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mirror_zfs/module/zfs/dsl_crypt.c

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Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0.
* You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version
* 1.0 of the CDDL.
*
* A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this
* source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at
* http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL.
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved.
Add types to featureflags in zfs The boolean featureflags in use thus far in ZFS are extremely useful, but because they take advantage of the zap layer, more interesting data than just a true/false value can be stored in a featureflag. In redacted send/receive, this is used to store the list of redaction snapshots for a redacted dataset. This change adds the ability for ZFS to store types other than a boolean in a featureflag. The only other implemented type is a uint64_t array. It also modifies the interfaces around dataset features to accomodate the new capabilities, and adds a few new functions to increase encapsulation. This functionality will be used by the Redacted Send/Receive feature. Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Closes #7981
2018-10-16 21:15:04 +03:00
* Copyright (c) 2018 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*/
#include <sys/dsl_crypt.h>
#include <sys/dsl_pool.h>
#include <sys/zap.h>
#include <sys/zil.h>
#include <sys/dsl_dir.h>
#include <sys/dsl_prop.h>
#include <sys/spa_impl.h>
#include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
#include <sys/zvol.h>
/*
* This file's primary purpose is for managing master encryption keys in
* memory and on disk. For more info on how these keys are used, see the
* block comment in zio_crypt.c.
*
* All master keys are stored encrypted on disk in the form of the DSL
* Crypto Key ZAP object. The binary key data in this object is always
* randomly generated and is encrypted with the user's wrapping key. This
* layer of indirection allows the user to change their key without
* needing to re-encrypt the entire dataset. The ZAP also holds on to the
* (non-encrypted) encryption algorithm identifier, IV, and MAC needed to
* safely decrypt the master key. For more info on the user's key see the
* block comment in libzfs_crypto.c
*
* In-memory encryption keys are managed through the spa_keystore. The
* keystore consists of 3 AVL trees, which are as follows:
*
* The Wrapping Key Tree:
* The wrapping key (wkey) tree stores the user's keys that are fed into the
* kernel through 'zfs load-key' and related commands. Datasets inherit their
* parent's wkey by default, so these structures are refcounted. The wrapping
* keys remain in memory until they are explicitly unloaded (with
* "zfs unload-key"). Unloading is only possible when no datasets are using
* them (refcount=0).
*
* The DSL Crypto Key Tree:
* The DSL Crypto Keys (DCK) are the in-memory representation of decrypted
* master keys. They are used by the functions in zio_crypt.c to perform
* encryption, decryption, and authentication. Snapshots and clones of a given
* dataset will share a DSL Crypto Key, so they are also refcounted. Once the
* refcount on a key hits zero, it is immediately zeroed out and freed.
*
* The Crypto Key Mapping Tree:
* The zio layer needs to lookup master keys by their dataset object id. Since
* the DSL Crypto Keys can belong to multiple datasets, we maintain a tree of
* dsl_key_mapping_t's which essentially just map the dataset object id to its
* appropriate DSL Crypto Key. The management for creating and destroying these
* mappings hooks into the code for owning and disowning datasets. Usually,
* there will only be one active dataset owner, but there are times
* (particularly during dataset creation and destruction) when this may not be
* true or the dataset may not be initialized enough to own. As a result, this
* object is also refcounted.
*/
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
/*
* This tunable allows datasets to be raw received even if the stream does
* not include IVset guids or if the guids don't match. This is used as part
* of the resolution for ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_8308_ENCRYPTION.
*/
int zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check = 0;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
static void
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
{
Linux 4.19-rc3+ compat: Remove refcount_t compat torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t was used by mistake. Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t. Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <fpletz@fnordicwalking.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7885 Closes #7932
2018-09-26 20:29:26 +03:00
(void) zfs_refcount_add(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
static void
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag)
{
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
(void) zfs_refcount_remove(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
static void
dsl_wrapping_key_free(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
{
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&wkey->wk_refcnt));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (wkey->wk_key.ck_data) {
bzero(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
Encryption patch follow-up * PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation. * HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests added to ensure correctness. * Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool and libicp. * Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but otherwise functions as advertised. * Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest to run on encrypted datasets. * Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch. * Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior. * Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records. * Minor code cleanups / consolidation. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
kmem_free(wkey->wk_key.ck_data,
Encryption patch follow-up * PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation. * HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests added to ensure correctness. * Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool and libicp. * Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but otherwise functions as advertised. * Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest to run on encrypted datasets. * Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch. * Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior. * Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records. * Minor code cleanups / consolidation. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_destroy(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
kmem_free(wkey, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t));
}
static int
dsl_wrapping_key_create(uint8_t *wkeydata, zfs_keyformat_t keyformat,
uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
/* allocate the wrapping key */
wkey = kmem_alloc(sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
if (!wkey)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOMEM));
/* allocate and initialize the underlying crypto key */
wkey->wk_key.ck_data = kmem_alloc(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN, KM_SLEEP);
if (!wkey->wk_key.ck_data) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
wkey->wk_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW;
Encryption patch follow-up * PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation. * HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests added to ensure correctness. * Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool and libicp. * Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but otherwise functions as advertised. * Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest to run on encrypted datasets. * Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch. * Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior. * Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records. * Minor code cleanups / consolidation. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
wkey->wk_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
bcopy(wkeydata, wkey->wk_key.ck_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN);
/* initialize the rest of the struct */
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_create(&wkey->wk_refcnt);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
wkey->wk_salt = salt;
wkey->wk_iters = iters;
*wkey_out = wkey;
return (0);
error:
dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
*wkey_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
int
dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(dcp_cmd_t cmd, nvlist_t *props,
nvlist_t *crypto_args, dsl_crypto_params_t **dcp_out)
{
int ret;
uint64_t crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT;
uint64_t keyformat = ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE;
uint64_t salt = 0, iters = 0;
dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = NULL;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
uint8_t *wkeydata = NULL;
uint_t wkeydata_len = 0;
char *keylocation = NULL;
dcp = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t), KM_SLEEP);
if (!dcp) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOMEM);
goto error;
}
dcp->cp_cmd = cmd;
/* get relevant arguments from the nvlists */
if (props != NULL) {
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION), &crypt);
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), &keyformat);
(void) nvlist_lookup_string(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), &keylocation);
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), &salt);
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), &iters);
dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
}
if (crypto_args != NULL) {
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata",
&wkeydata, &wkeydata_len);
}
/* check for valid command */
if (dcp->cp_cmd >= DCP_CMD_MAX) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
} else {
dcp->cp_cmd = cmd;
}
/* check for valid crypt */
if (dcp->cp_crypt >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
} else {
dcp->cp_crypt = crypt;
}
/* check for valid keyformat */
if (keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check for a valid keylocation (of any kind) and copy it in */
if (keylocation != NULL) {
if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_FALSE)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
dcp->cp_keylocation = spa_strdup(keylocation);
}
/* check wrapping key length, if given */
if (wkeydata != NULL && wkeydata_len != WRAPPING_KEY_LEN) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
Fix typos in module/zfs/ Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net> Closes #9240
2019-09-03 03:56:41 +03:00
/* if the user asked for the default crypt, determine that now */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_ON)
dcp->cp_crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_ON_VALUE;
/* create the wrapping key from the raw data */
if (wkeydata != NULL) {
/* create the wrapping key with the verified parameters */
ret = dsl_wrapping_key_create(wkeydata, keyformat, salt,
iters, &wkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dcp->cp_wkey = wkey;
}
/*
* Remove the encryption properties from the nvlist since they are not
* maintained through the DSL.
