2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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/*
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* CDDL HEADER START
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
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* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
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* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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*
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* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
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* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
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* and limitations under the License.
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*
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* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
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* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
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* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
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* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
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* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
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*
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* CDDL HEADER END
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2005, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2013 by Delphix. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2013 by Saso Kiselkov. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright 2013 Nexenta Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
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*/
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#ifndef _SYS_ARC_IMPL_H
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#define _SYS_ARC_IMPL_H
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#include <sys/arc.h>
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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#include <sys/zio_crypt.h>
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2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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/*
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* Note that buffers can be in one of 6 states:
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* ARC_anon - anonymous (discussed below)
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* ARC_mru - recently used, currently cached
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* ARC_mru_ghost - recentely used, no longer in cache
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* ARC_mfu - frequently used, currently cached
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* ARC_mfu_ghost - frequently used, no longer in cache
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* ARC_l2c_only - exists in L2ARC but not other states
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* When there are no active references to the buffer, they are
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* are linked onto a list in one of these arc states. These are
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* the only buffers that can be evicted or deleted. Within each
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* state there are multiple lists, one for meta-data and one for
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* non-meta-data. Meta-data (indirect blocks, blocks of dnodes,
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* etc.) is tracked separately so that it can be managed more
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* explicitly: favored over data, limited explicitly.
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*
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* Anonymous buffers are buffers that are not associated with
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* a DVA. These are buffers that hold dirty block copies
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* before they are written to stable storage. By definition,
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* they are "ref'd" and are considered part of arc_mru
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2017-01-03 20:31:18 +03:00
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* that cannot be freed. Generally, they will acquire a DVA
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2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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* as they are written and migrate onto the arc_mru list.
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*
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* The ARC_l2c_only state is for buffers that are in the second
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* level ARC but no longer in any of the ARC_m* lists. The second
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* level ARC itself may also contain buffers that are in any of
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* the ARC_m* states - meaning that a buffer can exist in two
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* places. The reason for the ARC_l2c_only state is to keep the
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* buffer header in the hash table, so that reads that hit the
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* second level ARC benefit from these fast lookups.
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*/
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typedef struct arc_state {
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2015-01-13 06:52:19 +03:00
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/*
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* list of evictable buffers
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*/
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2017-03-21 04:36:00 +03:00
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multilist_t *arcs_list[ARC_BUFC_NUMTYPES];
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2015-01-13 06:52:19 +03:00
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/*
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* total amount of evictable data in this state
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*/
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2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
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refcount_t arcs_esize[ARC_BUFC_NUMTYPES];
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2015-01-13 06:52:19 +03:00
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/*
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* total amount of data in this state; this includes: evictable,
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* non-evictable, ARC_BUFC_DATA, and ARC_BUFC_METADATA.
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*/
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2015-06-27 01:14:45 +03:00
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refcount_t arcs_size;
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2015-01-13 06:52:19 +03:00
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/*
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* supports the "dbufs" kstat
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*/
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2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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arc_state_type_t arcs_state;
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} arc_state_t;
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typedef struct arc_callback arc_callback_t;
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struct arc_callback {
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void *acb_private;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
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arc_read_done_func_t *acb_done;
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2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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arc_buf_t *acb_buf;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
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boolean_t acb_encrypted;
|
2016-07-11 20:45:52 +03:00
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boolean_t acb_compressed;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
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boolean_t acb_noauth;
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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zio_t *acb_zio_dummy;
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arc_callback_t *acb_next;
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};
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typedef struct arc_write_callback arc_write_callback_t;
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struct arc_write_callback {
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
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void *awcb_private;
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arc_write_done_func_t *awcb_ready;
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arc_write_done_func_t *awcb_children_ready;
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arc_write_done_func_t *awcb_physdone;
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arc_write_done_func_t *awcb_done;
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arc_buf_t *awcb_buf;
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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};
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2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
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/*
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* ARC buffers are separated into multiple structs as a memory saving measure:
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* - Common fields struct, always defined, and embedded within it:
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* - L2-only fields, always allocated but undefined when not in L2ARC
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* - L1-only fields, only allocated when in L1ARC
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*
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* Buffer in L1 Buffer only in L2
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* +------------------------+ +------------------------+
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* | arc_buf_hdr_t | | arc_buf_hdr_t |
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* | | | |
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* | | | |
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* | | | |
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* +------------------------+ +------------------------+
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* | l2arc_buf_hdr_t | | l2arc_buf_hdr_t |
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* | (undefined if L1-only) | | |
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* +------------------------+ +------------------------+
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* | l1arc_buf_hdr_t |
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* | |
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* | |
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* | |
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* | |
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* +------------------------+
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*
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* Because it's possible for the L2ARC to become extremely large, we can wind
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* up eating a lot of memory in L2ARC buffer headers, so the size of a header
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* is minimized by only allocating the fields necessary for an L1-cached buffer
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* when a header is actually in the L1 cache. The sub-headers (l1arc_buf_hdr and
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* l2arc_buf_hdr) are embedded rather than allocated separately to save a couple
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* words in pointers. arc_hdr_realloc() is used to switch a header between
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* these two allocation states.
