmark_phys_t resume;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct send_block_record {
|
|
|
|
boolean_t eos_marker; /* Marks the end of the stream */
|
|
|
|
blkptr_t bp;
|
|
|
|
zbookmark_phys_t zb;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t indblkshift;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t datablkszsec;
|
|
|
|
bqueue_node_t ln;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
typedef struct dump_bytes_io {
|
|
|
|
dmu_sendarg_t *dbi_dsp;
|
|
|
|
void *dbi_buf;
|
|
|
|
int dbi_len;
|
|
|
|
} dump_bytes_io_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
static int do_dump(dmu_sendarg_t *dsa, struct send_block_record *data);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2015-12-02 22:53:37 +03:00
|
|
|
dump_bytes_cb(void *arg)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
dump_bytes_io_t *dbi = (dump_bytes_io_t *)arg;
|
|
|
|
dmu_sendarg_t *dsp = dbi->dbi_dsp;
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *ds = dmu_objset_ds(dsp->dsa_os);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
ssize_t resid; /* have to get resid to get detailed errno */
|
2016-06-09 22:07:01 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* The code does not rely on len being a multiple of 8. We keep
|
2016-06-09 22:07:01 +03:00
|
|
|
* this assertion because of the corresponding assertion in
|
|
|
|
* receive_read(). Keeping this assertion ensures that we do not
|
|
|
|
* inadvertently break backwards compatibility (causing the assertion
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* in receive_read() to trigger on old software). Newer feature flags
|
|
|
|
* (such as raw send) may break this assertion since they were
|
|
|
|
* introduced after the requirement was made obsolete.
|
2016-06-09 22:07:01 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(dbi->dbi_len % 8 == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) != 0);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_err = vn_rdwr(UIO_WRITE, dsp->dsa_vp,
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
(caddr_t)dbi->dbi_buf, dbi->dbi_len,
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
0, UIO_SYSSPACE, FAPPEND, RLIM64_INFINITY, CRED(), &resid);
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&ds->ds_sendstream_lock);
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
*dsp->dsa_off += dbi->dbi_len;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&ds->ds_sendstream_lock);
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dump_bytes(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, void *buf, int len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump_bytes_io_t dbi;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dbi.dbi_dsp = dsp;
|
|
|
|
dbi.dbi_buf = buf;
|
|
|
|
dbi.dbi_len = len;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-02 22:53:37 +03:00
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LARGE_STACKS)
|
|
|
|
dump_bytes_cb(&dbi);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2013-05-04 01:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The vn_rdwr() call is performed in a taskq to ensure that there is
|
|
|
|
* always enough stack space to write safely to the target filesystem.
|
|
|
|
* The ZIO_TYPE_FREE threads are used because there can be a lot of
|
|
|
|
* them and they are used in vdev_file.c for a similar purpose.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
spa_taskq_dispatch_sync(dmu_objset_spa(dsp->dsa_os), ZIO_TYPE_FREE,
|
2015-12-02 22:53:37 +03:00
|
|
|
ZIO_TASKQ_ISSUE, dump_bytes_cb, &dbi, TQ_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_LARGE_STACKS */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (dsp->dsa_err);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For all record types except BEGIN, fill in the checksum (overlaid in
|
|
|
|
* drr_u.drr_checksum.drr_checksum). The checksum verifies everything
|
|
|
|
* up to the start of the checksum itself.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dump_record(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, void *payload, int payload_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(offsetof(dmu_replay_record_t, drr_u.drr_checksum.drr_checksum),
|
|
|
|
==, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t) - sizeof (zio_cksum_t));
|
2016-07-22 18:52:49 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) fletcher_4_incremental_native(dsp->dsa_drr,
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
offsetof(dmu_replay_record_t, drr_u.drr_checksum.drr_checksum),
|
|
|
|
&dsp->dsa_zc);
|
2016-09-23 02:01:19 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type == DRR_BEGIN) {
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_sent_begin = B_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(ZIO_CHECKSUM_IS_ZERO(&dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.
|
|
|
|
drr_checksum.drr_checksum));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_checksum.drr_checksum = dsp->dsa_zc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-09-23 02:01:19 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type == DRR_END) {
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_sent_end = B_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-22 18:52:49 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) fletcher_4_incremental_native(&dsp->dsa_drr->
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
drr_u.drr_checksum.drr_checksum,
|
|
|
|
sizeof (zio_cksum_t), &dsp->dsa_zc);
|
|
|
|
if (dump_bytes(dsp, dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
|
|
|
if (payload_len != 0) {
|
2016-07-22 18:52:49 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) fletcher_4_incremental_native(payload, payload_len,
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
&dsp->dsa_zc);
|
|
|
|
if (dump_bytes(dsp, payload, payload_len) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-09 21:18:16 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fill in the drr_free struct, or perform aggregation if the previous record is
|
|
|
|
* also a free record, and the two are adjacent.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note that we send free records even for a full send, because we want to be
|
|
|
|
* able to receive a full send as a clone, which requires a list of all the free
|
|
|
|
* and freeobject records that were generated on the source.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dump_free(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset,
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
struct drr_free *drrf = &(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_free);
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-29 22:58:53 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When we receive a free record, dbuf_free_range() assumes
|
|
|
|
* that the receiving system doesn't have any dbufs in the range
|
|
|
|
* being freed. This is always true because there is a one-record
|
|
|
|
* constraint: we only send one WRITE record for any given
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* object,offset. We know that the one-record constraint is
|
2013-07-29 22:58:53 +04:00
|
|
|
* true because we always send data in increasing order by
|
|
|
|
* object,offset.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the increasing-order constraint ever changes, we should find
|
|
|
|
* another way to assert that the one-record constraint is still
|
|
|
|
* satisfied.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(object > dsp->dsa_last_data_object ||
|
|
|
|
(object == dsp->dsa_last_data_object &&
|
|
|
|
offset > dsp->dsa_last_data_offset));
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there is a pending op, but it's not PENDING_FREE, push it out,
|
|
|
|
* since free block aggregation can only be done for blocks of the
|
|
|
|
* same type (i.e., DRR_FREE records can only be aggregated with
|
|
|
|
* other DRR_FREE records. DRR_FREEOBJECTS records can only be
|
|
|
|
* aggregated with other DRR_FREEOBJECTS records.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE &&
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_FREE) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op == PENDING_FREE) {
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
* There should never be a PENDING_FREE if length is
|
|
|
|
* DMU_OBJECT_END (because dump_dnode is the only place where
|
|
|
|
* this function is called with a DMU_OBJECT_END, and only after
|
|
|
|
* flushing any pending record).
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(length != DMU_OBJECT_END);
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check to see whether this free block can be aggregated
|
|
|
|
* with pending one.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (drrf->drr_object == object && drrf->drr_offset +
|
|
|
|
drrf->drr_length == offset) {
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
if (offset + length < offset)
|
|
|
|
drrf->drr_length = DMU_OBJECT_END;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
drrf->drr_length += length;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* not a continuation. Push out pending record */
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* create a FREE record and make it pending */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_FREE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrf->drr_object = object;
|
|
|
|
drrf->drr_offset = offset;
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
if (offset + length < offset)
|
|
|
|
drrf->drr_length = DMU_OBJECT_END;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
drrf->drr_length = length;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrf->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
if (length == DMU_OBJECT_END) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_FREE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dump_write(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, dmu_object_type_t type, uint64_t object,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t offset, int lsize, int psize, const blkptr_t *bp, void *data)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t payload_size;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t raw = (dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW);
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
struct drr_write *drrw = &(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_write);
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-29 22:58:53 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We send data in increasing object, offset order.
|
|
|
|
* See comment in dump_free() for details.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(object > dsp->dsa_last_data_object ||
|
|
|
|
(object == dsp->dsa_last_data_object &&
|
|
|
|
offset > dsp->dsa_last_data_offset));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_last_data_object = object;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_last_data_offset = offset + lsize - 1;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there is any kind of pending aggregation (currently either
|
|
|
|
* a grouping of free objects or free blocks), push it out to
|
|
|
|
* the stream, since aggregation can't be done across operations
|
|
|
|
* of different types.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
/* write a WRITE record */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_WRITE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrw->drr_object = object;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_type = type;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_offset = offset;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrw->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
drrw->drr_logical_size = lsize;
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/* only set the compression fields if the buf is compressed or raw */
|
|
|
|
if (raw || lsize != psize) {
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(!BP_IS_EMBEDDED(bp));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3S(psize, >, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (raw) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-08-24 02:54:24 +03:00
|
|
|
* This is a raw protected block so we need to pass
|
|
|
|
* along everything the receiving side will need to
|
|
|
|
* interpret this block, including the byteswap, salt,
|
|
|
|
* IV, and MAC.
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (BP_SHOULD_BYTESWAP(bp))
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_flags |= DRR_RAW_BYTESWAP;
|
|
|
|
zio_crypt_decode_params_bp(bp, drrw->drr_salt,
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_iv);
|
|
|
|
zio_crypt_decode_mac_bp(bp, drrw->drr_mac);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* this is a compressed block */
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(dsp->dsa_featureflags &
|
|
|
|
DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_COMPRESSED);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(!BP_SHOULD_BYTESWAP(bp));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(!DMU_OT_IS_METADATA(BP_GET_TYPE(bp)));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp), !=, ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3S(lsize, >=, psize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set fields common to compressed and raw sends */
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
drrw->drr_compressiontype = BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp);
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_compressed_size = psize;
|
|
|
|
payload_size = drrw->drr_compressed_size;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
payload_size = drrw->drr_logical_size;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (bp == NULL || BP_IS_EMBEDDED(bp) || (BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp) && !raw)) {
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* There's no pre-computed checksum for partial-block writes,
|
|
|
|
* embedded BP's, or encrypted BP's that are being sent as
|
|
|
|
* plaintext, so (like fletcher4-checkummed blocks) userland
|
|
|
|
* will have to compute a dedup-capable checksum itself.