*/
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION));
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
(void) nvlist_remove_all(props,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
*dcp_out = dcp;
return (0);
error:
if (wkey != NULL)
dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
if (dcp != NULL)
kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
*dcp_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
void
dsl_crypto_params_free(dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, boolean_t unload)
{
if (dcp == NULL)
return;
if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
spa_strfree(dcp->cp_keylocation);
if (unload && dcp->cp_wkey != NULL)
dsl_wrapping_key_free(dcp->cp_wkey);
kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t));
}
static int
spa_crypto_key_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const dsl_crypto_key_t *dcka = a;
const dsl_crypto_key_t *dckb = b;
if (dcka->dck_obj < dckb->dck_obj)
return (-1);
if (dcka->dck_obj > dckb->dck_obj)
return (1);
return (0);
}
static int
spa_key_mapping_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const dsl_key_mapping_t *kma = a;
const dsl_key_mapping_t *kmb = b;
if (kma->km_dsobj < kmb->km_dsobj)
return (-1);
if (kma->km_dsobj > kmb->km_dsobj)
return (1);
return (0);
}
static int
spa_wkey_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wka = a;
const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkb = b;
if (wka->wk_ddobj < wkb->wk_ddobj)
return (-1);
if (wka->wk_ddobj > wkb->wk_ddobj)
return (1);
return (0);
}
void
spa_keystore_init(spa_keystore_t *sk)
{
rw_init(&sk->sk_dk_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
rw_init(&sk->sk_km_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
rw_init(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL);
avl_create(&sk->sk_dsl_keys, spa_crypto_key_compare,
sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t),
offsetof(dsl_crypto_key_t, dck_avl_link));
avl_create(&sk->sk_key_mappings, spa_key_mapping_compare,
sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t),
offsetof(dsl_key_mapping_t, km_avl_link));
avl_create(&sk->sk_wkeys, spa_wkey_compare, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t),
offsetof(dsl_wrapping_key_t, wk_avl_link));
}
void
spa_keystore_fini(spa_keystore_t *sk)
{
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
void *cookie = NULL;
ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_dsl_keys));
ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_key_mappings));
while ((wkey = avl_destroy_nodes(&sk->sk_wkeys, &cookie)) != NULL)
dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey);
avl_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys);
avl_destroy(&sk->sk_key_mappings);
avl_destroy(&sk->sk_dsl_keys);
rw_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock);
rw_destroy(&sk->sk_km_lock);
rw_destroy(&sk->sk_dk_lock);
}
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
static int
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *rddobj)
{
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, rddobj));
}
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
int
dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *version)
{
*version = 0;
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT));
/* version 0 is implied by ENOENT */
(void) zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, version);
return (0);
}
boolean_t
dsl_dir_incompatible_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd)
{
int ret;
uint64_t version = 0;
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dd, &version);
if (ret != 0)
return (B_FALSE);
return (version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION);
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
static int
spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj,
void *tag, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
/* init the search wrapping key */
search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
/* lookup the wrapping key */
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &search_wkey, NULL);
if (!found_wkey) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error;
}
/* increment the refcount */
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(found_wkey, tag);
*wkey_out = found_wkey;
return (0);
error:
*wkey_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
uint64_t rddobj;
boolean_t locked = B_FALSE;
if (!RW_WRITE_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)) {
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_READER);
locked = B_TRUE;
}
/* get the ddobj that the keylocation property was inherited from */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* lookup the wkey in the avl tree */
ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa, rddobj, tag, &wkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* unlock the wkey tree if we locked it */
if (locked)
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
*wkey_out = wkey;
return (0);
error:
if (locked)
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
*wkey_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
int
dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation)
{
int ret = 0;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
uint64_t rddobj;
/* hold the dsl dir */
ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
goto out;
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* if dd is not encrypted, the value may only be "none" */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
if (strcmp(keylocation, "none") != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* check for a valid keylocation for encrypted datasets */
if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto out;
}
/* check that this is an encryption root */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
if (rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto out;
}
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (0);
out:
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
if (dp != NULL)
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_free(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck)
{
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
ASSERT(zfs_refcount_count(&dck->dck_holds) == 0);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* destroy the zio_crypt_key_t */
zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck->dck_key);
/* free the refcount, wrapping key, and lock */
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_destroy(&dck->dck_holds);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dck->dck_wkey)
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
/* free the key */
kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_rele(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
{
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
}
static int
dsl_crypto_key_open(objset_t *mos, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
uint64_t dckobj, void *tag, dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
uint64_t crypt = 0, guid = 0, version = 0;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck;
/* allocate and initialize the key */
dck = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t), KM_SLEEP);
if (!dck)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOMEM));
/* fetch all of the values we need from the ZAP */
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
&crypt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &guid);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
iv);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
mac);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
/* the initial on-disk format for encryption did not have a version */
(void) zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* Unwrap the keys. If there is an error return EACCES to indicate
* an authentication failure.
*/
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
ret = zio_crypt_key_unwrap(&wkey->wk_key, crypt, version, guid,
raw_keydata, raw_hmac_keydata, iv, mac, &dck->dck_key);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (ret != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto error;
}
/* finish initializing the dsl_crypto_key_t */
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_create(&dck->dck_holds);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
dck->dck_obj = dckobj;
Linux 4.19-rc3+ compat: Remove refcount_t compat torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t was used by mistake. Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t. Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <fpletz@fnordicwalking.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7885 Closes #7932
2018-09-26 20:29:26 +03:00
zfs_refcount_add(&dck->dck_holds, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*dck_out = dck;
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL) {
bzero(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t));
}
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dckobj, void *tag,
dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t search_dck;
dsl_crypto_key_t *found_dck;
ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock));
/* init the search key */
search_dck.dck_obj = dckobj;
/* find the matching key in the keystore */
found_dck = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, &search_dck, NULL);
if (!found_dck) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error;
}
/* increment the refcount */
Linux 4.19-rc3+ compat: Remove refcount_t compat torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t was used by mistake. Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t. Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <fpletz@fnordicwalking.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7885 Closes #7932
2018-09-26 20:29:26 +03:00
zfs_refcount_add(&found_dck->dck_holds, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*dck_out = found_dck;
return (0);
error:
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag,
dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
avl_index_t where;
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck_io = NULL, *dck_ks = NULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
uint64_t dckobj = dd->dd_crypto_obj;
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
/* Lookup the key in the tree of currently loaded keys */
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_READER);
ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
if (ret == 0) {
*dck_out = dck_ks;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (0);
}
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
/* Lookup the wrapping key from the keystore */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa, dd, FTAG, &wkey);
if (ret != 0) {
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
*dck_out = NULL;
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
/* Read the key from disk */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(spa->spa_meta_objset, wkey, dckobj,
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
tag, &dck_io);
if (ret != 0) {
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
* Add the key to the keystore. It may already exist if it was
* added while performing the read from disk. In this case discard
* it and return the key from the keystore.
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*/
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks);
if (ret != 0) {
avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, &where);
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, where);
*dck_out = dck_io;
} else {
dsl_crypto_key_free(dck_io);
*dck_out = dck_ks;
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
/* Release the wrapping key (the dsl key now has a reference to it) */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
return (0);
}
void
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag)
{
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER);
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0) {
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck);
dsl_crypto_key_free(dck);
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock);
}
int
spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey)
{
int ret;
avl_index_t where;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
/* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
if (found_wkey != NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EEXIST);
goto error_unlock;
}
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
boolean_t noop)
{
int ret;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
Replay logs before starting ztest workers This patch ensures that logs are replayed on all datasets prior to starting ztest workers. This ensures that the call to vdev_offline() a log device in ztest_fault_inject() will not fail due to the log device being required for replay. This patch also fixes a small issue found during testing where spa_keystore_load_wkey() does not check that the dataset specified is an encryption root. This check was present in libzfs, however. Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8084
2018-11-08 02:40:24 +03:00
uint64_t rddobj, keyformat, salt, iters;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* We don't validate the wrapping key's keyformat, salt, or iters
* since they will never be needed after the DCK has been wrapped.
*/
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL ||
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE ||
dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
Replay logs before starting ztest workers This patch ensures that logs are replayed on all datasets prior to starting ztest workers. This ensures that the call to vdev_offline() a log device in ztest_fault_inject() will not fail due to the log device being required for replay. This patch also fixes a small issue found during testing where spa_keystore_load_wkey() does not check that the dataset specified is an encryption root. This check was present in libzfs, however. Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8084
2018-11-08 02:40:24 +03:00
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
goto error;
}
/* hold the dsl dir */
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
goto error;
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Replay logs before starting ztest workers This patch ensures that logs are replayed on all datasets prior to starting ztest workers. This ensures that the call to vdev_offline() a log device in ztest_fault_inject() will not fail due to the log device being required for replay. This patch also fixes a small issue found during testing where spa_keystore_load_wkey() does not check that the dataset specified is an encryption root. This check was present in libzfs, however. Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8084
2018-11-08 02:40:24 +03:00
/* confirm that dd is the encryption root */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0 || rddobj != dd->dd_object) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* initialize the wkey's ddobj */
wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
/* verify that the wkey is correct by opening its dsl key */
ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(dp->dp_meta_objset, wkey,
dd->dd_crypto_obj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
/* initialize the wkey encryption parameters from the DSL Crypto Key */
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &keyformat);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ASSERT3U(keyformat, <, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS);
ASSERT3U(keyformat, !=, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE);
IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters != 0);
IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt != 0);
IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters == 0);
IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt == 0);
wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat;
wkey->wk_salt = salt;
wkey->wk_iters = iters;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
* At this point we have verified the wkey and confirmed that it can
* be used to decrypt a DSL Crypto Key. We can simply cleanup and
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
* return if this is all the user wanted to do.
