2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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/*
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* CDDL HEADER START
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
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* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
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* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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*
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* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
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2022-07-12 00:16:13 +03:00
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* or https://opensource.org/licenses/CDDL-1.0.
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
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* and limitations under the License.
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*
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* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
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2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
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* Copyright (c) 2006, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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2020-05-07 19:36:33 +03:00
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* Copyright (c) 2012, 2020 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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*/
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#include <libzfs.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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2022-01-22 03:56:46 +03:00
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#include <string.h>
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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#include <sys/file.h>
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#include <sys/mntent.h>
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#include <sys/mnttab.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/dmu.h>
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#include <sys/dmu_objset.h>
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#include <sys/dnode.h>
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2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
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#include <sys/vdev_impl.h>
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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#include <sys/mkdev.h>
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#include "zinject.h"
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static int debug;
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static void
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ziprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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va_list ap;
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if (!debug)
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return;
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va_start(ap, fmt);
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(void) vprintf(fmt, ap);
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va_end(ap);
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}
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2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
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static void
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compress_slashes(const char *src, char *dest)
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{
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while (*src != '\0') {
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*dest = *src++;
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while (*dest == '/' && *src == '/')
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++src;
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++dest;
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}
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*dest = '\0';
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}
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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/*
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* Given a full path to a file, translate into a dataset name and a relative
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* path within the dataset. 'dataset' must be at least MAXNAMELEN characters,
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* and 'relpath' must be at least MAXPATHLEN characters. We also pass a stat64
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* buffer, which we need later to get the object ID.
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*/
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static int
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2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
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parse_pathname(const char *inpath, char *dataset, char *relpath,
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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struct stat64 *statbuf)
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{
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struct extmnttab mp;
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const char *rel;
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2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
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char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
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compress_slashes(inpath, fullpath);
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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if (fullpath[0] != '/') {
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "invalid object '%s': must be full "
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"path\n", fullpath);
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usage();
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return (-1);
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}
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2019-10-02 20:39:48 +03:00
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if (getextmntent(fullpath, &mp, statbuf) != 0) {
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "cannot find mountpoint for '%s'\n",
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fullpath);
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return (-1);
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}
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if (strcmp(mp.mnt_fstype, MNTTYPE_ZFS) != 0) {
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "invalid path '%s': not a ZFS "
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"filesystem\n", fullpath);
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return (-1);
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}
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if (strncmp(fullpath, mp.mnt_mountp, strlen(mp.mnt_mountp)) != 0) {
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(void) fprintf(stderr, "invalid path '%s': mountpoint "
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"doesn't match path\n", fullpath);
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return (-1);
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}
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|
|
|
Fix unsafe string operations
Coverity caught unsafe use of `strcpy()` in `ztest_dmu_objset_own()`,
`nfs_init_tmpfile()` and `dump_snapshot()`. It also caught an unsafe use
of `strlcat()` in `nfs_init_tmpfile()`.
Inspired by this, I did an audit of every single usage of `strcpy()` and
`strcat()` in the code. If I could not prove that the usage was safe, I
changed the code to use either `strlcpy()` or `strlcat()`, depending on
which function was originally used. In some cases, `snprintf()` was used
to replace multiple uses of `strcat` because it was cleaner.
Whenever I changed a function, I preferred to use `sizeof(dst)` when the
compiler is able to provide the string size via that. When it could not
because the string was passed by a caller, I checked the entire call
tree of the function to find out how big the buffer was and hard coded
it. Hardcoding is less than ideal, but it is safe unless someone shrinks
the buffer sizes being passed.
Additionally, Coverity reported three more string related issues:
* It caught a case where we do an overlapping memory copy in a call to
`snprintf()`. We fix that via `kmem_strdup()` and `kmem_strfree()`.
* It caught `sizeof (buf)` being used instead of `buflen` in
`zdb_nicenum()`'s call to `zfs_nicenum()`, which is passed to
`snprintf()`. We change that to pass `buflen`.
* It caught a theoretical unterminated string passed to `strcmp()`.
This one is likely a false positive, but we have the information
needed to do this more safely, so we change this to silence the false
positive not just in coverity, but potentially other static analysis
tools too. We switch to `strncmp()`.
* There was a false positive in tests/zfs-tests/cmd/dir_rd_update.c. We
suppress it by switching to `snprintf()` since other static analysis
tools might complain about it too. Interestingly, there is a possible
real bug there too, since it assumes that the passed directory path
ends with '/'. We add a '/' to fix that potential bug.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes #13913
2022-09-28 02:47:24 +03:00
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(void) strlcpy(dataset, mp.mnt_special, MAXNAMELEN);
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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rel = fullpath + strlen(mp.mnt_mountp);
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if (rel[0] == '/')
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rel++;
|
Fix unsafe string operations
Coverity caught unsafe use of `strcpy()` in `ztest_dmu_objset_own()`,
`nfs_init_tmpfile()` and `dump_snapshot()`. It also caught an unsafe use
of `strlcat()` in `nfs_init_tmpfile()`.