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_checksumtype = ZIO_CHECKSUM_OFF;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_checksumtype = BP_GET_CHECKSUM(bp);
|
2016-06-16 01:47:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (zio_checksum_table[drrw->drr_checksumtype].ci_flags &
|
|
|
|
ZCHECKSUM_FLAG_DEDUP)
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
drrw->drr_flags |= DRR_CHECKSUM_DEDUP;
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
DDK_SET_LSIZE(&drrw->drr_key, BP_GET_LSIZE(bp));
|
|
|
|
DDK_SET_PSIZE(&drrw->drr_key, BP_GET_PSIZE(bp));
|
|
|
|
DDK_SET_COMPRESS(&drrw->drr_key, BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp));
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
DDK_SET_CRYPT(&drrw->drr_key, BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp));
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
drrw->drr_key.ddk_cksum = bp->blk_cksum;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, data, payload_size) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dump_write_embedded(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, uint64_t object, uint64_t offset,
|
|
|
|
int blksz, const blkptr_t *bp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char buf[BPE_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
struct drr_write_embedded *drrw =
|
|
|
|
&(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_write_embedded);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2017-08-03 07:16:12 +03:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_EMBEDDED(bp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_object = object;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_length = blksz;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_compression = BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp);
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_etype = BPE_GET_ETYPE(bp);
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_lsize = BPE_GET_LSIZE(bp);
|
|
|
|
drrw->drr_psize = BPE_GET_PSIZE(bp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
decode_embedded_bp_compressed(bp, buf);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, buf, P2ROUNDUP(drrw->drr_psize, 8)) != 0)
|
2017-08-03 07:16:12 +03:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
static int
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dump_spill(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp, uint64_t object, void *data)
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
struct drr_spill *drrs = &(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_spill);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t blksz = BP_GET_LSIZE(bp);
|
2018-04-17 21:19:03 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t payload_size = blksz;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* write a SPILL record */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_SPILL;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrs->drr_object = object;
|
|
|
|
drrs->drr_length = blksz;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrs->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
/* See comment in dump_dnode() for full details */
|
|
|
|
if (zfs_send_unmodified_spill_blocks &&
|
|
|
|
(bp->blk_birth <= dsp->dsa_fromtxg)) {
|
|
|
|
drrs->drr_flags |= DRR_SPILL_UNMODIFIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/* handle raw send fields */
|
2017-08-24 02:54:24 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp));
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (BP_SHOULD_BYTESWAP(bp))
|
|
|
|
drrs->drr_flags |= DRR_RAW_BYTESWAP;
|
|
|
|
drrs->drr_compressiontype = BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp);
|
|
|
|
drrs->drr_compressed_size = BP_GET_PSIZE(bp);
|
|
|
|
zio_crypt_decode_params_bp(bp, drrs->drr_salt, drrs->drr_iv);
|
|
|
|
zio_crypt_decode_mac_bp(bp, drrs->drr_mac);
|
2018-04-17 21:19:03 +03:00
|
|
|
payload_size = drrs->drr_compressed_size;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-17 21:19:03 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, data, payload_size) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dump_freeobjects(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, uint64_t firstobj, uint64_t numobjs)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
struct drr_freeobjects *drrfo = &(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_freeobjects);
|
2017-09-26 15:03:21 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t maxobj = DNODES_PER_BLOCK *
|
|
|
|
(DMU_META_DNODE(dsp->dsa_os)->dn_maxblkid + 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ZoL < 0.7 does not handle large FREEOBJECTS records correctly,
|
|
|
|
* leading to zfs recv never completing. to avoid this issue, don't
|
|
|
|
* send FREEOBJECTS records for object IDs which cannot exist on the
|
|
|
|
* receiving side.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (maxobj > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (maxobj < firstobj)
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (maxobj < firstobj + numobjs)
|
|
|
|
numobjs = maxobj - firstobj;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there is a pending op, but it's not PENDING_FREEOBJECTS,
|
|
|
|
* push it out, since free block aggregation can only be done for
|
|
|
|
* blocks of the same type (i.e., DRR_FREE records can only be
|
|
|
|
* aggregated with other DRR_FREE records. DRR_FREEOBJECTS records
|
|
|
|
* can only be aggregated with other DRR_FREEOBJECTS records.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE &&
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_FREEOBJECTS) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op == PENDING_FREEOBJECTS) {
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See whether this free object array can be aggregated
|
|
|
|
* with pending one
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (drrfo->drr_firstobj + drrfo->drr_numobjs == firstobj) {
|
|
|
|
drrfo->drr_numobjs += numobjs;
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* can't be aggregated. Push out pending record */
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
/* write a FREEOBJECTS record */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_FREEOBJECTS;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrfo->drr_firstobj = firstobj;
|
|
|
|
drrfo->drr_numobjs = numobjs;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drrfo->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_FREEOBJECTS;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dump_dnode(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp, uint64_t object,
|
|
|
|
dnode_phys_t *dnp)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
struct drr_object *drro = &(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_object);
|
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
|
|
|
int bonuslen;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (object < dsp->dsa_resume_object) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note: when resuming, we will visit all the dnodes in
|
|
|
|
* the block of dnodes that we are resuming from. In
|
|
|
|
* this case it's unnecessary to send the dnodes prior to
|
|
|
|
* the one we are resuming from. We should be at most one
|
|
|
|
* block's worth of dnodes behind the resume point.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(dsp->dsa_resume_object - object, <,
|
|
|
|
1 << (DNODE_BLOCK_SHIFT - DNODE_SHIFT));
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dnp == NULL || dnp->dn_type == DMU_OT_NONE)
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
return (dump_freeobjects(dsp, object, 1));
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE) {
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
/* write an OBJECT record */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_OBJECT;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drro->drr_object = object;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_type = dnp->dn_type;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_bonustype = dnp->dn_bonustype;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_blksz = dnp->dn_datablkszsec << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_bonuslen = dnp->dn_bonuslen;
|
Implement large_dnode pool feature
Justification
-------------
This feature adds support for variable length dnodes. Our motivation is
to eliminate the overhead associated with using spill blocks. Spill
blocks are used to store system attribute data (i.e. file metadata) that
does not fit in the dnode's bonus buffer. By allowing a larger bonus
buffer area the use of a spill block can be avoided. Spill blocks
potentially incur an additional read I/O for every dnode in a dnode
block. As a worst case example, reading 32 dnodes from a 16k dnode block
and all of the spill blocks could issue 33 separate reads. Now suppose
those dnodes have size 1024 and therefore don't need spill blocks. Then
the worst case number of blocks read is reduced to from 33 to two--one
per dnode block. In practice spill blocks may tend to be co-located on
disk with the dnode blocks so the reduction in I/O would not be this
drastic. In a badly fragmented pool, however, the improvement could be
significant.
ZFS-on-Linux systems that make heavy use of extended attributes would
benefit from this feature. In particular, ZFS-on-Linux supports the
xattr=sa dataset property which allows file extended attribute data
to be stored in the dnode bonus buffer as an alternative to the
traditional directory-based format. Workloads such as SELinux and the
Lustre distributed filesystem often store enough xattr data to force
spill bocks when xattr=sa is in effect. Large dnodes may therefore
provide a performance benefit to such systems.
Other use cases that may benefit from this feature include files with
large ACLs and symbolic links with long target names. Furthermore,
this feature may be desirable on other platforms in case future
applications or features are developed that could make use of a
larger bonus buffer area.
Implementation
--------------
The size of a dnode may be a multiple of 512 bytes up to the size of
a dnode block (currently 16384 bytes). A dn_extra_slots field was
added to the current on-disk dnode_phys_t structure to describe the
size of the physical dnode on disk. The 8 bits for this field were
taken from the zero filled dn_pad2 field. The field represents how
many "extra" dnode_phys_t slots a dnode consumes in its dnode block.
This convention results in a value of 0 for 512 byte dnodes which
preserves on-disk format compatibility with older software.
Similarly, the in-memory dnode_t structure has a new dn_num_slots field
to represent the total number of dnode_phys_t slots consumed on disk.
Thus dn->dn_num_slots is 1 greater than the corresponding
dnp->dn_extra_slots. This difference in convention was adopted
because, unlike on-disk structures, backward compatibility is not a
concern for in-memory objects, so we used a more natural way to
represent size for a dnode_t.
The default size for newly created dnodes is determined by the value of
a new "dnodesize" dataset property. By default the property is set to
"legacy" which is compatible with older software. Setting the property
to "auto" will allow the filesystem to choose the most suitable dnode
size. Currently this just sets the default dnode size to 1k, but future
code improvements could dynamically choose a size based on observed
workload patterns. Dnodes of varying sizes can coexist within the same
dataset and even within the same dnode block. For example, to enable
automatically-sized dnodes, run
# zfs set dnodesize=auto tank/fish
The user can also specify literal values for the dnodesize property.
These are currently limited to powers of two from 1k to 16k. The
power-of-2 limitation is only for simplicity of the user interface.
Internally the implementation can handle any multiple of 512 up to 16k,
and consumers of the DMU API can specify any legal dnode value.
The size of a new dnode is determined at object allocation time and
stored as a new field in the znode in-memory structure. New DMU
interfaces are added to allow the consumer to specify the dnode size
that a newly allocated object should use. Existing interfaces are
unchanged to avoid having to update every call site and to preserve
compatibility with external consumers such as Lustre. The new
interfaces names are given below. The versions of these functions that
don't take a dnodesize parameter now just call the _dnsize() versions
with a dnodesize of 0, which means use the legacy dnode size.