*/
if (noop)
goto error;
/* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
/* create any zvols under this ds */
zvol_create_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE);
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG);
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
if (dp != NULL)
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey;
/* init the search wrapping key */
search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
/* remove the wrapping key from the keystore */
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys,
&search_wkey, NULL);
if (!found_wkey) {
Adopt pyzfs from ClusterHQ This commit introduces several changes: * Update LICENSE and project information * Give a good PEP8 talk to existing Python source code * Add RPM/DEB packaging for pyzfs * Fix some outstanding issues with the existing pyzfs code caused by changes in the ABI since the last time the code was updated * Integrate pyzfs Python unittest with the ZFS Test Suite * Add missing libzfs_core functions: lzc_change_key, lzc_channel_program, lzc_channel_program_nosync, lzc_load_key, lzc_receive_one, lzc_receive_resumable, lzc_receive_with_cmdprops, lzc_receive_with_header, lzc_reopen, lzc_send_resume, lzc_sync, lzc_unload_key, lzc_remap Note: this commit slightly changes zfs_ioc_unload_key() ABI. This allow to differentiate the case where we tried to unload a key on a non-existing dataset (ENOENT) from the situation where a dataset has no key loaded: this is consistent with the "change" case where trying to zfs_ioc_change_key() from a dataset with no key results in EACCES. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: loli10K <ezomori.nozomu@gmail.com> Closes #7230
2018-03-18 11:34:45 +03:00
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
goto error_unlock;
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
} else if (zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt) != 0) {
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = SET_ERROR(EBUSY);
goto error_unlock;
}
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
/* free the wrapping key */
dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_keystore_unload_wkey(const char *dsname)
{
int ret = 0;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL;
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
spa_t *spa = NULL;
ret = spa_open(dsname, &spa, FTAG);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
/*
* Wait for any outstanding txg IO to complete, releasing any
* remaining references on the wkey.
*/
if (spa_mode(spa) != FREAD)
txg_wait_synced(spa->spa_dsl_pool, 0);
spa_close(spa, FTAG);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* hold the dsl dir */
ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
ret = (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
goto error;
}
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
goto error;
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* unload the wkey */
ret = spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, dd->dd_object);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
/* remove any zvols under this ds */
zvol_remove_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE);
return (0);
error:
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
if (dp != NULL)
dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
void
key_mapping_add_ref(dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
{
ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
}
/*
* The locking here is a little tricky to ensure we don't cause unnecessary
* performance problems. We want to release a key mapping whenever someone
* decrements the refcount to 0, but freeing the mapping requires removing
* it from the spa_keystore, which requires holding sk_km_lock as a writer.
* Most of the time we don't want to hold this lock as a writer, since the
* same lock is held as a reader for each IO that needs to encrypt / decrypt
* data for any dataset and in practice we will only actually free the
* mapping after unmounting a dataset.
*/
void
key_mapping_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag)
{
ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1);
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, tag) != 0)
return;
/*
* We think we are going to need to free the mapping. Add a
* reference to prevent most other releasers from thinking
* this might be their responsibility. This is inherently
* racy, so we will confirm that we are legitimately the
* last holder once we have the sk_km_lock as a writer.
*/
zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG);
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG) != 0) {
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
return;
}
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km);
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
int
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
spa_keystore_create_mapping(spa_t *spa, dsl_dataset_t *ds, void *tag,
dsl_key_mapping_t **km_out)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
int ret;
avl_index_t where;
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
dsl_key_mapping_t *km, *found_km;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
boolean_t should_free = B_FALSE;
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
/* Allocate and initialize the mapping */
km = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t), KM_SLEEP);
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_create(&km->km_refcnt);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa, ds->ds_dir, km, &km->km_key);
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
if (ret != 0) {
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
if (km_out != NULL)
*km_out = NULL;
Fix hash_lock / keystore.sk_dk_lock lock inversion The keystore.sk_dk_lock should not be held while performing I/O. Drop the lock when reading from disk and update the code so they the first successful caller adds the key. Improve error handling in spa_keystore_create_mapping_impl(). Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #7112 Closes #7115
2018-02-05 01:07:13 +03:00
return (ret);
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
km->km_dsobj = ds->ds_object;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER);
/*
* If a mapping already exists, simply increment its refcount and
* cleanup the one we made. We want to allocate / free outside of
* the lock because this lock is also used by the zio layer to lookup
* key mappings. Otherwise, use the one we created. Normally, there will
* only be one active reference at a time (the objset owner), but there
* are times when there could be multiple async users.
*/
found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, &where);
if (found_km != NULL) {
should_free = B_TRUE;
Linux 4.19-rc3+ compat: Remove refcount_t compat torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t was used by mistake. Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t. Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <fpletz@fnordicwalking.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7885 Closes #7932
2018-09-26 20:29:26 +03:00
zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_refcnt, tag);
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
if (km_out != NULL)
*km_out = found_km;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
} else {
Linux 4.19-rc3+ compat: Remove refcount_t compat torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t was used by mistake. Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t. Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <fpletz@fnordicwalking.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7885 Closes #7932
2018-09-26 20:29:26 +03:00
zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, where);
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
if (km_out != NULL)
*km_out = km;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
if (should_free) {
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km);
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t));
}
return (0);
}
int
spa_keystore_remove_mapping(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag)
{
int ret;
dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
/* init the search key mapping */
search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* find the matching mapping */
found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings,
&search_km, NULL);
if (found_km == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error_unlock;
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
Refcounted DSL Crypto Key Mappings Since native ZFS encryption was merged, we have been fighting against a series of bugs that come down to the same problem: Key mappings (which must be present during all I/O operations) are created and destroyed based on dataset ownership, but I/Os can have traditionally been allowed to "leak" into the next txg after the dataset is disowned. In the past we have attempted to solve this problem by trying to ensure that datasets are disowned ater all I/O is finished by calling txg_wait_synced(), but we have repeatedly found edge cases that need to be squashed and code paths that might incur a high number of txg syncs. This patch attempts to resolve this issue differently, by adding a reference to the key mapping for each txg it is dirtied in. By doing so, we can remove many of the unnecessary calls to txg_wait_synced() we have added in the past and ensure we don't need to deal with this problem in the future. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7949
2018-10-03 19:47:11 +03:00
key_mapping_rele(spa, found_km, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
return (ret);
}
/*
* This function is primarily used by the zio and arc layer to lookup
* DSL Crypto Keys for encryption. Callers must release the key with
* spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(). The function may also be called with
* dck_out == NULL and tag == NULL to simply check that a key exists
* without getting a reference to it.
*/
int
spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag,
dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out)
{
int ret;
dsl_key_mapping_t search_km;
dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km;
ASSERT((tag != NULL && dck_out != NULL) ||
(tag == NULL && dck_out == NULL));
/* init the search key mapping */
search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj;
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER);
/* remove the mapping from the tree */
found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, &search_km,
NULL);
if (found_km == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT);
goto error_unlock;
}
if (found_km && tag)
Linux 4.19-rc3+ compat: Remove refcount_t compat torvalds/linux@59b57717f ("blkcg: delay blkg destruction until after writeback has finished") added a refcount_t to the blkcg structure. Due to the refcount_t compatibility code, zfs_refcount_t was used by mistake. Resolve this by removing the compatibility code and replacing the occurrences of refcount_t with zfs_refcount_t. Reviewed-by: Franz Pletz <fpletz@fnordicwalking.de> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7885 Closes #7932
2018-09-26 20:29:26 +03:00
zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_key->dck_holds, tag);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
if (dck_out != NULL)
*dck_out = found_km->km_key;
return (0);
error_unlock:
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock);
if (dck_out != NULL)
*dck_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
static int
dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dsl_dir_t *dd)
{
int ret;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL;
ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dd->dd_pool->dp_spa, dd, FTAG,
&wkey);
if (ret != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
return (0);
}
static zfs_keystatus_t
dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dsl_dir_t *dd)
{
/* check if this dd has a has a dsl key */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (ZFS_KEYSTATUS_NONE);
return (dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd) == 0 ?