Inspired by this, I did an audit of every single usage of `strcpy()` and
`strcat()` in the code. If I could not prove that the usage was safe, I
changed the code to use either `strlcpy()` or `strlcat()`, depending on
which function was originally used. In some cases, `snprintf()` was used
to replace multiple uses of `strcat` because it was cleaner.
Whenever I changed a function, I preferred to use `sizeof(dst)` when the
compiler is able to provide the string size via that. When it could not
because the string was passed by a caller, I checked the entire call
tree of the function to find out how big the buffer was and hard coded
it. Hardcoding is less than ideal, but it is safe unless someone shrinks
the buffer sizes being passed.
Additionally, Coverity reported three more string related issues:
* It caught a case where we do an overlapping memory copy in a call to
`snprintf()`. We fix that via `kmem_strdup()` and `kmem_strfree()`.
* It caught `sizeof (buf)` being used instead of `buflen` in
`zdb_nicenum()`'s call to `zfs_nicenum()`, which is passed to
`snprintf()`. We change that to pass `buflen`.
* It caught a theoretical unterminated string passed to `strcmp()`.
This one is likely a false positive, but we have the information
needed to do this more safely, so we change this to silence the false
positive not just in coverity, but potentially other static analysis
tools too. We switch to `strncmp()`.
* There was a false positive in tests/zfs-tests/cmd/dir_rd_update.c. We
suppress it by switching to `snprintf()` since other static analysis
tools might complain about it too. Interestingly, there is a possible
real bug there too, since it assumes that the passed directory path
ends with '/'. We add a '/' to fix that potential bug.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes #13913
2022-09-28 02:47:24 +03:00
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(void) strlcpy(relpath, rel, MAXPATHLEN);
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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return (0);
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}
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/*
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
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* Convert from a dataset to a objset id. Note that
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* we grab the object number from the inode number.
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2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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|
*/
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static int
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
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object_from_path(const char *dataset, uint64_t object, zinject_record_t *record)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
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|
{
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
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|
zfs_handle_t *zhp;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
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|
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
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|
if ((zhp = zfs_open(g_zfs, dataset, ZFS_TYPE_DATASET)) == NULL)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
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|
return (-1);
|
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|
|
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
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|
record->zi_objset = zfs_prop_get_int(zhp, ZFS_PROP_OBJSETID);
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|
record->zi_object = object;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
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|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
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|
zfs_close(zhp);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
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|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-08-30 19:43:30 +03:00
|
|
|
* Initialize the range based on the type, level, and range given.
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
|
|
initialize_range(err_type_t type, int level, char *range,
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
zinject_record_t *record)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine the numeric range from the string.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (range == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If range is unspecified, set the range to [0,-1], which
|
|
|
|
* indicates that the whole object should be treated as an
|
|
|
|
* error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
record->zi_start = 0;
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = -1ULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
char *end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX add support for suffixes */
|
|
|
|
record->zi_start = strtoull(range, &end, 10);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*end == '\0')
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start + 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (*end == ',')
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = strtoull(end + 1, &end, 10);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*end != '\0') {
|
|
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "invalid range '%s': must be "
|
|
|
|
"a numeric range of the form 'start[,end]'\n",
|
|
|
|
range);
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
2010-08-26 20:52:41 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2022-01-22 03:56:46 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
case TYPE_DATA:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_DNODE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this is a request to inject faults into the dnode, then we
|
|
|
|
* must translate the current (objset,object) pair into an
|
|
|
|
* offset within the metadnode for the objset. Specifying any
|
|
|
|
* kind of range with type 'dnode' is illegal.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (range != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "range cannot be specified when "
|
|
|
|
"type is 'dnode'\n");
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
record->zi_start = record->zi_object * sizeof (dnode_phys_t);
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start + sizeof (dnode_phys_t);
|
|
|
|
record->zi_object = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
record->zi_level = level;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
translate_record(err_type_t type, const char *object, const char *range,
|
|
|
|
int level, zinject_record_t *record, char *poolname, char *dataset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
|
|
|
|
char *slash;
|
|
|
|
struct stat64 statbuf;
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
debug = (getenv("ZINJECT_DEBUG") != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ziprintf("translating: %s\n", object);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (MOS_TYPE(type)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* MOS objects are treated specially.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
2010-08-26 20:52:41 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
case TYPE_MOS:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_MOSDIR:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = DMU_OT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_METASLAB:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = DMU_OT_OBJECT_ARRAY;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_CONFIG:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = DMU_OT_PACKED_NVLIST;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
case TYPE_BPOBJ:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = DMU_OT_BPOBJ;
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_SPACEMAP:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = DMU_OT_SPACE_MAP;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_ERRLOG:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_type = DMU_OT_ERROR_LOG;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dataset[0] = '\0';
|
Fix unsafe string operations
Coverity caught unsafe use of `strcpy()` in `ztest_dmu_objset_own()`,
`nfs_init_tmpfile()` and `dump_snapshot()`. It also caught an unsafe use
of `strlcat()` in `nfs_init_tmpfile()`.