New DMU interfaces:
dmu_object_alloc_dnsize()
dmu_object_claim_dnsize()
dmu_object_reclaim_dnsize()
New ZAP interfaces:
zap_create_dnsize()
zap_create_norm_dnsize()
zap_create_flags_dnsize()
zap_create_claim_norm_dnsize()
zap_create_link_dnsize()
The constant DN_MAX_BONUSLEN is renamed to DN_OLD_MAX_BONUSLEN. The
spa_maxdnodesize() function should be used to determine the maximum
bonus length for a pool.
These are a few noteworthy changes to key functions:
* The prototype for dnode_hold_impl() now takes a "slots" parameter.
When the DNODE_MUST_BE_FREE flag is set, this parameter is used to
ensure the hole at the specified object offset is large enough to
hold the dnode being created. The slots parameter is also used
to ensure a dnode does not span multiple dnode blocks. In both of
these cases, if a failure occurs, ENOSPC is returned. Keep in mind,
these failure cases are only possible when using DNODE_MUST_BE_FREE.
If the DNODE_MUST_BE_ALLOCATED flag is set, "slots" must be 0.
dnode_hold_impl() will check if the requested dnode is already
consumed as an extra dnode slot by an large dnode, in which case
it returns ENOENT.
* The function dmu_object_alloc() advances to the next dnode block
if dnode_hold_impl() returns an error for a requested object.
This is because the beginning of the next dnode block is the only
location it can safely assume to either be a hole or a valid
starting point for a dnode.
* dnode_next_offset_level() and other functions that iterate
through dnode blocks may no longer use a simple array indexing
scheme. These now use the current dnode's dn_num_slots field to
advance to the next dnode in the block. This is to ensure we
properly skip the current dnode's bonus area and don't interpret it
as a valid dnode.
zdb
---
The zdb command was updated to display a dnode's size under the
"dnsize" column when the object is dumped.
For ZIL create log records, zdb will now display the slot count for
the object.
ztest
-----
Ztest chooses a random dnodesize for every newly created object. The
random distribution is more heavily weighted toward small dnodes to
better simulate real-world datasets.
Unused bonus buffer space is filled with non-zero values computed from
the object number, dataset id, offset, and generation number. This
helps ensure that the dnode traversal code properly skips the interior
regions of large dnodes, and that these interior regions are not
overwritten by data belonging to other dnodes. A new test visits each
object in a dataset. It verifies that the actual dnode size matches what
was stored in the ztest block tag when it was created. It also verifies
that the unused bonus buffer space is filled with the expected data
patterns.
ZFS Test Suite
--------------
Added six new large dnode-specific tests, and integrated the dnodesize
property into existing tests for zfs allow and send/recv.
Send/Receive
------------
ZFS send streams for datasets containing large dnodes cannot be received
on pools that don't support the large_dnode feature. A send stream with
large dnodes sets a DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_DNODE flag which will be
unrecognized by an incompatible receiving pool so that the zfs receive
will fail gracefully.
While not implemented here, it may be possible to generate a
backward-compatible send stream from a dataset containing large
dnodes. The implementation may be tricky, however, because the send
object record for a large dnode would need to be resized to a 512
byte dnode, possibly kicking in a spill block in the process. This
means we would need to construct a new SA layout and possibly
register it in the SA layout object. The SA layout is normally just
sent as an ordinary object record. But if we are constructing new
layouts while generating the send stream we'd have to build the SA
layout object dynamically and send it at the end of the stream.
For sending and receiving between pools that do support large dnodes,
the drr_object send record type is extended with a new field to store
the dnode slot count. This field was repurposed from unused padding
in the structure.
ZIL Replay
----------
The dnode slot count is stored in the uppermost 8 bits of the lr_foid
field. The bits were unused as the object id is currently capped at
48 bits.
Resizing Dnodes
---------------
It should be possible to resize a dnode when it is dirtied if the
current dnodesize dataset property differs from the dnode's size, but
this functionality is not currently implemented. Clearly a dnode can
only grow if there are sufficient contiguous unused slots in the
dnode block, but it should always be possible to shrink a dnode.
Growing dnodes may be useful to reduce fragmentation in a pool with
many spill blocks in use. Shrinking dnodes may be useful to allow
sending a dataset to a pool that doesn't support the large_dnode
feature.
Feature Reference Counting
--------------------------
The reference count for the large_dnode pool feature tracks the
number of datasets that have ever contained a dnode of size larger
than 512 bytes. The first time a large dnode is created in a dataset
the dataset is converted to an extensible dataset. This is a one-way
operation and the only way to decrement the feature count is to
destroy the dataset, even if the dataset no longer contains any large
dnodes. The complexity of reference counting on a per-dnode basis was
too high, so we chose to track it on a per-dataset basis similarly to
the large_block feature.
Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <bass6@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Closes #3542
2016-03-17 04:25:34 +03:00
|
|
|
drro->drr_dn_slots = dnp->dn_extra_slots + 1;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drro->drr_checksumtype = dnp->dn_checksum;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_compress = dnp->dn_compress;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drro->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!(dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_BLOCKS) &&
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_blksz > SPA_OLD_MAXBLOCKSIZE)
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_blksz = SPA_OLD_MAXBLOCKSIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
|
|
|
bonuslen = P2ROUNDUP(dnp->dn_bonuslen, 8);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-24 02:54:24 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW)) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_ENCRYPTED(bp));
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (BP_SHOULD_BYTESWAP(bp))
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_flags |= DRR_RAW_BYTESWAP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* needed for reconstructing dnp on recv side */
|
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
|
|
|
drro->drr_maxblkid = dnp->dn_maxblkid;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
drro->drr_indblkshift = dnp->dn_indblkshift;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_nlevels = dnp->dn_nlevels;
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_nblkptr = dnp->dn_nblkptr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since we encrypt the entire bonus area, the (raw) part
|
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
|
|
|
* beyond the bonuslen is actually nonzero, so we need
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
* to send it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (bonuslen != 0) {
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_raw_bonuslen = DN_MAX_BONUS_LEN(dnp);
|
|
|
|
bonuslen = drro->drr_raw_bonuslen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DRR_OBJECT_SPILL is set for every dnode which references a
|
|
|
|
* spill block. This allows the receiving pool to definitively
|
|
|
|
* determine when a spill block should be kept or freed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (dnp->dn_flags & DNODE_FLAG_SPILL_BLKPTR)
|
|
|
|
drro->drr_flags |= DRR_OBJECT_SPILL;
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, DN_BONUS(dnp), bonuslen) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-29 22:58:53 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Free anything past the end of the file. */
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dump_free(dsp, object, (dnp->dn_maxblkid + 1) *
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
(dnp->dn_datablkszsec << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT), DMU_OBJECT_END) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Send DRR_SPILL records for unmodified spill blocks. This is useful
|
|
|
|
* because changing certain attributes of the object (e.g. blocksize)
|
|
|
|
* can cause old versions of ZFS to incorrectly remove a spill block.
|
|
|
|
* Including these records in the stream forces an up to date version
|
|
|
|
* to always be written ensuring they're never lost. Current versions
|
|
|
|
* of the code which understand the DRR_FLAG_SPILL_BLOCK feature can
|
|
|
|
* ignore these unmodified spill blocks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (zfs_send_unmodified_spill_blocks &&
|
|
|
|
(dnp->dn_flags & DNODE_FLAG_SPILL_BLKPTR) &&
|
|
|
|
(DN_SPILL_BLKPTR(dnp)->blk_birth <= dsp->dsa_fromtxg)) {
|
|
|
|
struct send_block_record record;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(&record, sizeof (struct send_block_record));
|
|
|
|
record.eos_marker = B_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
record.bp = *DN_SPILL_BLKPTR(dnp);
|
|
|
|
SET_BOOKMARK(&(record.zb), dmu_objset_id(dsp->dsa_os),
|
|
|
|
object, 0, DMU_SPILL_BLKID);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (do_dump(dsp, &record) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_err != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dump_object_range(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp, uint64_t firstobj,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t numslots)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct drr_object_range *drror =
|
|
|
|
&(dsp->dsa_drr->drr_u.drr_object_range);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we only use this record type for raw sends */
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp), ==, ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(BP_GET_TYPE(bp), ==, DMU_OT_DNODE);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT0(BP_GET_LEVEL(bp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(dsp->dsa_drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr->drr_type = DRR_OBJECT_RANGE;
|
|
|
|
drror->drr_firstobj = firstobj;
|
|
|
|
drror->drr_numslots = numslots;
|
|
|
|
drror->drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
|
|
|
if (BP_SHOULD_BYTESWAP(bp))
|
|
|
|
drror->drr_flags |= DRR_RAW_BYTESWAP;
|
|
|
|
zio_crypt_decode_params_bp(bp, drror->drr_salt, drror->drr_iv);
|
|
|
|
zio_crypt_decode_mac_bp(bp, drror->drr_mac);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
static boolean_t
|
|
|
|
backup_do_embed(dmu_sendarg_t *dsp, const blkptr_t *bp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!BP_IS_EMBEDDED(bp))
|
|
|
|
return (B_FALSE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Compression function must be legacy, or explicitly enabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp) >= ZIO_COMPRESS_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS &&
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
!(dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LZ4)))
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
return (B_FALSE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Embed type must be explicitly enabled.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (BPE_GET_ETYPE(bp)) {
|
|
|
|
case BP_EMBEDDED_TYPE_DATA:
|
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_EMBED_DATA)
|
|
|
|
return (B_TRUE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (B_FALSE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (B_FALSE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is the callback function to traverse_dataset that acts as the worker
|
|
|
|
* thread for dmu_send_impl.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*ARGSUSED*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
send_cb(spa_t *spa, zilog_t *zilog, const blkptr_t *bp,
|
|
|
|
const zbookmark_phys_t *zb, const struct dnode_phys *dnp, void *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct send_thread_arg *sta = arg;
|
|
|
|
struct send_block_record *record;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t record_size;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(zb->zb_object == DMU_META_DNODE_OBJECT ||
|
|
|
|
zb->zb_object >= sta->resume.zb_object);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT3P(sta->ds, !=, NULL);
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (sta->cancel)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINTR));
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (bp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(zb->zb_level, ==, ZB_DNODE_LEVEL);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
} else if (zb->zb_level < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
record = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (struct send_block_record), KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
record->eos_marker = B_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
record->bp = *bp;
|
|
|
|
record->zb = *zb;
|
|
|
|
record->indblkshift = dnp->dn_indblkshift;
|
|
|
|
record->datablkszsec = dnp->dn_datablkszsec;
|
|
|
|
record_size = dnp->dn_datablkszsec << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT;
|
|
|
|
bqueue_enqueue(&sta->q, record, record_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This function kicks off the traverse_dataset. It also handles setting the
|
|
|
|
* error code of the thread in case something goes wrong, and pushes the End of
|
|
|
|
* Stream record when the traverse_dataset call has finished. If there is no
|
|
|
|
* dataset to traverse, the thread immediately pushes End of Stream marker.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
send_traverse_thread(void *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct send_thread_arg *st_arg = arg;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
struct send_block_record *data;
|
2016-08-21 16:22:32 +03:00
|
|
|
fstrans_cookie_t cookie = spl_fstrans_mark();
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (st_arg->ds != NULL) {
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = traverse_dataset_resume(st_arg->ds,
|
|
|
|
st_arg->fromtxg, &st_arg->resume,
|
|
|
|
st_arg->flags, send_cb, st_arg);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (err != EINTR)
|
|
|
|
st_arg->error_code = err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (*data), KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
data->eos_marker = B_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
bqueue_enqueue(&st_arg->q, data, 1);
|
2016-08-21 16:22:32 +03:00
|
|
|
spl_fstrans_unmark(cookie);
|
2017-01-19 02:10:35 +03:00
|
|
|
thread_exit();
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This function actually handles figuring out what kind of record needs to be
|
|
|
|
* dumped, reading the data (which has hopefully been prefetched), and calling
|
|
|
|
* the appropriate helper function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
do_dump(dmu_sendarg_t *dsa, struct send_block_record *data)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *ds = dmu_objset_ds(dsa->dsa_os);
|
|
|
|
const blkptr_t *bp = &data->bp;
|
|
|
|
const zbookmark_phys_t *zb = &data->zb;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t indblkshift = data->indblkshift;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t dblkszsec = data->datablkszsec;
|
|
|
|
spa_t *spa = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool->dp_spa;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_object_type_t type = bp ? BP_GET_TYPE(bp) : DMU_OT_NONE;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(zb->zb_level, >=, 0);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(zb->zb_object == DMU_META_DNODE_OBJECT ||
|
|
|
|
zb->zb_object >= dsa->dsa_resume_object);
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* All bps of an encrypted os should have the encryption bit set.