ZFS_KEYSTATUS_AVAILABLE : ZFS_KEYSTATUS_UNAVAILABLE);
}
static int
dsl_dir_get_crypt(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *crypt)
{
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
*crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
return (0);
}
return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, crypt));
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(objset_t *mos, uint64_t dckobj, uint64_t crypt,
uint64_t root_ddobj, uint64_t guid, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac,
uint8_t *keydata, uint8_t *hmac_keydata, uint64_t keyformat,
uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
&crypt, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
&root_ddobj, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1,
&guid, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
iv, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
mac, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, keydata, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, hmac_keydata, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
8, 1, &keyformat, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
8, 1, &salt, tx));
VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
8, 1, &iters, tx));
}
static void
dsl_crypto_key_sync(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
zio_crypt_key_t *key = &dck->dck_key;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dck->dck_wkey;
uint8_t keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
uint8_t hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
ASSERT3U(key->zk_crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
/* encrypt and store the keys along with the IV and MAC */
VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_wrap(&dck->dck_wkey->wk_key, key, iv, mac,
keydata, hmac_keydata));
/* update the ZAP with the obtained values */
dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck->dck_obj,
key->zk_crypt, wkey->wk_ddobj, key->zk_guid, iv, mac, keydata,
hmac_keydata, wkey->wk_keyformat, wkey->wk_salt, wkey->wk_iters,
tx);
}
typedef struct spa_keystore_change_key_args {
const char *skcka_dsname;
dsl_crypto_params_t *skcka_cp;
} spa_keystore_change_key_args_t;
static int
spa_keystore_change_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
uint64_t rddobj;
/* check for the encryption feature */
if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
goto error;
}
/* check for valid key change command */
if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY &&
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_INHERIT &&
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY &&
dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* hold the dd */
ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL);
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
if (ret != 0) {
dd = NULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
goto error;
zfs_ioc_unload_key can drop extra spa ref Reviewed by: Thomas Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Don Brady <don.brady@delphix.com> Closes #7759
2018-08-04 00:50:51 +03:00
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* verify that the dataset is encrypted */
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* clones must always use their origin's key */
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* lookup the ddobj we are inheriting the keylocation from */
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Adopt pyzfs from ClusterHQ This commit introduces several changes: * Update LICENSE and project information * Give a good PEP8 talk to existing Python source code * Add RPM/DEB packaging for pyzfs * Fix some outstanding issues with the existing pyzfs code caused by changes in the ABI since the last time the code was updated * Integrate pyzfs Python unittest with the ZFS Test Suite * Add missing libzfs_core functions: lzc_change_key, lzc_channel_program, lzc_channel_program_nosync, lzc_load_key, lzc_receive_one, lzc_receive_resumable, lzc_receive_with_cmdprops, lzc_receive_with_header, lzc_reopen, lzc_send_resume, lzc_sync, lzc_unload_key, lzc_remap Note: this commit slightly changes zfs_ioc_unload_key() ABI. This allow to differentiate the case where we tried to unload a key on a non-existing dataset (ENOENT) from the situation where a dataset has no key loaded: this is consistent with the "change" case where trying to zfs_ioc_change_key() from a dataset with no key results in EACCES. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: loli10K <ezomori.nozomu@gmail.com> Closes #7230
2018-03-18 11:34:45 +03:00
/* Handle inheritance */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) {
/* no other encryption params should be given */
if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that this is an encryption root */
if (dd->dd_object != rddobj) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that the parent is encrypted */
if (dd->dd_parent->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* if we are rewrapping check that both keys are loaded */
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd->dd_parent);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
}
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (0);
}
/* handle forcing an encryption root without rewrapping */
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
/* no other encryption params should be given */
if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL ||
dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that this is not an encryption root */
if (dd->dd_object == rddobj) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (0);
}
/* crypt cannot be changed after creation */
if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* we are not inheritting our parent's wkey so we need one ourselves */
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check for a valid keyformat for the new wrapping key */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/*
* If this dataset is not currently an encryption root we need a new
* keylocation for this dataset's new wrapping key. Otherwise we can
* just keep the one we already had.
*/
if (dd->dd_object != rddobj && dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* check that the keylocation is valid if it is not NULL */
if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE)) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
/* passphrases require pbkdf2 salt and iters */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
} else {
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error;
}
}
/* make sure the dd's wkey is loaded */
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (0);
error:
if (dd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
/*
* This function deals with the intricacies of updating wrapping
* key references and encryption roots recursively in the event
* of a call to 'zfs change-key' or 'zfs promote'. The 'skip'
* parameter should always be set to B_FALSE when called
* externally.
*/
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
static void
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj,
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
uint64_t new_rddobj, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, boolean_t skip,
dmu_tx_t *tx)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
zap_cursor_t *zc;
zap_attribute_t *za;
dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
uint64_t curr_rddobj;
ASSERT(RW_WRITE_HELD(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock));
/* hold the dd */
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, ddobj, NULL, FTAG, &dd));
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
/* ignore special dsl dirs */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dd->dd_myname[0] == '$' || dd->dd_myname[0] == '%') {
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return;
}
Fix for #6703 This patch resolves an issue where spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() incorrectly recursed into clone DSL Directories while recursively rewrapping encryption keys. Clones share keys with their origins, so this logic was incorrect. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 04:55:39 +03:00
/*
* Stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root
* or if this dd is a clone.
*/
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj));
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
if (!skip && (curr_rddobj != rddobj || dsl_dir_is_clone(dd))) {
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
return;
}
/*
* If we don't have a wrapping key just update the dck to reflect the
* new encryption root. Otherwise rewrap the entire dck and re-sync it
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
* to disk. If skip is set, we don't do any of this work.
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*/
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
if (!skip) {
if (wkey == NULL) {
VERIFY0(zap_update(dp->dp_meta_objset,
dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1,
&new_rddobj, tx));
} else {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa, dd,
FTAG, &dck));
dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck);
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck);
dck->dck_wkey = wkey;
dsl_crypto_key_sync(dck, tx);
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(dp->dp_spa, dck, FTAG);
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
zc = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_cursor_t), KM_SLEEP);
za = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_attribute_t), KM_SLEEP);
Fix for #6703 This patch resolves an issue where spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() incorrectly recursed into clone DSL Directories while recursively rewrapping encryption keys. Clones share keys with their origins, so this logic was incorrect. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 04:55:39 +03:00
/* Recurse into all child dsl dirs. */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_child_dir_zapobj);
zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
za->za_first_integer, new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
}
zap_cursor_fini(zc);
/*
* Recurse into all dsl dirs of clones. We utilize the skip parameter
* here so that we don't attempt to process the clones directly. This
* is because the clone and its origin share the same dck, which has
* already been updated.
*/
for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset,
dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_clones);
zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0;
zap_cursor_advance(zc)) {
dsl_dataset_t *clone;
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, za->za_first_integer,
FTAG, &clone));
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj,
clone->ds_dir->dd_object, new_rddobj, wkey, B_TRUE, tx);
dsl_dataset_rele(clone, FTAG);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
zap_cursor_fini(zc);
kmem_free(za, sizeof (zap_attribute_t));
kmem_free(zc, sizeof (zap_cursor_t));
dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG);
}
static void
spa_keystore_change_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_dataset_t *ds;
avl_index_t where;
dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx);
spa_t *spa = dp->dp_spa;
spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg;
dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL, *found_wkey;
dsl_wrapping_key_t wkey_search;
char *keylocation = dcp->cp_keylocation;
uint64_t rddobj, new_rddobj;
/* create and initialize the wrapping key */
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &ds));
ASSERT(!ds->ds_is_snapshot);
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY ||
dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) {
/*
* We are changing to a new wkey. Set additional properties
* which can be sent along with this ioctl. Note that this
* command can set keylocation even if it can't normally be
* set via 'zfs set' due to a non-local keylocation.
*/
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
wkey->wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
} else {
keylocation = "prompt";
}
if (keylocation != NULL) {
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
keylocation, tx);
}
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj));
new_rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
} else {
/*
* We are inheritting the parent's wkey. Unset any local
* keylocation and grab a reference to the wkey.
*/
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa,
ds->ds_dir->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
}
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), ZPROP_SRC_NONE,
0, 0, NULL, tx);
rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
Fix encryption root hierarchy issue After doing a recursive raw receive, zfs userspace performs a final pass to adjust the encryption root hierarchy as needed. Unfortunately, the FORCE_INHERIT ioctl had a bug which caused the encryption root to always be assigned to the direct parent instead of the inheriting parent. This patch simply fixes this issue. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6847 Closes #6848
2017-11-09 02:25:30 +03:00
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir->dd_parent,
&new_rddobj));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
if (wkey == NULL) {
ASSERT(dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT ||
dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY);
}
rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
/* recurse through all children and rewrap their keys */
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, ds->ds_dir->dd_object,
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* All references to the old wkey should be released now (if it
* existed). Replace the wrapping key.
*/
wkey_search.wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object;
found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &wkey_search, NULL);
if (found_wkey != NULL) {
Prefix all refcount functions with zfs_ Recent changes in the Linux kernel made it necessary to prefix the refcount_add() function with zfs_ due to a name collision. To bring the other functions in line with that and to avoid future collisions, prefix the other refcount functions as well. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi@gmx.de> Closes #7963
2018-10-01 20:42:05 +03:00
ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey);
dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey);
}
if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) {
avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where);
avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where);
} else if (wkey != NULL) {
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
}
rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
}
int
spa_keystore_change_key(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp)
{
spa_keystore_change_key_args_t skcka;
/* initialize the args struct */
skcka.skcka_dsname = dsname;
skcka.skcka_cp = dcp;
/*
* Perform the actual work in syncing context. The blocks modified
* here could be calculated but it would require holding the pool
Fix typos in module/zfs/ Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net> Closes #9240
2019-09-03 03:56:41 +03:00
* lock and traversing all of the datasets that will have their keys
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
* changed.
*/
return (dsl_sync_task(dsname, spa_keystore_change_key_check,
spa_keystore_change_key_sync, &skcka, 15,
ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_RESERVED));
}
int
dsl_dir_rename_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *dd, dsl_dir_t *newparent)
{
int ret;
uint64_t curr_rddobj, parent_rddobj;
Allow unencrypted children of encrypted datasets When encryption was first added to ZFS, we made a decision to prevent users from creating unencrypted children of encrypted datasets. The idea was to prevent users from inadvertently leaving some of their data unencrypted. However, since the release of 0.8.0, some legitimate reasons have been brought up for this behavior to be allowed. This patch simply removes this limitation from all code paths that had checks for it and updates the tests accordingly. Reviewed-by: Jason King <jason.king@joyent.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Eric Fagan <sef@ixsystems.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8737 Closes #8870
2019-06-20 22:29:51 +03:00
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (0);
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/*
* if this is not an encryption root, we must make sure we are not
* moving dd to a new encryption root
*/
if (dd->dd_object != curr_rddobj) {
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(newparent,
&parent_rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (parent_rddobj != curr_rddobj) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
goto error;
}
}
return (0);
error:
return (ret);
}
/*
* Check to make sure that a promote from targetdd to origindd will not require
* any key rewraps.