Inspired by this, I did an audit of every single usage of `strcpy()` and
`strcat()` in the code. If I could not prove that the usage was safe, I
changed the code to use either `strlcpy()` or `strlcat()`, depending on
which function was originally used. In some cases, `snprintf()` was used
to replace multiple uses of `strcat` because it was cleaner.
Whenever I changed a function, I preferred to use `sizeof(dst)` when the
compiler is able to provide the string size via that. When it could not
because the string was passed by a caller, I checked the entire call
tree of the function to find out how big the buffer was and hard coded
it. Hardcoding is less than ideal, but it is safe unless someone shrinks
the buffer sizes being passed.
Additionally, Coverity reported three more string related issues:
* It caught a case where we do an overlapping memory copy in a call to
`snprintf()`. We fix that via `kmem_strdup()` and `kmem_strfree()`.
* It caught `sizeof (buf)` being used instead of `buflen` in
`zdb_nicenum()`'s call to `zfs_nicenum()`, which is passed to
`snprintf()`. We change that to pass `buflen`.
* It caught a theoretical unterminated string passed to `strcmp()`.
This one is likely a false positive, but we have the information
needed to do this more safely, so we change this to silence the false
positive not just in coverity, but potentially other static analysis
tools too. We switch to `strncmp()`.
* There was a false positive in tests/zfs-tests/cmd/dir_rd_update.c. We
suppress it by switching to `snprintf()` since other static analysis
tools might complain about it too. Interestingly, there is a possible
real bug there too, since it assumes that the passed directory path
ends with '/'. We add a '/' to fix that potential bug.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes #13913
2022-09-28 02:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) strlcpy(poolname, object, MAXNAMELEN);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert a full path into a (dataset, file) pair.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (parse_pathname(object, dataset, path, &statbuf) != 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ziprintf(" dataset: %s\n", dataset);
|
|
|
|
ziprintf(" path: %s\n", path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Convert (dataset, file) into (objset, object)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
|
|
if (object_from_path(dataset, statbuf.st_ino, record) != 0)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ziprintf("raw objset: %llu\n", record->zi_objset);
|
|
|
|
ziprintf("raw object: %llu\n", record->zi_object);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-08-30 19:43:30 +03:00
|
|
|
* For the given object, initialize the range in bytes
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-11-05 22:22:33 +03:00
|
|
|
if (initialize_range(type, level, (char *)range, record) != 0)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ziprintf(" objset: %llu\n", record->zi_objset);
|
|
|
|
ziprintf(" object: %llu\n", record->zi_object);
|
|
|
|
if (record->zi_start == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end == -1ULL)
|
|
|
|
ziprintf(" range: all\n");
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ziprintf(" range: [%llu, %llu]\n", record->zi_start,
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copy the pool name
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Fix unsafe string operations
Coverity caught unsafe use of `strcpy()` in `ztest_dmu_objset_own()`,
`nfs_init_tmpfile()` and `dump_snapshot()`. It also caught an unsafe use
of `strlcat()` in `nfs_init_tmpfile()`.
Inspired by this, I did an audit of every single usage of `strcpy()` and
`strcat()` in the code. If I could not prove that the usage was safe, I
changed the code to use either `strlcpy()` or `strlcat()`, depending on
which function was originally used. In some cases, `snprintf()` was used
to replace multiple uses of `strcat` because it was cleaner.
Whenever I changed a function, I preferred to use `sizeof(dst)` when the
compiler is able to provide the string size via that. When it could not
because the string was passed by a caller, I checked the entire call
tree of the function to find out how big the buffer was and hard coded
it. Hardcoding is less than ideal, but it is safe unless someone shrinks
the buffer sizes being passed.
Additionally, Coverity reported three more string related issues:
* It caught a case where we do an overlapping memory copy in a call to
`snprintf()`. We fix that via `kmem_strdup()` and `kmem_strfree()`.
* It caught `sizeof (buf)` being used instead of `buflen` in
`zdb_nicenum()`'s call to `zfs_nicenum()`, which is passed to
`snprintf()`. We change that to pass `buflen`.
* It caught a theoretical unterminated string passed to `strcmp()`.
This one is likely a false positive, but we have the information
needed to do this more safely, so we change this to silence the false
positive not just in coverity, but potentially other static analysis
tools too. We switch to `strncmp()`.