|
|
|
|
* If this is not true it indicates tampering and we report an error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (dsa->dsa_os->os_encrypted &&
|
|
|
|
!BP_IS_HOLE(bp) && !BP_USES_CRYPT(bp)) {
|
|
|
|
spa_log_error(spa, zb);
|
|
|
|
zfs_panic_recover("unencrypted block in encrypted "
|
|
|
|
"object set %llu", ds->ds_object);
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EIO));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (zb->zb_object != DMU_META_DNODE_OBJECT &&
|
|
|
|
DMU_OBJECT_IS_SPECIAL(zb->zb_object)) {
|
2009-07-03 02:44:48 +04:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
2013-12-09 22:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (BP_IS_HOLE(bp) &&
|
|
|
|
zb->zb_object == DMU_META_DNODE_OBJECT) {
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t span = BP_SPAN(dblkszsec, indblkshift, zb->zb_level);
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t dnobj = (zb->zb_blkid * span) >> DNODE_SHIFT;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dump_freeobjects(dsa, dnobj, span >> DNODE_SHIFT);
|
2013-12-09 22:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (BP_IS_HOLE(bp)) {
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t span = BP_SPAN(dblkszsec, indblkshift, zb->zb_level);
|
|
|
|
uint64_t offset = zb->zb_blkid * span;
|
2017-10-27 02:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Don't dump free records for offsets > DMU_OBJECT_END */
|
|
|
|
if (zb->zb_blkid == 0 || span <= DMU_OBJECT_END / zb->zb_blkid)
|
|
|
|
err = dump_free(dsa, zb->zb_object, offset, span);
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (zb->zb_level > 0 || type == DMU_OT_OBJSET) {
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
} else if (type == DMU_OT_DNODE) {
|
Implement large_dnode pool feature
Justification
-------------
This feature adds support for variable length dnodes. Our motivation is
to eliminate the overhead associated with using spill blocks. Spill
blocks are used to store system attribute data (i.e. file metadata) that
does not fit in the dnode's bonus buffer. By allowing a larger bonus
buffer area the use of a spill block can be avoided. Spill blocks
potentially incur an additional read I/O for every dnode in a dnode
block. As a worst case example, reading 32 dnodes from a 16k dnode block
and all of the spill blocks could issue 33 separate reads. Now suppose
those dnodes have size 1024 and therefore don't need spill blocks. Then
the worst case number of blocks read is reduced to from 33 to two--one
per dnode block. In practice spill blocks may tend to be co-located on
disk with the dnode blocks so the reduction in I/O would not be this
drastic. In a badly fragmented pool, however, the improvement could be
significant.
ZFS-on-Linux systems that make heavy use of extended attributes would
benefit from this feature. In particular, ZFS-on-Linux supports the
xattr=sa dataset property which allows file extended attribute data
to be stored in the dnode bonus buffer as an alternative to the
traditional directory-based format. Workloads such as SELinux and the
Lustre distributed filesystem often store enough xattr data to force
spill bocks when xattr=sa is in effect. Large dnodes may therefore
provide a performance benefit to such systems.
Other use cases that may benefit from this feature include files with
large ACLs and symbolic links with long target names. Furthermore,
this feature may be desirable on other platforms in case future
applications or features are developed that could make use of a
larger bonus buffer area.
Implementation
--------------
The size of a dnode may be a multiple of 512 bytes up to the size of
a dnode block (currently 16384 bytes). A dn_extra_slots field was
added to the current on-disk dnode_phys_t structure to describe the
size of the physical dnode on disk. The 8 bits for this field were
taken from the zero filled dn_pad2 field. The field represents how
many "extra" dnode_phys_t slots a dnode consumes in its dnode block.
This convention results in a value of 0 for 512 byte dnodes which
preserves on-disk format compatibility with older software.
Similarly, the in-memory dnode_t structure has a new dn_num_slots field
to represent the total number of dnode_phys_t slots consumed on disk.
Thus dn->dn_num_slots is 1 greater than the corresponding
dnp->dn_extra_slots. This difference in convention was adopted
because, unlike on-disk structures, backward compatibility is not a
concern for in-memory objects, so we used a more natural way to
represent size for a dnode_t.
The default size for newly created dnodes is determined by the value of
a new "dnodesize" dataset property. By default the property is set to
"legacy" which is compatible with older software. Setting the property
to "auto" will allow the filesystem to choose the most suitable dnode
size. Currently this just sets the default dnode size to 1k, but future
code improvements could dynamically choose a size based on observed
workload patterns. Dnodes of varying sizes can coexist within the same
dataset and even within the same dnode block. For example, to enable
automatically-sized dnodes, run
# zfs set dnodesize=auto tank/fish
The user can also specify literal values for the dnodesize property.
These are currently limited to powers of two from 1k to 16k. The
power-of-2 limitation is only for simplicity of the user interface.
Internally the implementation can handle any multiple of 512 up to 16k,
and consumers of the DMU API can specify any legal dnode value.
The size of a new dnode is determined at object allocation time and
stored as a new field in the znode in-memory structure. New DMU
interfaces are added to allow the consumer to specify the dnode size
that a newly allocated object should use. Existing interfaces are
unchanged to avoid having to update every call site and to preserve
compatibility with external consumers such as Lustre. The new
interfaces names are given below. The versions of these functions that
don't take a dnodesize parameter now just call the _dnsize() versions
with a dnodesize of 0, which means use the legacy dnode size.
New DMU interfaces:
dmu_object_alloc_dnsize()
dmu_object_claim_dnsize()
dmu_object_reclaim_dnsize()
New ZAP interfaces:
zap_create_dnsize()
zap_create_norm_dnsize()
zap_create_flags_dnsize()
zap_create_claim_norm_dnsize()
zap_create_link_dnsize()
The constant DN_MAX_BONUSLEN is renamed to DN_OLD_MAX_BONUSLEN. The
spa_maxdnodesize() function should be used to determine the maximum
bonus length for a pool.
These are a few noteworthy changes to key functions:
* The prototype for dnode_hold_impl() now takes a "slots" parameter.
When the DNODE_MUST_BE_FREE flag is set, this parameter is used to
ensure the hole at the specified object offset is large enough to
hold the dnode being created. The slots parameter is also used
to ensure a dnode does not span multiple dnode blocks. In both of
these cases, if a failure occurs, ENOSPC is returned. Keep in mind,
these failure cases are only possible when using DNODE_MUST_BE_FREE.
If the DNODE_MUST_BE_ALLOCATED flag is set, "slots" must be 0.
dnode_hold_impl() will check if the requested dnode is already
consumed as an extra dnode slot by an large dnode, in which case
it returns ENOENT.
* The function dmu_object_alloc() advances to the next dnode block
if dnode_hold_impl() returns an error for a requested object.
This is because the beginning of the next dnode block is the only
location it can safely assume to either be a hole or a valid
starting point for a dnode.
* dnode_next_offset_level() and other functions that iterate
through dnode blocks may no longer use a simple array indexing
scheme. These now use the current dnode's dn_num_slots field to
advance to the next dnode in the block. This is to ensure we
properly skip the current dnode's bonus area and don't interpret it
as a valid dnode.
zdb
---
The zdb command was updated to display a dnode's size under the
"dnsize" column when the object is dumped.