*/
int
dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin)
{
int ret;
uint64_t rddobj, op_rddobj, tp_rddobj;
/* If the dataset is not encrypted we don't need to check anything */
if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return (0);
/*
* If we are not changing the first origin snapshot in a chain
* the encryption root won't change either.
*/
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
return (0);
/*
* If the origin is the encryption root we will update
* the DSL Crypto Key to point to the target instead.
*/
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
if (rddobj == origin->dd_object)
return (0);
/*
* The origin is inheriting its encryption root from its parent.
* Check that the parent of the target has the same encryption root.
*/
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin->dd_parent, &op_rddobj);
Fix error message on promoting encrypted dataset This patch corrects the error message reported when attempting to promote a dataset outside of its encryption root. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8905 Closes #8935
2019-06-25 02:42:52 +03:00
if (ret == ENOENT)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
else if (ret != 0)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (ret);
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(target->dd_parent, &tp_rddobj);
Fix error message on promoting encrypted dataset This patch corrects the error message reported when attempting to promote a dataset outside of its encryption root. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8905 Closes #8935
2019-06-25 02:42:52 +03:00
if (ret == ENOENT)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
else if (ret != 0)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (ret);
if (op_rddobj != tp_rddobj)
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
return (0);
}
void
dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_sync(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin,
dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
uint64_t rddobj;
dsl_pool_t *dp = target->dd_pool;
dsl_dataset_t *targetds;
dsl_dataset_t *originds;
char *keylocation;
if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return;
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin))
return;
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj));
if (rddobj != origin->dd_object)
return;
/*
Fix typos in module/zfs/ Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net> Closes #9240
2019-09-03 03:56:41 +03:00
* If the target is being promoted to the encryption root update the
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
* DSL Crypto Key and keylocation to reflect that. We also need to
* update the DSL Crypto Keys of all children inheritting their
* encryption root to point to the new target. Otherwise, the check
* function ensured that the encryption root will not change.
*/
keylocation = kmem_alloc(ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, KM_SLEEP);
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
dsl_dir_phys(target)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &targetds));
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp,
dsl_dir_phys(origin)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &originds));
VERIFY0(dsl_prop_get_dd(origin, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
1, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, keylocation, NULL, B_FALSE));
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(targetds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, keylocation, tx);
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(originds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_NONE, 0, 0, NULL, tx);
rw_enter(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER);
spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, origin->dd_object,
Fix clone handling with encryption roots Currently, spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl() does not recurse into clones when updating encryption roots for either a call to 'zfs promote' or 'zfs change-key'. This can cause children of these clones to end up in a state where they point to the wrong dataset as the encryption root. It can also trigger ASSERTs in some cases where the code checks reference counts on wrapping keys. This patch fixes this issue by ensuring that this function properly recurses into clones during processing. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Alek Pinchuk <apinchuk@datto.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #9267 Closes #9294
2019-09-16 20:07:33 +03:00
target->dd_object, NULL, B_FALSE, tx);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
rw_exit(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock);
dsl_dataset_rele(targetds, FTAG);
dsl_dataset_rele(originds, FTAG);
kmem_free(keylocation, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN);
}
int
Check encrypted dataset + embedded recv earlier This patch fixes a bug where attempting to receive a send stream with embedded data into an encrypted dataset would not cleanup that dataset when the error was reached. The check was moved into dmu_recv_begin_check(), preventing this issue. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <Richard.Elling@RichardElling.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7650
2018-06-18 22:47:12 +03:00
dmu_objset_create_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *parentdd, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp,
boolean_t *will_encrypt)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
int ret;
uint64_t pcrypt, crypt;
Added encryption support for zfs recv -o / -x One small integration that was absent from b52563 was support for zfs recv -o / -x with regards to encryption parameters. The main use cases of this are as follows: * Receiving an unencrypted stream as encrypted without needing to create a "dummy" encrypted parent so that encryption can be inheritted. * Allowing users to change their keylocation on receive, so long as the receiving dataset is an encryption root. * Allowing users to explicitly exclude or override the encryption property from an unencrypted properties stream, allowing it to be received as encrypted. * Receiving a recursive heirarchy of unencrypted datasets, encrypting the top-level one and forcing all children to inherit the encryption. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <Richard.Elling@RichardElling.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7650
2017-10-13 20:09:04 +03:00
dsl_crypto_params_t dummy_dcp = { 0 };
Check encrypted dataset + embedded recv earlier This patch fixes a bug where attempting to receive a send stream with embedded data into an encrypted dataset would not cleanup that dataset when the error was reached. The check was moved into dmu_recv_begin_check(), preventing this issue. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <Richard.Elling@RichardElling.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7650
2018-06-18 22:47:12 +03:00
if (will_encrypt != NULL)
*will_encrypt = B_FALSE;
Added encryption support for zfs recv -o / -x One small integration that was absent from b52563 was support for zfs recv -o / -x with regards to encryption parameters. The main use cases of this are as follows: * Receiving an unencrypted stream as encrypted without needing to create a "dummy" encrypted parent so that encryption can be inheritted. * Allowing users to change their keylocation on receive, so long as the receiving dataset is an encryption root. * Allowing users to explicitly exclude or override the encryption property from an unencrypted properties stream, allowing it to be received as encrypted. * Receiving a recursive heirarchy of unencrypted datasets, encrypting the top-level one and forcing all children to inherit the encryption. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <Richard.Elling@RichardElling.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7650
2017-10-13 20:09:04 +03:00
if (dcp == NULL)
dcp = &dummy_dcp;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
if (parentdd != NULL) {
ret = dsl_dir_get_crypt(parentdd, &pcrypt);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
} else {
pcrypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF;
}
crypt = (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) ? pcrypt : dcp->cp_crypt;
ASSERT3U(pcrypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
ASSERT3U(crypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT);
/* check for valid dcp with no encryption (inherited or local) */
if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) {
/* Must not specify encryption params */
if (dcp->cp_wkey != NULL ||
(dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL &&
strcmp(dcp->cp_keylocation, "none") != 0))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
return (0);
}
Check encrypted dataset + embedded recv earlier This patch fixes a bug where attempting to receive a send stream with embedded data into an encrypted dataset would not cleanup that dataset when the error was reached. The check was moved into dmu_recv_begin_check(), preventing this issue. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <Richard.Elling@RichardElling.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7650
2018-06-18 22:47:12 +03:00
if (will_encrypt != NULL)
*will_encrypt = B_TRUE;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* We will now definitely be encrypting. Check the feature flag. When
* creating the pool the caller will check this for us since we won't
Check encrypted dataset + embedded recv earlier This patch fixes a bug where attempting to receive a send stream with embedded data into an encrypted dataset would not cleanup that dataset when the error was reached. The check was moved into dmu_recv_begin_check(), preventing this issue. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Richard Elling <Richard.Elling@RichardElling.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7650
2018-06-18 22:47:12 +03:00
* technically have the feature activated yet.
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*/
if (parentdd != NULL &&
!spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) {
return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
}
Better user experience for errata 4 This patch attempts to address some user concerns that have arisen since errata 4 was introduced. * The errata warning has been made less scary for users without any encrypted datasets. * The errata warning now clears itself without a pool reimport if the bookmark_v2 feature is enabled and no encrypted datasets exist. * It is no longer possible to create new encrypted datasets without enabling the bookmark_v2 feature, thus helping to ensure that the errata is resolved. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Issue ##8308 Closes #8504
2019-03-15 02:48:30 +03:00
/* Check for errata #4 (encryption enabled, bookmark_v2 disabled) */
if (parentdd != NULL &&
!spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa,
SPA_FEATURE_BOOKMARK_V2)) {
return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP));
}
Adopt pyzfs from ClusterHQ This commit introduces several changes: * Update LICENSE and project information * Give a good PEP8 talk to existing Python source code * Add RPM/DEB packaging for pyzfs * Fix some outstanding issues with the existing pyzfs code caused by changes in the ABI since the last time the code was updated * Integrate pyzfs Python unittest with the ZFS Test Suite * Add missing libzfs_core functions: lzc_change_key, lzc_channel_program, lzc_channel_program_nosync, lzc_load_key, lzc_receive_one, lzc_receive_resumable, lzc_receive_with_cmdprops, lzc_receive_with_header, lzc_reopen, lzc_send_resume, lzc_sync, lzc_unload_key, lzc_remap Note: this commit slightly changes zfs_ioc_unload_key() ABI. This allow to differentiate the case where we tried to unload a key on a non-existing dataset (ENOENT) from the situation where a dataset has no key loaded: this is consistent with the "change" case where trying to zfs_ioc_change_key() from a dataset with no key results in EACCES. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: loli10K <ezomori.nozomu@gmail.com> Closes #7230
2018-03-18 11:34:45 +03:00
/* handle inheritance */
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
ASSERT3P(parentdd, !=, NULL);
/* key must be fully unspecified */
if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* parent must have a key to inherit */
if (pcrypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* check for parent key */
ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(parentdd);
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
return (0);
}
/* At this point we should have a fully specified key. Check location */
if (dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL ||
!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/* Must have fully specified keyformat */
switch (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat) {
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_HEX:
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_RAW:
/* requires no pbkdf2 iters and salt */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
break;
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE:
/* requires pbkdf2 iters and salt */
if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 ||
dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
break;
case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE:
default:
/* keyformat must be specified and valid */
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
}
return (0);
}
void
dsl_dataset_create_crypt_sync(uint64_t dsobj, dsl_dir_t *dd,
dsl_dataset_t *origin, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_pool_t *dp = dd->dd_pool;
uint64_t crypt;
dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey;
/* clones always use their origin's wrapping key */
if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) {
ASSERT3P(dcp, ==, NULL);
/*
* If this is an encrypted clone we just need to clone the
* dck into dd. Zapify the dd so we can do that.