* There was a false positive in tests/zfs-tests/cmd/dir_rd_update.c. We
suppress it by switching to `snprintf()` since other static analysis
tools might complain about it too. Interestingly, there is a possible
real bug there too, since it assumes that the passed directory path
ends with '/'. We add a '/' to fix that potential bug.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes #13913
2022-09-28 02:47:24 +03:00
|
|
|
(void) strlcpy(poolname, dataset, MAXNAMELEN);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((slash = strchr(poolname, '/')) != NULL)
|
|
|
|
*slash = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
translate_raw(const char *str, zinject_record_t *record)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A raw bookmark of the form objset:object:level:blkid, where each
|
2017-01-03 20:31:18 +03:00
|
|
|
* number is a hexadecimal value.
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sscanf(str, "%llx:%llx:%x:%llx", (u_longlong_t *)&record->zi_objset,
|
|
|
|
(u_longlong_t *)&record->zi_object, &record->zi_level,
|
|
|
|
(u_longlong_t *)&record->zi_start) != 4) {
|
|
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "bad raw spec '%s': must be of the form "
|
|
|
|
"'objset:object:level:blkid'\n", str);
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
translate_device(const char *pool, const char *device, err_type_t label_type,
|
|
|
|
zinject_record_t *record)
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *end;
|
|
|
|
zpool_handle_t *zhp;
|
|
|
|
nvlist_t *tgt;
|
|
|
|
boolean_t isspare, iscache;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Given a device name or GUID, create an appropriate injection record
|
|
|
|
* with zi_guid set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((zhp = zpool_open(g_zfs, pool)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
|
Make command line guid parsing more tolerant
Several of the zfs utilities allow you to pass a vdev's guid rather
than the device name. However, the utilities are not consistent in
how they parse that guid. For example, 'zinject' expects the guid
to be passed as a hex value while 'zpool replace' wants it as a
decimal. The user is forced to just know what format to use.
This patch improve things by making the parsing more tolerant.
When strtol(3) is called using 0 for the base, rather than say
10 or 16, it will then accept hex, decimal, or octal input based
on the prefix. From the man page.
If base is zero or 16, the string may then include a "0x"
prefix, and the number will be read in base 16; otherwise,
a zero base is taken as 10 (decimal) unless the next character
is '0', in which case it is taken as 8 (octal).
NOTE: There may be additional conversions not caught be this patch.
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Chris Dunlap <cdunlap@llnl.gov>
Issue #2
2014-01-25 03:27:59 +04:00
|
|
|
record->zi_guid = strtoull(device, &end, 0);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
if (record->zi_guid == 0 || *end != '\0') {
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
tgt = zpool_find_vdev(zhp, device, &isspare, &iscache, NULL);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tgt == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
(void) fprintf(stderr, "cannot find device '%s' in "
|
|
|
|
"pool '%s'\n", device, pool);
|
2016-09-21 03:45:45 +03:00
|
|
|
zpool_close(zhp);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
verify(nvlist_lookup_uint64(tgt, ZPOOL_CONFIG_GUID,
|
|
|
|
&record->zi_guid) == 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 02:49:23 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Device faults can take on three different forms:
|
|
|
|
* 1). delayed or hanging I/O
|
|
|
|
* 2). zfs label faults
|
|
|
|
* 3). generic disk faults
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (record->zi_timer != 0) {
|
|
|
|
record->zi_cmd = ZINJECT_DELAY_IO;
|
|
|
|
} else if (label_type != TYPE_INVAL) {
|
|
|
|
record->zi_cmd = ZINJECT_LABEL_FAULT;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
record->zi_cmd = ZINJECT_DEVICE_FAULT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
switch (label_type) {
|
2010-08-26 20:52:41 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
case TYPE_LABEL_UBERBLOCK:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_start = offsetof(vdev_label_t, vl_uberblock[0]);
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start + VDEV_UBERBLOCK_RING - 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_LABEL_NVLIST:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_start = offsetof(vdev_label_t, vl_vdev_phys);
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start + VDEV_PHYS_SIZE - 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
case TYPE_LABEL_PAD1:
|
|
|
|
record->zi_start = offsetof(vdev_label_t, vl_pad1);
|
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start + VDEV_PAD_SIZE - 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TYPE_LABEL_PAD2:
|
2020-05-07 19:36:33 +03:00
|
|
|
record->zi_start = offsetof(vdev_label_t, vl_be);
|
2010-05-29 00:45:14 +04:00
|
|
|
record->zi_end = record->zi_start + VDEV_PAD_SIZE - 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2008-12-03 23:09:06 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-09-21 03:45:45 +03:00
|
|
|
zpool_close(zhp);
|
2008-11-20 23:01:55 +03:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|