For ZIL create log records, zdb will now display the slot count for
the object.
ztest
-----
Ztest chooses a random dnodesize for every newly created object. The
random distribution is more heavily weighted toward small dnodes to
better simulate real-world datasets.
Unused bonus buffer space is filled with non-zero values computed from
the object number, dataset id, offset, and generation number. This
helps ensure that the dnode traversal code properly skips the interior
regions of large dnodes, and that these interior regions are not
overwritten by data belonging to other dnodes. A new test visits each
object in a dataset. It verifies that the actual dnode size matches what
was stored in the ztest block tag when it was created. It also verifies
that the unused bonus buffer space is filled with the expected data
patterns.
ZFS Test Suite
--------------
Added six new large dnode-specific tests, and integrated the dnodesize
property into existing tests for zfs allow and send/recv.
Send/Receive
------------
ZFS send streams for datasets containing large dnodes cannot be received
on pools that don't support the large_dnode feature. A send stream with
large dnodes sets a DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_DNODE flag which will be
unrecognized by an incompatible receiving pool so that the zfs receive
will fail gracefully.
While not implemented here, it may be possible to generate a
backward-compatible send stream from a dataset containing large
dnodes. The implementation may be tricky, however, because the send
object record for a large dnode would need to be resized to a 512
byte dnode, possibly kicking in a spill block in the process. This
means we would need to construct a new SA layout and possibly
register it in the SA layout object. The SA layout is normally just
sent as an ordinary object record. But if we are constructing new
layouts while generating the send stream we'd have to build the SA
layout object dynamically and send it at the end of the stream.
For sending and receiving between pools that do support large dnodes,
the drr_object send record type is extended with a new field to store
the dnode slot count. This field was repurposed from unused padding
in the structure.
ZIL Replay
----------
The dnode slot count is stored in the uppermost 8 bits of the lr_foid
field. The bits were unused as the object id is currently capped at
48 bits.
Resizing Dnodes
---------------
It should be possible to resize a dnode when it is dirtied if the
current dnodesize dataset property differs from the dnode's size, but
this functionality is not currently implemented. Clearly a dnode can
only grow if there are sufficient contiguous unused slots in the
dnode block, but it should always be possible to shrink a dnode.
Growing dnodes may be useful to reduce fragmentation in a pool with
many spill blocks in use. Shrinking dnodes may be useful to allow
sending a dataset to a pool that doesn't support the large_dnode
feature.
Feature Reference Counting
--------------------------
The reference count for the large_dnode pool feature tracks the
number of datasets that have ever contained a dnode of size larger
than 512 bytes. The first time a large dnode is created in a dataset
the dataset is converted to an extensible dataset. This is a one-way
operation and the only way to decrement the feature count is to
destroy the dataset, even if the dataset no longer contains any large
dnodes. The complexity of reference counting on a per-dnode basis was
too high, so we chose to track it on a per-dataset basis similarly to
the large_block feature.
Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <bass6@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Closes #3542
2016-03-17 04:25:34 +03:00
|
|
|
int epb = BP_GET_LSIZE(bp) >> DNODE_SHIFT;
|
2014-12-06 20:24:32 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_flags_t aflags = ARC_FLAG_WAIT;
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_t *abuf;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
enum zio_flag zioflags = ZIO_FLAG_CANFAIL;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dsa->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_ENCRYPTED(bp));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(BP_GET_COMPRESS(bp), ==, ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF);
|
|
|
|
zioflags |= ZIO_FLAG_RAW;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT0(zb->zb_level);
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-03 00:26:24 +04:00
|
|
|
if (arc_read(NULL, spa, bp, arc_getbuf_func, &abuf,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ZIO_PRIORITY_ASYNC_READ, zioflags, &aflags, zb) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EIO));
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-04 23:25:13 +03:00
|
|
|
dnode_phys_t *blk = abuf->b_data;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t dnobj = zb->zb_blkid * epb;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Raw sends require sending encryption parameters for the
|
|
|
|
* block of dnodes. Regular sends do not need to send this
|
|
|
|
* info.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (dsa->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(arc_is_encrypted(abuf));
|
|
|
|
err = dump_object_range(dsa, bp, dnobj, epb);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err == 0) {
|
2017-11-04 23:25:13 +03:00
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < epb;
|
|
|
|
i += blk[i].dn_extra_slots + 1) {
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dump_dnode(dsa, bp, dnobj + i, blk + i);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_destroy(abuf, &abuf);
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (type == DMU_OT_SA) {
|
2014-12-06 20:24:32 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_flags_t aflags = ARC_FLAG_WAIT;
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_t *abuf;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
enum zio_flag zioflags = ZIO_FLAG_CANFAIL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dsa->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp));
|
|
|
|
zioflags |= ZIO_FLAG_RAW;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-03 00:26:24 +04:00
|
|
|
if (arc_read(NULL, spa, bp, arc_getbuf_func, &abuf,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ZIO_PRIORITY_ASYNC_READ, zioflags, &aflags, zb) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EIO));
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dump_spill(dsa, bp, zb->zb_object, abuf->b_data);
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_destroy(abuf, &abuf);
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (backup_do_embed(dsa, bp)) {
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
/* it's an embedded level-0 block of a regular object */
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
int blksz = dblkszsec << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT;
|
|
|
|
ASSERT0(zb->zb_level);
|
|
|
|
err = dump_write_embedded(dsa, zb->zb_object,
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
zb->zb_blkid * blksz, blksz, bp);
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* it's a level-0 block of a regular object */
|
2014-12-06 20:24:32 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_flags_t aflags = ARC_FLAG_WAIT;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_t *abuf;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
int blksz = dblkszsec << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t offset;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we have large blocks stored on disk but the send flags
|
|
|
|
* don't allow us to send large blocks, we split the data from
|
|
|
|
* the arc buf into chunks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-04-12 00:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t split_large_blocks = blksz > SPA_OLD_MAXBLOCKSIZE &&
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
!(dsa->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_BLOCKS);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Raw sends require that we always get raw data as it exists
|
|
|
|
* on disk, so we assert that we are not splitting blocks here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
boolean_t request_raw =
|
|
|
|
(dsa->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) != 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We should only request compressed data from the ARC if all
|
|
|
|
* the following are true:
|
|
|
|
* - stream compression was requested
|
|
|
|
* - we aren't splitting large blocks into smaller chunks
|
|
|
|
* - the data won't need to be byteswapped before sending
|
|
|
|
* - this isn't an embedded block
|
|
|
|
* - this isn't metadata (if receiving on a different endian
|
|
|
|
* system it can be byteswapped more easily)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
boolean_t request_compressed =
|
|
|
|
(dsa->dsa_featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_COMPRESSED) &&
|
|
|
|
!split_large_blocks && !BP_SHOULD_BYTESWAP(bp) &&
|
|
|
|
!BP_IS_EMBEDDED(bp) && !DMU_OT_IS_METADATA(BP_GET_TYPE(bp));
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
IMPLY(request_raw, !split_large_blocks);
|
|
|
|
IMPLY(request_raw, BP_IS_PROTECTED(bp));
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
ASSERT0(zb->zb_level);
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(zb->zb_object > dsa->dsa_resume_object ||
|
|
|
|
(zb->zb_object == dsa->dsa_resume_object &&
|
|
|
|
zb->zb_blkid * blksz >= dsa->dsa_resume_offset));
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-12 00:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(blksz, ==, BP_GET_LSIZE(bp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum zio_flag zioflags = ZIO_FLAG_CANFAIL;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (request_raw)
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
zioflags |= ZIO_FLAG_RAW;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
else if (request_compressed)
|
|
|
|
zioflags |= ZIO_FLAG_RAW_COMPRESS;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2013-07-03 00:26:24 +04:00
|
|
|
if (arc_read(NULL, spa, bp, arc_getbuf_func, &abuf,
|
2017-04-12 00:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
ZIO_PRIORITY_ASYNC_READ, zioflags, &aflags, zb) != 0) {
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (zfs_send_corrupt_data) {
|
|
|
|
/* Send a block filled with 0x"zfs badd bloc" */
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
abuf = arc_alloc_buf(spa, &abuf, ARC_BUFC_DATA,
|
|
|
|
blksz);
|
2017-04-12 00:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t *ptr;
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
for (ptr = abuf->b_data;
|
|
|
|
(char *)ptr < (char *)abuf->b_data + blksz;
|
|
|
|
ptr++)
|
2013-02-05 04:35:54 +04:00
|
|
|
*ptr = 0x2f5baddb10cULL;
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EIO));
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
offset = zb->zb_blkid * blksz;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
if (split_large_blocks) {
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT0(arc_is_encrypted(abuf));
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT3U(arc_get_compression(abuf), ==,
|
|
|
|
ZIO_COMPRESS_OFF);
|
2017-04-12 00:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
char *buf = abuf->b_data;
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
while (blksz > 0 && err == 0) {
|
|
|
|
int n = MIN(blksz, SPA_OLD_MAXBLOCKSIZE);
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dump_write(dsa, type, zb->zb_object,
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
offset, n, n, NULL, buf);
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
offset += n;
|
|
|
|
buf += n;
|
|
|
|
blksz -= n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dump_write(dsa, type, zb->zb_object, offset,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
blksz, arc_buf_size(abuf), bp, abuf->b_data);
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_destroy(abuf, &abuf);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(err == 0 || err == EINTR);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
* Pop the new data off the queue, and free the old data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct send_block_record *
|
|
|
|
get_next_record(bqueue_t *bq, struct send_block_record *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct send_block_record *tmp = bqueue_dequeue(bq);
|
|
|
|
kmem_free(data, sizeof (*data));
|
|
|
|
return (tmp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Actually do the bulk of the work in a zfs send.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: Releases dp using the specified tag.