*/
if (origin->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
dd->dd_crypto_obj =
dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(origin->ds_dir, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1,
&dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
}
return;
}
/*
* A NULL dcp at this point indicates this is the origin dataset
* which does not have an objset to encrypt. Raw receives will handle
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
* encryption separately later. In both cases we can simply return.
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*/
if (dcp == NULL || dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_RAW_RECV)
return;
crypt = dcp->cp_crypt;
wkey = dcp->cp_wkey;
/* figure out the effective crypt */
if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT && dd->dd_parent != NULL)
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd->dd_parent, &crypt));
/* if we aren't doing encryption just return */
if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF || crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT)
return;
/* zapify the dd so that we can add the crypto key obj to it */
dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
/* use the new key if given or inherit from the parent */
if (wkey == NULL) {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa,
dd->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey));
} else {
wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object;
}
Encryption patch follow-up * PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation. * HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests added to ensure correctness. * Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool and libicp. * Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but otherwise functions as advertised. * Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest to run on encrypted datasets. * Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch. * Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior. * Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records. * Minor code cleanups / consolidation. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
ASSERT3P(wkey, !=, NULL);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* Create or clone the DSL crypto key and activate the feature */
dd->dd_crypto_obj = dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(crypt, wkey, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object,
DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj,
tx));
Add types to featureflags in zfs The boolean featureflags in use thus far in ZFS are extremely useful, but because they take advantage of the zap layer, more interesting data than just a true/false value can be stored in a featureflag. In redacted send/receive, this is used to store the list of redaction snapshots for a redacted dataset. This change adds the ability for ZFS to store types other than a boolean in a featureflag. The only other implemented type is a uint64_t array. It also modifies the interfaces around dataset features to accomodate the new capabilities, and adds a few new functions to increase encapsulation. This functionality will be used by the Redacted Send/Receive feature. Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Closes #7981
2018-10-16 21:15:04 +03:00
dsl_dataset_activate_feature(dsobj, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION,
(void *)B_TRUE, tx);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* If we inherited the wrapping key we release our reference now.
* Otherwise, this is a new key and we need to load it into the
* keystore.
*/
if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) {
dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG);
} else {
VERIFY0(spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey));
}
}
typedef struct dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg {
uint64_t dcrka_dsobj;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
uint64_t dcrka_fromobj;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dmu_objset_type_t dcrka_ostype;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
nvlist_t *dcrka_nvl;
boolean_t dcrka_do_key;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
} dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
static int
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dsl_dataset_t *fromds,
dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
int ret;
objset_t *os;
dnode_t *mdn;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
uint_t len;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
uint64_t intval, nlevels, blksz, ibs;
uint64_t nblkptr, maxblkid;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ostype != DMU_OST_ZFS && ostype != DMU_OST_ZVOL)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* raw receives also need info about the structure of the metadnode */
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", &intval);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_COMPRESS_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", &intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CHECKSUM_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", &nlevels);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0 || nlevels > DN_MAX_LEVELS)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", &blksz);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0 || blksz < SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
else if (blksz > spa_maxblocksize(tx->tx_pool->dp_spa))
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", &ibs);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0 || ibs < DN_MIN_INDBLKSHIFT || ibs > DN_MAX_INDBLKSHIFT)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", &nblkptr);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0 || nblkptr != DN_MAX_NBLKPTR)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", &maxblkid);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os);
if (ret != 0)
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
return (ret);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* Useraccounting is not portable and must be done with the keys loaded.
* Therefore, whenever we do any kind of receive the useraccounting
* must not be present.
*/
ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USERACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
ASSERT0(os->os_flags & OBJSET_FLAG_USEROBJACCOUNTING_COMPLETE);
mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
/*
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
* If we already created the objset, make sure its unchangeable
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
* properties match the ones received in the nvlist.
*/
rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
if (!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds)) &&
(mdn->dn_nlevels != nlevels || mdn->dn_datablksz != blksz ||
mdn->dn_indblkshift != ibs || mdn->dn_nblkptr != nblkptr)) {
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
/*
* Check that the ivset guid of the fromds matches the one from the
* send stream. Older versions of the encryption code did not have
* an ivset guid on the from dataset and did not send one in the
* stream. For these streams we provide the
* zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable to allow these datasets to
* be received with a generated ivset guid.
*/
if (fromds != NULL && !zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check) {
uint64_t from_ivset_guid = 0;
intval = 0;
(void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", &intval);
(void) zap_lookup(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
fromds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID,
sizeof (from_ivset_guid), 1, &from_ivset_guid);
if (intval == 0 || from_ivset_guid == 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISSING));
if (intval != from_ivset_guid)
return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISMATCH));
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (0);
}
static void
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dmu_objset_type_t ostype,
nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
objset_t *os;
dnode_t *mdn;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
zio_t *zio;
uint8_t *portable_mac;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
uint_t len;
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
uint64_t compress, checksum, nlevels, blksz, ibs, maxblkid;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
boolean_t newds = B_FALSE;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
/*
* Fetch the values we need from the nvlist. "to_ivset_guid" must
* be set on the snapshot, which doesn't exist yet. The receive
* code will take care of this for us later.
*/
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
compress = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress");
checksum = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum");
nlevels = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels");
blksz = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz");
ibs = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift");
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
maxblkid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid");
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &portable_mac,
&len));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* if we haven't created an objset for the ds yet, do that now */
rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG);
if (BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))) {
(void) dmu_objset_create_impl_dnstats(dp->dp_spa, ds,
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds), ostype, nlevels, blksz,
ibs, tx);
newds = B_TRUE;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG);
/*
* Set the portable MAC. The local MAC will always be zero since the
* incoming data will all be portable and user accounting will be
* deferred until the next mount. Afterwards, flag the os to be
* written out raw next time.
*/
arc_release(os->os_phys_buf, &os->os_phys_buf);
bcopy(portable_mac, os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
bzero(os->os_phys->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
Change os->os_next_write_raw to work per txg Currently, os_next_write_raw is a single boolean used for determining whether or not the next call to dmu_objset_sync() should write out the objset_phys_t as a raw buffer. Since the boolean is not associated with a txg, the work simply happens during the next txg, which is not necessarily the correct one. In the current implementation this issue was misdiagnosed, resulting in a small hack in dmu_objset_sync() which seemed to resolve the problem. This patch changes os_next_write_raw to be an array of booleans, one for each txg in TXG_OFF and removes the hack. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6864
2018-02-01 23:37:24 +03:00
os->os_next_write_raw[tx->tx_txg & TXG_MASK] = B_TRUE;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* set metadnode compression and checksum */
mdn->dn_compress = compress;
mdn->dn_checksum = checksum;
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
rw_enter(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_WRITER);
Fix handling of maxblkid for raw sends Currently, the receive code can create an unreadable dataset from a correct raw send stream. This is because it is currently impossible to set maxblkid to a lower value without freeing the associated object. This means truncating files on the send side to a non-0 size could result in corruption. This patch solves this issue by adding a new 'force' flag to dnode_new_blkid() which will allow the raw receive code to force the DMU to accept the provided maxblkid even if it is a lower value than the existing one. For testing purposes the send_encrypted_files.ksh test has been extended to include a variety of truncated files and multiple snapshots. It also now leverages the xattrtest command to help ensure raw receives correctly handle xattrs. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8168 Closes #8487
2019-03-13 20:52:01 +03:00
dnode_new_blkid(mdn, maxblkid, tx, B_FALSE, B_TRUE);
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
rw_exit(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
/*
* We can't normally dirty the dataset in syncing context unless
* we are creating a new dataset. In this case, we perform a
* pseudo txg sync here instead.
*/
if (newds) {
dsl_dataset_dirty(ds, tx);
} else {
zio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED);
dsl_dataset_sync(ds, zio, tx);
VERIFY0(zio_wait(zio));
/* dsl_dataset_sync_done will drop this reference. */
dmu_buf_add_ref(ds->ds_dbuf, ds);
dsl_dataset_sync_done(ds, tx);
}
}
int
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
uint_t len;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
uint64_t intval, key_guid, version;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
boolean_t is_passphrase = B_FALSE;
ASSERT(dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_flags & DS_FLAG_INCONSISTENT);
/*
* Read and check all the encryption values from the nvlist. We need
* all of the fields of a DSL Crypto Key, as well as a fully specified
* wrapping key.