|
2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_send_impl(void *tag, dsl_pool_t *dp, dsl_dataset_t *to_ds,
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
zfs_bookmark_phys_t *ancestor_zb, boolean_t is_clone,
|
|
|
|
boolean_t embedok, boolean_t large_block_ok, boolean_t compressok,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t rawok, int outfd, uint64_t resumeobj, uint64_t resumeoff,
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnode_t *vp, offset_t *off)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
objset_t *os;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_replay_record_t *drr;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dmu_sendarg_t *dsp;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t fromtxg = 0;
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
uint64_t featureflags = 0;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
struct send_thread_arg to_arg;
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
void *payload = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t payload_len = 0;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
struct send_block_record *to_data;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_objset_from_ds(to_ds, &os);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, tag);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this is a non-raw send of an encrypted ds, we can ensure that
|
|
|
|
* the objset_phys_t is authenticated. This is safe because this is
|
|
|
|
* either a snapshot or we have owned the dataset, ensuring that
|
|
|
|
* it can't be modified.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!rawok && os->os_encrypted &&
|
|
|
|
arc_is_unauthenticated(os->os_phys_buf)) {
|
2018-03-31 21:12:51 +03:00
|
|
|
zbookmark_phys_t zb;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET_BOOKMARK(&zb, to_ds->ds_object, ZB_ROOT_OBJECT,
|
|
|
|
ZB_ROOT_LEVEL, ZB_ROOT_BLKID);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = arc_untransform(os->os_phys_buf, os->os_spa,
|
2018-03-31 21:12:51 +03:00
|
|
|
&zb, B_FALSE);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, tag);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSERT0(arc_is_unauthenticated(os->os_phys_buf));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
drr = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t), KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_type = DRR_BEGIN;
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_magic = DMU_BACKUP_MAGIC;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
DMU_SET_STREAM_HDRTYPE(drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_versioninfo,
|
|
|
|
DMU_SUBSTREAM);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
bzero(&to_arg, sizeof (to_arg));
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dmu_objset_type(os) == DMU_OST_ZFS) {
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
uint64_t version;
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (zfs_get_zplprop(os, ZFS_PROP_VERSION, &version) != 0) {
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
kmem_free(drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, tag);
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (version >= ZPL_VERSION_SA) {
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_SA_SPILL;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/* raw sends imply large_block_ok */
|
|
|
|
if ((large_block_ok || rawok) &&
|
2018-10-16 21:15:04 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_feature_is_active(to_ds, SPA_FEATURE_LARGE_BLOCKS))
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_BLOCKS;
|
2018-10-16 21:15:04 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dsl_dataset_feature_is_active(to_ds, SPA_FEATURE_LARGE_DNODE))
|
Implement large_dnode pool feature
Justification
-------------
This feature adds support for variable length dnodes. Our motivation is
to eliminate the overhead associated with using spill blocks. Spill
blocks are used to store system attribute data (i.e. file metadata) that
does not fit in the dnode's bonus buffer. By allowing a larger bonus
buffer area the use of a spill block can be avoided. Spill blocks
potentially incur an additional read I/O for every dnode in a dnode
block. As a worst case example, reading 32 dnodes from a 16k dnode block
and all of the spill blocks could issue 33 separate reads. Now suppose
those dnodes have size 1024 and therefore don't need spill blocks. Then
the worst case number of blocks read is reduced to from 33 to two--one
per dnode block. In practice spill blocks may tend to be co-located on
disk with the dnode blocks so the reduction in I/O would not be this
drastic. In a badly fragmented pool, however, the improvement could be
significant.
ZFS-on-Linux systems that make heavy use of extended attributes would
benefit from this feature. In particular, ZFS-on-Linux supports the
xattr=sa dataset property which allows file extended attribute data
to be stored in the dnode bonus buffer as an alternative to the
traditional directory-based format. Workloads such as SELinux and the
Lustre distributed filesystem often store enough xattr data to force
spill bocks when xattr=sa is in effect. Large dnodes may therefore
provide a performance benefit to such systems.
Other use cases that may benefit from this feature include files with
large ACLs and symbolic links with long target names. Furthermore,
this feature may be desirable on other platforms in case future
applications or features are developed that could make use of a
larger bonus buffer area.
Implementation
--------------
The size of a dnode may be a multiple of 512 bytes up to the size of
a dnode block (currently 16384 bytes). A dn_extra_slots field was
added to the current on-disk dnode_phys_t structure to describe the
size of the physical dnode on disk. The 8 bits for this field were
taken from the zero filled dn_pad2 field. The field represents how
many "extra" dnode_phys_t slots a dnode consumes in its dnode block.
This convention results in a value of 0 for 512 byte dnodes which
preserves on-disk format compatibility with older software.
Similarly, the in-memory dnode_t structure has a new dn_num_slots field
to represent the total number of dnode_phys_t slots consumed on disk.
Thus dn->dn_num_slots is 1 greater than the corresponding
dnp->dn_extra_slots. This difference in convention was adopted
because, unlike on-disk structures, backward compatibility is not a
concern for in-memory objects, so we used a more natural way to
represent size for a dnode_t.
The default size for newly created dnodes is determined by the value of
a new "dnodesize" dataset property. By default the property is set to
"legacy" which is compatible with older software. Setting the property
to "auto" will allow the filesystem to choose the most suitable dnode
size. Currently this just sets the default dnode size to 1k, but future
code improvements could dynamically choose a size based on observed
workload patterns. Dnodes of varying sizes can coexist within the same
dataset and even within the same dnode block. For example, to enable
automatically-sized dnodes, run
# zfs set dnodesize=auto tank/fish
The user can also specify literal values for the dnodesize property.
These are currently limited to powers of two from 1k to 16k. The
power-of-2 limitation is only for simplicity of the user interface.
Internally the implementation can handle any multiple of 512 up to 16k,
and consumers of the DMU API can specify any legal dnode value.
The size of a new dnode is determined at object allocation time and
stored as a new field in the znode in-memory structure. New DMU
interfaces are added to allow the consumer to specify the dnode size
that a newly allocated object should use. Existing interfaces are
unchanged to avoid having to update every call site and to preserve
compatibility with external consumers such as Lustre. The new
interfaces names are given below. The versions of these functions that
don't take a dnodesize parameter now just call the _dnsize() versions
with a dnodesize of 0, which means use the legacy dnode size.
New DMU interfaces:
dmu_object_alloc_dnsize()
dmu_object_claim_dnsize()
dmu_object_reclaim_dnsize()
New ZAP interfaces:
zap_create_dnsize()
zap_create_norm_dnsize()
zap_create_flags_dnsize()
zap_create_claim_norm_dnsize()
zap_create_link_dnsize()
The constant DN_MAX_BONUSLEN is renamed to DN_OLD_MAX_BONUSLEN. The
spa_maxdnodesize() function should be used to determine the maximum
bonus length for a pool.
These are a few noteworthy changes to key functions:
* The prototype for dnode_hold_impl() now takes a "slots" parameter.
When the DNODE_MUST_BE_FREE flag is set, this parameter is used to
ensure the hole at the specified object offset is large enough to
hold the dnode being created. The slots parameter is also used
to ensure a dnode does not span multiple dnode blocks. In both of
these cases, if a failure occurs, ENOSPC is returned. Keep in mind,
these failure cases are only possible when using DNODE_MUST_BE_FREE.
If the DNODE_MUST_BE_ALLOCATED flag is set, "slots" must be 0.
dnode_hold_impl() will check if the requested dnode is already
consumed as an extra dnode slot by an large dnode, in which case
it returns ENOENT.
* The function dmu_object_alloc() advances to the next dnode block
if dnode_hold_impl() returns an error for a requested object.
This is because the beginning of the next dnode block is the only
location it can safely assume to either be a hole or a valid
starting point for a dnode.
* dnode_next_offset_level() and other functions that iterate
through dnode blocks may no longer use a simple array indexing
scheme. These now use the current dnode's dn_num_slots field to
advance to the next dnode in the block. This is to ensure we
properly skip the current dnode's bonus area and don't interpret it
as a valid dnode.
zdb
---
The zdb command was updated to display a dnode's size under the
"dnsize" column when the object is dumped.
For ZIL create log records, zdb will now display the slot count for
the object.
ztest
-----
Ztest chooses a random dnodesize for every newly created object. The
random distribution is more heavily weighted toward small dnodes to
better simulate real-world datasets.
Unused bonus buffer space is filled with non-zero values computed from
the object number, dataset id, offset, and generation number. This
helps ensure that the dnode traversal code properly skips the interior
regions of large dnodes, and that these interior regions are not
overwritten by data belonging to other dnodes. A new test visits each
object in a dataset. It verifies that the actual dnode size matches what
was stored in the ztest block tag when it was created. It also verifies
that the unused bonus buffer space is filled with the expected data
patterns.
ZFS Test Suite
--------------
Added six new large dnode-specific tests, and integrated the dnodesize
property into existing tests for zfs allow and send/recv.
Send/Receive
------------
ZFS send streams for datasets containing large dnodes cannot be received
on pools that don't support the large_dnode feature. A send stream with
large dnodes sets a DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_DNODE flag which will be
unrecognized by an incompatible receiving pool so that the zfs receive
will fail gracefully.
While not implemented here, it may be possible to generate a
backward-compatible send stream from a dataset containing large
dnodes. The implementation may be tricky, however, because the send
object record for a large dnode would need to be resized to a 512
byte dnode, possibly kicking in a spill block in the process. This
means we would need to construct a new SA layout and possibly
register it in the SA layout object. The SA layout is normally just
sent as an ordinary object record. But if we are constructing new
layouts while generating the send stream we'd have to build the SA
layout object dynamically and send it at the end of the stream.
For sending and receiving between pools that do support large dnodes,
the drr_object send record type is extended with a new field to store
the dnode slot count. This field was repurposed from unused padding
in the structure.
ZIL Replay
----------
The dnode slot count is stored in the uppermost 8 bits of the lr_foid
field. The bits were unused as the object id is currently capped at
48 bits.
Resizing Dnodes
---------------
It should be possible to resize a dnode when it is dirtied if the
current dnodesize dataset property differs from the dnode's size, but
this functionality is not currently implemented. Clearly a dnode can
only grow if there are sufficient contiguous unused slots in the
dnode block, but it should always be possible to shrink a dnode.
Growing dnodes may be useful to reduce fragmentation in a pool with
many spill blocks in use. Shrinking dnodes may be useful to allow
sending a dataset to a pool that doesn't support the large_dnode
feature.
Feature Reference Counting
--------------------------
The reference count for the large_dnode pool feature tracks the
number of datasets that have ever contained a dnode of size larger
than 512 bytes. The first time a large dnode is created in a dataset
the dataset is converted to an extensible dataset. This is a one-way
operation and the only way to decrement the feature count is to
destroy the dataset, even if the dataset no longer contains any large
dnodes. The complexity of reference counting on a per-dnode basis was
too high, so we chose to track it on a per-dataset basis similarly to
the large_block feature.
Signed-off-by: Ned Bass <bass6@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Closes #3542
2016-03-17 04:25:34 +03:00
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LARGE_DNODE;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* encrypted datasets will not have embedded blocks */
|
|
|
|
if ((embedok || rawok) && !os->os_encrypted &&
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
spa_feature_is_active(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_EMBEDDED_DATA)) {
|
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_EMBED_DATA;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* raw send implies compressok */
|
|
|
|
if (compressok || rawok)
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_COMPRESSED;
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rawok && os->os_encrypted)
|
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((featureflags &
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
(DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_EMBED_DATA | DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_COMPRESSED |
|
|
|
|
DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW)) != 0 &&
|
|
|
|
spa_feature_is_active(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_LZ4_COMPRESS)) {
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_LZ4;
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (resumeobj != 0 || resumeoff != 0) {
|
|
|
|
featureflags |= DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RESUMING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
DMU_SET_FEATUREFLAGS(drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_versioninfo,
|
|
|
|
featureflags);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_creation_time =
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_phys(to_ds)->ds_creation_time;
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_type = dmu_objset_type(os);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (is_clone)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_flags |= DRR_FLAG_CLONE;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_toguid = dsl_dataset_phys(to_ds)->ds_guid;
|
|
|
|
if (dsl_dataset_phys(to_ds)->ds_flags & DS_FLAG_CI_DATASET)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_flags |= DRR_FLAG_CI_DATA;
|
2016-06-09 21:46:42 +03:00
|
|
|
if (zfs_send_set_freerecords_bit)
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_flags |= DRR_FLAG_FREERECORDS;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_flags |= DRR_FLAG_SPILL_BLOCK;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ancestor_zb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_fromguid =
|
|
|
|
ancestor_zb->zbm_guid;
|
|
|
|
fromtxg = ancestor_zb->zbm_creation_txg;
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_name(to_ds, drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_toname);
|
|
|
|
if (!to_ds->ds_is_snapshot) {
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
(void) strlcat(drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_toname, "@--head--",
|
|
|
|
sizeof (drr->drr_u.drr_begin.drr_toname));
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dmu_sendarg_t), KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_drr = drr;
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_vp = vp;
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_outfd = outfd;
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_proc = curproc;
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_os = os;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_off = off;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_toguid = dsl_dataset_phys(to_ds)->ds_guid;
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_fromtxg = fromtxg;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_pending_op = PENDING_NONE;
|
2014-06-06 01:19:08 +04:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_featureflags = featureflags;
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_resume_object = resumeobj;
|
|
|
|
dsp->dsa_resume_offset = resumeoff;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&to_ds->ds_sendstream_lock);
|
|
|
|
list_insert_head(&to_ds->ds_sendstreams, dsp);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&to_ds->ds_sendstream_lock);
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_long_hold(to_ds, FTAG);
|
2013-04-11 01:54:56 +04:00
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, tag);
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/* handle features that require a DRR_BEGIN payload */
|
|
|
|
if (featureflags &
|
|
|
|
(DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RESUMING | DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW)) {
|
|
|
|
nvlist_t *keynvl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
nvlist_t *nvl = fnvlist_alloc();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RESUMING) {
|
|
|
|
dmu_object_info_t to_doi;
|
|
|
|
err = dmu_object_info(os, resumeobj, &to_doi);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
fnvlist_free(nvl);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET_BOOKMARK(&to_arg.resume, to_ds->ds_object,
|
|
|
|
resumeobj, 0,
|
|
|
|
resumeoff / to_doi.doi_data_block_size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "resume_object", resumeobj);
|
|
|
|
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "resume_offset", resumeoff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (featureflags & DMU_BACKUP_FEATURE_RAW) {
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t ivset_guid = (ancestor_zb != NULL) ?
|
|
|
|
ancestor_zb->zbm_ivset_guid : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(os->os_encrypted);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(to_ds,
|
|
|
|
ivset_guid, &keynvl);
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
fnvlist_free(nvl);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fnvlist_add_nvlist(nvl, "crypt_keydata", keynvl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload = fnvlist_pack(nvl, &payload_len);
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_payloadlen = payload_len;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
fnvlist_free(keynvl);
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
fnvlist_free(nvl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = dump_record(dsp, payload, payload_len);
|
|
|
|
fnvlist_pack_free(payload, payload_len);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
err = dsp->dsa_err;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-09 05:41:15 +03:00
|
|
|
err = bqueue_init(&to_arg.q,
|
|
|
|
MAX(zfs_send_queue_length, 2 * zfs_max_recordsize),
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
offsetof(struct send_block_record, ln));
|
|
|
|
to_arg.error_code = 0;
|
|
|
|
to_arg.cancel = B_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
to_arg.ds = to_ds;
|
|
|
|
to_arg.fromtxg = fromtxg;
|
|
|
|
to_arg.flags = TRAVERSE_PRE | TRAVERSE_PREFETCH;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rawok)
|
|
|
|
to_arg.flags |= TRAVERSE_NO_DECRYPT;
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) thread_create(NULL, 0, send_traverse_thread, &to_arg, 0, curproc,
|
|
|
|
TS_RUN, minclsyspri);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
to_data = bqueue_dequeue(&to_arg.q);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (!to_data->eos_marker && err == 0) {
|
|
|
|
err = do_dump(dsp, to_data);
|
|
|
|
to_data = get_next_record(&to_arg.q, to_data);
|
|
|
|
if (issig(JUSTLOOKING) && issig(FORREAL))
|
|
|
|
err = EINTR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
to_arg.cancel = B_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
while (!to_data->eos_marker) {
|
|
|
|
to_data = get_next_record(&to_arg.q, to_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kmem_free(to_data, sizeof (*to_data));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bqueue_destroy(&to_arg.q);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err == 0 && to_arg.error_code != 0)
|
|
|
|
err = to_arg.error_code;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
if (dsp->dsa_pending_op != PENDING_NONE)
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
err = SET_ERROR(EINTR);
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (err == EINTR && dsp->dsa_err != 0)
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
err = dsp->dsa_err;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_type = DRR_END;
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_end.drr_checksum = dsp->dsa_zc;
|
|
|
|
drr->drr_u.drr_end.drr_toguid = dsp->dsa_toguid;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
if (dump_record(dsp, NULL, 0) != 0)
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
err = dsp->dsa_err;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&to_ds->ds_sendstream_lock);
|
|
|
|
list_remove(&to_ds->ds_sendstreams, dsp);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&to_ds->ds_sendstream_lock);
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-09-23 02:01:19 +03:00
|
|
|
VERIFY(err != 0 || (dsp->dsa_sent_begin && dsp->dsa_sent_end));
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
kmem_free(drr, sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t));
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
kmem_free(dsp, sizeof (dmu_sendarg_t));
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-22 04:31:57 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_long_rele(to_ds, FTAG);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-10 02:05:14 +04:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
int
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
dmu_send_obj(const char *pool, uint64_t tosnap, uint64_t fromsnap,
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t embedok, boolean_t large_block_ok, boolean_t compressok,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t rawok, int outfd, vnode_t *vp, offset_t *off)
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_t *dp;
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *ds;
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *fromds = NULL;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ds_hold_flags_t dsflags = (rawok) ? 0 : DS_HOLD_FLAG_DECRYPT;
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = dsl_pool_hold(pool, FTAG, &dp);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_dataset_hold_obj_flags(dp, tosnap, dsflags, FTAG, &ds);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fromsnap != 0) {
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
zfs_bookmark_phys_t zb = { 0 };
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
boolean_t is_clone;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, fromsnap, FTAG, &fromds);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele_flags(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!dsl_dataset_is_before(ds, fromds, 0)) {
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
err = SET_ERROR(EXDEV);
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele_flags(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-01 18:14:34 +03:00
|
|
|
zb.zbm_creation_time =
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_phys(fromds)->ds_creation_time;
|
|
|
|
zb.zbm_creation_txg = dsl_dataset_phys(fromds)->ds_creation_txg;
|
|
|
|
zb.zbm_guid = dsl_dataset_phys(fromds)->ds_guid;
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dsl_dataset_is_zapified(fromds)) {
|
|
|
|
(void) zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset,
|
|
|
|
fromds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1,
|
|
|
|
&zb.zbm_ivset_guid);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
is_clone = (fromds->ds_dir != ds->ds_dir);
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_send_impl(FTAG, dp, ds, &zb, is_clone,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
embedok, large_block_ok, compressok, rawok, outfd,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, vp, off);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_send_impl(FTAG, dp, ds, NULL, B_FALSE,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