*/
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, &intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS ||
intval <= ZIO_CRYPT_OFF)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, &intval);
if (ret != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/*
* If this is an incremental receive make sure the given key guid
* matches the one we already have.
*/
if (ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) {
ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj,
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ret != 0)
return (ret);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
if (intval != key_guid)
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
}
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
&buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
&buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_IV_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &buf, &len);
if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_MAC_LEN)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
/*
* We don't support receiving old on-disk formats. The version 0
* implementation protected several fields in an objset that were
* not always portable during a raw receive. As a result, we call
* the old version an on-disk errata #3.
*/
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, &version);
if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION)
return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT),
&intval);
if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS ||
intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE)
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
is_passphrase = (intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE);
/*
* for raw receives we allow any number of pbkdf2iters since there
* won't be a chance for the user to change it.
*/
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS),
&intval);
if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT),
&intval);
if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0)))
return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL));
return (0);
}
void
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool;
objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
uint_t len;
uint64_t rddobj, one = 1;
uint8_t *keydata, *hmac_keydata, *iv, *mac;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
uint64_t crypt, key_guid, keyformat, iters, salt;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
char *keylocation = "prompt";
/* lookup the values we need to create the DSL Crypto Key */
crypt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
key_guid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
keyformat = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT));
iters = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS));
salt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
&keydata, &len));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
&hmac_keydata, &len));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &iv, &len));
VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &mac, &len));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* if this is a new dataset setup the DSL Crypto Key. */
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) {
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* zapify the dsl dir so we can add the key object to it */
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx);
dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* create the DSL Crypto Key on disk and activate the feature */
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dd->dd_crypto_obj = zap_create(mos,
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION,
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dsl_dataset_activate_feature(ds->ds_object,
Add types to featureflags in zfs The boolean featureflags in use thus far in ZFS are extremely useful, but because they take advantage of the zap layer, more interesting data than just a true/false value can be stored in a featureflag. In redacted send/receive, this is used to store the list of redaction snapshots for a redacted dataset. This change adds the ability for ZFS to store types other than a boolean in a featureflag. The only other implemented type is a uint64_t array. It also modifies the interfaces around dataset features to accomodate the new capabilities, and adds a few new functions to increase encapsulation. This functionality will be used by the Redacted Send/Receive feature. Reviewed-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Closes #7981
2018-10-16 21:15:04 +03:00
SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION, (void *)B_TRUE, tx);
ds->ds_feature[SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION] = (void *)B_TRUE;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/* save the dd_crypto_obj on disk */
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
VERIFY0(zap_add(mos, dd->dd_object, DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ,
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
/*
* Set the keylocation to prompt by default. If keylocation
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
* has been provided via the properties, this will be overridden
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
* later.
*/
dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION),
ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1,
keylocation, tx);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
rddobj = dd->dd_object;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
} else {
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
/* sync the key data to the ZAP object on disk */
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(mos, dd->dd_crypto_obj, crypt,
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
rddobj, key_guid, iv, mac, keydata, hmac_keydata, keyformat, salt,
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
iters, tx);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
int
dsl_crypto_recv_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
dsl_dataset_t *ds = NULL, *fromds = NULL;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
FTAG, &ds);
if (ret != 0)
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
goto out;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
if (dcrka->dcrka_fromobj != 0) {
ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_fromobj,
FTAG, &fromds);
if (ret != 0)
goto out;
}
ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(ds, fromds,
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dcrka->dcrka_ostype, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
if (ret != 0)
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
goto out;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
/*
* We run this check even if we won't be doing this part of
* the receive now so that we don't make the user wait until
* the receive finishes to fail.
*/
ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
if (ret != 0)
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
goto out;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
out:
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
if (ds != NULL)
dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
if (fromds != NULL)
dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG);
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
return (ret);
}
void
dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg;
dsl_dataset_t *ds;
VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj,
FTAG, &ds));
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_ostype,
dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
if (dcrka->dcrka_do_key)
dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG);
}
/*
* This function is used to sync an nvlist representing a DSL Crypto Key and
* the associated encryption parameters. The key will be written exactly as is
* without wrapping it.
*/
int
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
dsl_crypto_recv_raw(const char *poolname, uint64_t dsobj, uint64_t fromobj,
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, boolean_t do_key)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t dcrka;
dcrka.dcrka_dsobj = dsobj;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
dcrka.dcrka_fromobj = fromobj;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dcrka.dcrka_ostype = ostype;
Raw receive should change key atomically Currently, raw zfs sends transfer the encrypted master keys and objset_phys_t encryption parameters in the DRR_BEGIN payload of each send file. Both of these are processed as soon as they are read in dmu_recv_stream(), meaning that the new keys are set before the new snapshot is received. In addition to the fact that this changes the user's keys for the dataset earlier than they might expect, the keys were never reset to what they originally were in the event that the receive failed. This patch splits the processing into objset handling and key handling, the later of which is moved to dmu_recv_end() so that they key change can be done atomically. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7200
2018-02-21 23:31:03 +03:00
dcrka.dcrka_nvl = nvl;
dcrka.dcrka_do_key = do_key;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (dsl_sync_task(poolname, dsl_crypto_recv_key_check,
dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync, &dcrka, 1, ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_NORMAL));
}
int
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(dsl_dataset_t *ds, uint64_t from_ivset_guid,
nvlist_t **nvl_out)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
int ret;
objset_t *os;
dnode_t *mdn;
uint64_t rddobj;
nvlist_t *nvl = NULL;
uint64_t dckobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj;
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
dsl_dir_t *rdd = NULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
dsl_pool_t *dp = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool;
objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
uint64_t crypt = 0, key_guid = 0, format = 0;
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
uint64_t iters = 0, salt = 0, version = 0;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
uint64_t to_ivset_guid = 0;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN];
uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN];
ASSERT(dckobj != 0);
VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os));
mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os);
ret = nvlist_alloc(&nvl, NV_UNIQUE_NAME, KM_SLEEP);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* lookup values from the DSL Crypto Key */
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1,
&crypt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1,
MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1,
SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN,
iv);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN,
mac);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
/* see zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable for errata info */
ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1,
&to_ivset_guid);
if (ret != 0)
ASSERT3U(dp->dp_spa->spa_errata, !=, 0);
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
/*
* We don't support raw sends of legacy on-disk formats. See the
* comment in dsl_crypto_recv_key_check() for details.
*/
ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version);
if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION) {
dp->dp_spa->spa_errata = ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_6845_ENCRYPTION;
ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP);
goto error;
}
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
/*
* Lookup wrapping key properties. An early version of the code did
* not correctly add these values to the wrapping key or the DSL
* Crypto Key on disk for non encryption roots, so to be safe we
* always take the slightly circuitous route of looking it up from
* the encryption root's key.
*/
ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
dsl_pool_config_enter(dp, FTAG);
ret = dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, rddobj, NULL, FTAG, &rdd);
if (ret != 0)
goto error_unlock;
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format);
if (ret != 0)
goto error_unlock;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (format == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) {
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters);
if (ret != 0)
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
goto error_unlock;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj,
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt);
if (ret != 0)
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
goto error_unlock;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, crypt);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, key_guid);
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, version);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY,
raw_keydata, MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY,
raw_hmac_keydata, SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, iv,
WRAPPING_IV_LEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, mac,
WRAPPING_MAC_LEN));
VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac",
os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN));
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), format);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), iters);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), salt);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", mdn->dn_checksum);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", mdn->dn_compress);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", mdn->dn_nlevels);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", mdn->dn_datablksz);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", mdn->dn_indblkshift);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", mdn->dn_nblkptr);
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", mdn->dn_maxblkid);
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "to_ivset_guid", to_ivset_guid);
fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", from_ivset_guid);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
*nvl_out = nvl;
return (0);
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
error_unlock:
dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
error:
Fix for #6706 This patch resolves an issue where raw sends would fail to send encryption parameters if the wrapping key was unloaded and reloaded before the data was sent and the dataset wass not an encryption root. The code attempted to lookup the values from the wrapping key which was not being initialized upon reload. This change forces the code to lookup the correct value from the encryption root's DSL Crypto Key. Unfortunately, this issue led to the on-disk DSL Crypto Key for some non-encryption root datasets being left with zeroed out encryption parameters. However, this should not present a problem since these values are never looked at and are overrwritten upon changing keys. This patch also fixes an issue where raw, resumable sends were not being cleaned up appropriately if an invalid DSL Crypto Key was received. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-10-03 20:18:45 +03:00
if (rdd != NULL)
dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
nvlist_free(nvl);
*nvl_out = NULL;
return (ret);
}
uint64_t
dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(uint64_t crypt, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey,
dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
dsl_crypto_key_t dck;
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION;
uint64_t one = 1ULL;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
ASSERT3U(crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS);
ASSERT3U(crypt, >, ZIO_CRYPT_OFF);
/* create the DSL Crypto Key ZAP object */
dck.dck_obj = zap_create(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset,
DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx);
/* fill in the key (on the stack) and sync it to disk */
dck.dck_wkey = wkey;
VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_init(crypt, &dck.dck_key));
dsl_crypto_key_sync(&dck, tx);
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx));
Encryption Stability and On-Disk Format Fixes The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all the MACs in the block below it along with a few other fields that determine how the data is interpreted. Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally, raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining the portable objset MAC. This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a "version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC can be maintained correctly. This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups. Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #6845 Closes #6864 Closes #7052
2017-11-08 22:12:59 +03:00
VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx));
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck.dck_key);
bzero(&dck.dck_key, sizeof (zio_crypt_key_t));
return (dck.dck_obj);
}
uint64_t
dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(dsl_dir_t *origindd, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx));
VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, origindd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, 1, tx));
return (origindd->dd_crypto_obj);
}
void
dsl_crypto_key_destroy_sync(uint64_t dckobj, dmu_tx_t *tx)
{
objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset;
uint64_t refcnt;
/* Decrement the refcount, destroy if this is the last reference */
VERIFY0(zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &refcnt));
if (refcnt != 1) {
VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT,
-1, tx));
} else {
VERIFY0(zap_destroy(mos, dckobj, tx));
}
}
void
dsl_dataset_crypt_stats(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nv)
{
uint64_t intval;
dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir;
dsl_dir_t *enc_root;
char buf[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN];
if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0)
return;
intval = dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dd);
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYSTATUS, intval);
if (dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd, &intval) == 0)
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION, intval);
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEY_GUID, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT, intval);
}
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj,
zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS, intval);
}
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, ds->ds_object,
DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) {
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_IVSET_GUID, intval);
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &intval) == 0) {
Remove VERIFY from dsl_dataset_crypt_stats() This patch fixes an issue where dsl_dataset_crypt_stats() would VERIFY that it was able to hold the encryption root. This function should instead silently continue without populating the related field in the nvlist, as is the convention for this code. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8976
2019-07-06 02:53:14 +03:00
if (dsl_dir_hold_obj(dd->dd_pool, intval, NULL, FTAG,
&enc_root) == 0) {
dsl_dir_name(enc_root, buf);
dsl_dir_rele(enc_root, FTAG);
dsl_prop_nvlist_add_string(nv,
ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION_ROOT, buf);
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
}
}
int
spa_crypt_get_salt(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, uint8_t *salt)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (ret);
}
/*
* Objset blocks are a special case for MAC generation. These blocks have 2
* 256-bit MACs which are embedded within the block itself, rather than a
* single 128 bit MAC. As a result, this function handles encoding and decoding
* the MACs on its own, unlike other functions in this file.
*/
int
spa_do_crypt_objset_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj,
abd_t *abd, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
void *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
objset_phys_t *osp = buf;
uint8_t portable_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
uint8_t local_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN];
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* calculate both HMACs */
ret = zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
byteswap, portable_mac, local_mac);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
/* if we are generating encode the HMACs in the objset_phys_t */
if (generate) {
bcopy(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
bcopy(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN);
abd_return_buf_copy(abd, buf, datalen);
return (0);
}
if (bcmp(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0 ||
bcmp(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
}
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (ret);
}
int
spa_do_crypt_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, abd_t *abd,
uint_t datalen, uint8_t *mac)
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
uint8_t *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen);
uint8_t digestbuf[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN];
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
/* perform the hmac */
Encryption patch follow-up * PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation. * HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests added to ensure correctness. * Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool and libicp. * Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but otherwise functions as advertised. * Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest to run on encrypted datasets. * Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch. * Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior. * Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records. * Minor code cleanups / consolidation. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen,
digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
/*
* Truncate and fill in mac buffer if we were asked to generate a MAC.
* Otherwise verify that the MAC matched what we expected.
*/
if (generate) {
bcopy(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
return (0);
}
if (bcmp(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN) != 0)
return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM));
return (0);
error:
if (dck != NULL)
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen);
return (ret);
}
/*
* This function serves as a multiplexer for encryption and decryption of
* all blocks (except the L2ARC). For encryption, it will populate the IV,
* salt, MAC, and cabd (the ciphertext). On decryption it will simply use
* these fields to populate pabd (the plaintext).
*/
int
Add support for decryption faults in zinject This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which may be provided for "data" object types. This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors consistently, and do not have unused arguments. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7474
2018-05-03 01:36:20 +03:00
spa_do_crypt_abd(boolean_t encrypt, spa_t *spa, const zbookmark_phys_t *zb,
dmu_object_type_t ot, boolean_t dedup, boolean_t bswap, uint8_t *salt,
uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen, abd_t *pabd, abd_t *cabd,
boolean_t *no_crypt)
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
{
int ret;
dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL;
uint8_t *plainbuf = NULL, *cipherbuf = NULL;
ASSERT(spa_feature_is_active(spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION));
/* look up the key from the spa's keystore */
Add support for decryption faults in zinject This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which may be provided for "data" object types. This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors consistently, and do not have unused arguments. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7474
2018-05-03 01:36:20 +03:00
ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, zb->zb_objset, FTAG, &dck);
if (ret != 0) {
ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (ret);
Add support for decryption faults in zinject This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which may be provided for "data" object types. This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors consistently, and do not have unused arguments. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7474
2018-05-03 01:36:20 +03:00
}
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (encrypt) {
plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(pabd, datalen);
cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf(cabd, datalen);
} else {
plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf(pabd, datalen);
cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(cabd, datalen);
}
/*
* Both encryption and decryption functions need a salt for key
* generation and an IV. When encrypting a non-dedup block, we
* generate the salt and IV randomly to be stored by the caller. Dedup
* blocks perform a (more expensive) HMAC of the plaintext to obtain
* the salt and the IV. ZIL blocks have their salt and IV generated
* at allocation time in zio_alloc_zil(). On decryption, we simply use
* the provided values.
*/
Add support for decryption faults in zinject This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which may be provided for "data" object types. This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors consistently, and do not have unused arguments. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7474
2018-05-03 01:36:20 +03:00
if (encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_INTENT_LOG && !dedup) {
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv(iv);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
Add support for decryption faults in zinject This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which may be provided for "data" object types. This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors consistently, and do not have unused arguments. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7474
2018-05-03 01:36:20 +03:00
} else if (encrypt && dedup) {
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(&dck->dck_key,
plainbuf, datalen, iv, salt);
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
}
/* call lower level function to perform encryption / decryption */
Add support for decryption faults in zinject This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which may be provided for "data" object types. This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors consistently, and do not have unused arguments. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #7474
2018-05-03 01:36:20 +03:00
ret = zio_do_crypt_data(encrypt, &dck->dck_key, ot, bswap, salt, iv,
mac, datalen, plainbuf, cipherbuf, no_crypt);
/*
* Handle injected decryption faults. Unfortunately, we cannot inject
* faults for dnode blocks because we might trigger the panic in
* dbuf_prepare_encrypted_dnode_leaf(), which exists because syncing
* context is not prepared to handle malicious decryption failures.
*/
if (zio_injection_enabled && !encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_DNODE && ret == 0)
ret = zio_handle_decrypt_injection(spa, zb, ot, ECKSUM);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
if (ret != 0)
goto error;
if (encrypt) {
abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
} else {
abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
}
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
return (0);
error:
if (encrypt) {
/* zero out any state we might have changed while encrypting */
bzero(salt, ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN);
bzero(iv, ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN);
bzero(mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN);
abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
} else {
abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen);
abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen);
}
Encryption patch follow-up * PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation. * HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests added to ensure correctness. * Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool and libicp. * Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but otherwise functions as advertised. * Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest to run on encrypted datasets. * Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch. * Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior. * Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records. * Minor code cleanups / consolidation. Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
2017-09-12 23:15:11 +03:00
spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
return (ret);
}
Detect and prevent mixed raw and non-raw sends Currently, there is an issue in the raw receive code where raw receives are allowed to happen on top of previously non-raw received datasets. This is a problem because the source-side dataset doesn't know about how the blocks on the destination were encrypted. As a result, any MAC in the objset's checksum-of-MACs tree that is a parent of both blocks encrypted on the source and blocks encrypted by the destination will be incorrect. This will result in authentication errors when we decrypt the dataset. This patch fixes this issue by adding a new check to the raw receive code. The code now maintains an "IVset guid", which acts as an identifier for the set of IVs used to encrypt a given snapshot. When a snapshot is raw received, the destination snapshot will take this value from the DRR_BEGIN payload. Non-raw receives and normal "zfs snap" operations will cause ZFS to generate a new IVset guid. When a raw incremental stream is received, ZFS will check that the "from" IVset guid in the stream matches that of the "from" destination snapshot. If they do not match, the code will error out the receive, preventing the problem. This patch requires an on-disk format change to add the IVset guids to snapshots and bookmarks. As a result, this patch has errata handling and a tunable to help affected users resolve the issue with as little interruption as possible. Reviewed-by: Paul Dagnelie <pcd@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #8308
2019-02-04 22:24:55 +03:00
#if defined(_KERNEL)
module_param(zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check, int, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check,
"Set to allow raw receives without IVset guids");
#endif
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