embedok, large_block_ok, compressok, rawok, outfd,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, vp, off);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele_flags(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_send(const char *tosnap, const char *fromsnap, boolean_t embedok,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t large_block_ok, boolean_t compressok, boolean_t rawok,
|
|
|
|
int outfd, uint64_t resumeobj, uint64_t resumeoff, vnode_t *vp,
|
|
|
|
offset_t *off)
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_t *dp;
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *ds;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
ds_hold_flags_t dsflags = (rawok) ? 0 : DS_HOLD_FLAG_DECRYPT;
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
boolean_t owned = B_FALSE;
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (fromsnap != NULL && strpbrk(fromsnap, "@#") == NULL)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = dsl_pool_hold(tosnap, FTAG, &dp);
|
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (strchr(tosnap, '@') == NULL && spa_writeable(dp->dp_spa)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are sending a filesystem or volume. Ensure
|
|
|
|
* that it doesn't change by owning the dataset.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_dataset_own(dp, tosnap, dsflags, FTAG, &ds);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
owned = B_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_dataset_hold_flags(dp, tosnap, dsflags, FTAG, &ds);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fromsnap != NULL) {
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
zfs_bookmark_phys_t zb = { 0 };
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
boolean_t is_clone = B_FALSE;
|
|
|
|
int fsnamelen = strchr(tosnap, '@') - tosnap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the fromsnap is in a different filesystem, then
|
|
|
|
* mark the send stream as a clone.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(tosnap, fromsnap, fsnamelen) != 0 ||
|
|
|
|
(fromsnap[fsnamelen] != '@' &&
|
|
|
|
fromsnap[fsnamelen] != '#')) {
|
|
|
|
is_clone = B_TRUE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strchr(fromsnap, '@')) {
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_t *fromds;
|
|
|
|
err = dsl_dataset_hold(dp, fromsnap, FTAG, &fromds);
|
|
|
|
if (err == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!dsl_dataset_is_before(ds, fromds, 0))
|
|
|
|
err = SET_ERROR(EXDEV);
|
|
|
|
zb.zbm_creation_time =
|
2015-04-01 18:14:34 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_phys(fromds)->ds_creation_time;
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
zb.zbm_creation_txg =
|
2015-04-01 18:14:34 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_phys(fromds)->ds_creation_txg;
|
|
|
|
zb.zbm_guid = dsl_dataset_phys(fromds)->ds_guid;
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
is_clone = (ds->ds_dir != fromds->ds_dir);
|
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dsl_dataset_is_zapified(fromds)) {
|
|
|
|
(void) zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset,
|
|
|
|
fromds->ds_object,
|
|
|
|
DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1,
|
|
|
|
&zb.zbm_ivset_guid);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
err = dsl_bookmark_lookup(dp, fromsnap, ds, &zb);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (owned)
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_disown(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele_flags(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_send_impl(FTAG, dp, ds, &zb, is_clone,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
embedok, large_block_ok, compressok, rawok,
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
outfd, resumeobj, resumeoff, vp, off);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-11-03 23:15:08 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_send_impl(FTAG, dp, ds, NULL, B_FALSE,
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
embedok, large_block_ok, compressok, rawok,
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
outfd, resumeobj, resumeoff, vp, off);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (owned)
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_disown(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
dsl_dataset_rele_flags(ds, dsflags, FTAG);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_adjust_send_estimate_for_indirects(dsl_dataset_t *ds, uint64_t uncompressed,
|
|
|
|
uint64_t compressed, boolean_t stream_compressed, uint64_t *sizep)
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-08-26 21:43:21 +03:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t size;
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Assume that space (both on-disk and in-stream) is dominated by
|
|
|
|
* data. We will adjust for indirect blocks and the copies property,
|
|
|
|
* but ignore per-object space used (eg, dnodes and DRR_OBJECT records).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t recordsize;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t record_count;
|
2016-07-08 01:00:51 +03:00
|
|
|
objset_t *os;
|
|
|
|
VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Assume all (uncompressed) blocks are recordsize. */
|
2016-08-26 21:43:21 +03:00
|
|
|
if (zfs_override_estimate_recordsize != 0) {
|
|
|
|
recordsize = zfs_override_estimate_recordsize;
|
|
|
|
} else if (os->os_phys->os_type == DMU_OST_ZVOL) {
|
2016-07-08 01:00:51 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_prop_get_int_ds(ds,
|
|
|
|
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_VOLBLOCKSIZE), &recordsize);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
err = dsl_prop_get_int_ds(ds,
|
|
|
|
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_RECORDSIZE), &recordsize);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
record_count = uncompressed / recordsize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're estimating a send size for a compressed stream, use the
|
|
|
|
* compressed data size to estimate the stream size. Otherwise, use the
|
|
|
|
* uncompressed data size.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
size = stream_compressed ? compressed : uncompressed;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Subtract out approximate space used by indirect blocks.
|
|
|
|
* Assume most space is used by data blocks (non-indirect, non-dnode).
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
* Assume no ditto blocks or internal fragmentation.
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Therefore, space used by indirect blocks is sizeof(blkptr_t) per
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
* block.
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
size -= record_count * sizeof (blkptr_t);
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add in the space for the record associated with each block. */
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
size += record_count * sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t);
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*sizep = size;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
int
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_send_estimate(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dsl_dataset_t *fromds,
|
|
|
|
boolean_t stream_compressed, uint64_t *sizep)
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t uncomp, comp;
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-13 20:50:35 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(dsl_pool_config_held(ds->ds_dir->dd_pool));
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* tosnap must be a snapshot */
|
2015-04-02 06:44:32 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!ds->ds_is_snapshot)
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2015-07-02 16:04:35 +03:00
|
|
|
/* fromsnap, if provided, must be a snapshot */
|
|
|
|
if (fromds != NULL && !fromds->ds_is_snapshot)
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
|
|
|
|
|
2013-08-28 15:45:09 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* fromsnap must be an earlier snapshot from the same fs as tosnap,
|
|
|
|
* or the origin's fs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-12-12 02:33:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (fromds != NULL && !dsl_dataset_is_before(ds, fromds, 0))
|
2013-03-08 22:41:28 +04:00
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EXDEV));
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Get compressed and uncompressed size estimates of changed data. */
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (fromds == NULL) {
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
uncomp = dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_uncompressed_bytes;
|
|
|
|
comp = dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_compressed_bytes;
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
uint64_t used;
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
err = dsl_dataset_space_written(fromds, ds,
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
&used, &comp, &uncomp);
|
2013-09-04 16:00:57 +04:00
|
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_adjust_send_estimate_for_indirects(ds, uncomp, comp,
|
|
|
|
stream_compressed, sizep);
|
2016-07-08 01:00:51 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Add the size of the BEGIN and END records to the estimate.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*sizep += 2 * sizeof (dmu_replay_record_t);
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
struct calculate_send_arg {
|
|
|
|
uint64_t uncompressed;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t compressed;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Simple callback used to traverse the blocks of a snapshot and sum their
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
* uncompressed and compressed sizes.
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dmu_calculate_send_traversal(spa_t *spa, zilog_t *zilog, const blkptr_t *bp,
|
|
|
|
const zbookmark_phys_t *zb, const dnode_phys_t *dnp, void *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
struct calculate_send_arg *space = arg;
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
if (bp != NULL && !BP_IS_HOLE(bp)) {
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
space->uncompressed += BP_GET_UCSIZE(bp);
|
|
|
|
space->compressed += BP_GET_PSIZE(bp);
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Given a desination snapshot and a TXG, calculate the approximate size of a
|
|
|
|
* send stream sent from that TXG. from_txg may be zero, indicating that the
|
|
|
|
* whole snapshot will be sent.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
dmu_send_estimate_from_txg(dsl_dataset_t *ds, uint64_t from_txg,
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
boolean_t stream_compressed, uint64_t *sizep)
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
struct calculate_send_arg size = { 0 };
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-13 20:50:35 +03:00
|
|
|
ASSERT(dsl_pool_config_held(ds->ds_dir->dd_pool));
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* tosnap must be a snapshot */
|
|
|
|
if (!dsl_dataset_is_snapshot(ds))
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* verify that from_txg is before the provided snapshot was taken */
|
|
|
|
if (from_txg >= dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_creation_txg) {
|
|
|
|
return (SET_ERROR(EXDEV));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
* traverse the blocks of the snapshot with birth times after
|
|
|
|
* from_txg, summing their uncompressed size
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
*/
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
err = traverse_dataset(ds, from_txg,
|
|
|
|
TRAVERSE_POST | TRAVERSE_NO_DECRYPT,
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
dmu_calculate_send_traversal, &size);
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
|
|
|
err = dmu_adjust_send_estimate_for_indirects(ds, size.uncompressed,
|
|
|
|
size.compressed, stream_compressed, sizep);
|
2015-04-08 21:37:13 +03:00
|
|
|
return (err);
|
2011-11-17 22:14:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-07 00:22:48 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-10 00:05:13 +03:00
|
|
|
#if defined(_KERNEL)
|
|
|
|
/* BEGIN CSTYLED */
|
|
|
|
module_param(zfs_override_estimate_recordsize, ulong, 0644);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_PARM_DESC(zfs_override_estimate_recordsize,
|
|
|
|
"Record size calculation override for zfs send estimates");
|
|
|
|
/* END CSTYLED */
|
2015-07-06 06:20:31 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-10 00:05:13 +03:00
|
|
|
module_param(zfs_send_corrupt_data, int, 0644);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_PARM_DESC(zfs_send_corrupt_data, "Allow sending corrupt data");
|
2018-04-09 05:41:15 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_param(zfs_send_queue_length, int, 0644);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_PARM_DESC(zfs_send_queue_length, "Maximum send queue length");
|
2019-05-08 01:18:44 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_param(zfs_send_unmodified_spill_blocks, int, 0644);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_PARM_DESC(zfs_send_unmodified_spill_blocks,
|
|
|
|
"Send unmodified spill blocks");
|
2013-12-18 01:53:52 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|