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*/
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typedef struct l1arc_buf_hdr {
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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kmutex_t b_freeze_lock;
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
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zio_cksum_t *b_freeze_cksum;
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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arc_buf_t *b_buf;
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
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uint32_t b_bufcnt;
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
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/* for waiting on writes to complete */
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
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kcondvar_t b_cv;
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
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uint8_t b_byteswap;
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
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/* protected by arc state mutex */
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arc_state_t *b_state;
|
2015-01-13 06:52:19 +03:00
|
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multilist_node_t b_arc_node;
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
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/* updated atomically */
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clock_t b_arc_access;
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uint32_t b_mru_hits;
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uint32_t b_mru_ghost_hits;
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uint32_t b_mfu_hits;
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uint32_t b_mfu_ghost_hits;
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uint32_t b_l2_hits;
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/* self protecting */
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refcount_t b_refcnt;
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|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
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|
arc_callback_t *b_acb;
|
2016-07-22 18:52:49 +03:00
|
|
|
abd_t *b_pabd;
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
} l1arc_buf_hdr_t;
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Encrypted blocks will need to be stored encrypted on the L2ARC
|
|
|
|
* disk as they appear in the main pool. In order for this to work we
|
|
|
|
* need to pass around the encryption parameters so they can be used
|
|
|
|
* to write data to the L2ARC. This struct is only defined in the
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|
|
|
* arc_buf_hdr_t if the L1 header is defined and has the ARC_FLAG_ENCRYPTED
|
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|
* flag set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef struct arc_buf_hdr_crypt {
|
|
|
|
abd_t *b_rabd; /* raw encrypted data */
|
|
|
|
dmu_object_type_t b_ot; /* object type */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t b_ebufcnt; /* count of encrypted buffers */
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
/* dsobj for looking up encryption key for l2arc encryption */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t b_dsobj;
|
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|
|
/* encryption parameters */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t b_salt[ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t b_iv[ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Technically this could be removed since we will always be able to
|
|
|
|
* get the mac from the bp when we need it. However, it is inconvenient
|
|
|
|
* for callers of arc code to have to pass a bp in all the time. This
|
|
|
|
* also allows us to assert that L2ARC data is properly encrypted to
|
|
|
|
* match the data in the main storage pool.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint8_t b_mac[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN];
|
|
|
|
} arc_buf_hdr_crypt_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
|
|
typedef struct l2arc_dev {
|
|
|
|
vdev_t *l2ad_vdev; /* vdev */
|
|
|
|
spa_t *l2ad_spa; /* spa */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t l2ad_hand; /* next write location */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t l2ad_start; /* first addr on device */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t l2ad_end; /* last addr on device */
|
|
|
|
boolean_t l2ad_first; /* first sweep through */
|
|
|
|
boolean_t l2ad_writing; /* currently writing */
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
kmutex_t l2ad_mtx; /* lock for buffer list */
|
|
|
|
list_t l2ad_buflist; /* buffer list */
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
|
|
list_node_t l2ad_node; /* device list node */
|
2015-06-16 02:12:19 +03:00
|
|
|
refcount_t l2ad_alloc; /* allocated bytes */
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
|
|
} l2arc_dev_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
typedef struct l2arc_buf_hdr {
|
|
|
|
/* protected by arc_buf_hdr mutex */
|
|
|
|
l2arc_dev_t *b_dev; /* L2ARC device */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t b_daddr; /* disk address, offset byte */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t b_hits;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_node_t b_l2node;
|
|
|
|
} l2arc_buf_hdr_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-13 05:07:39 +03:00
|
|
|
typedef struct l2arc_write_callback {
|
|
|
|
l2arc_dev_t *l2wcb_dev; /* device info */
|
|
|
|
arc_buf_hdr_t *l2wcb_head; /* head of write buflist */
|
|
|
|
} l2arc_write_callback_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
struct arc_buf_hdr {
|
|
|
|
/* protected by hash lock */
|
|
|
|
dva_t b_dva;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t b_birth;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_contents_t b_type;
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
arc_buf_hdr_t *b_hash_next;
|
|
|
|
arc_flags_t b_flags;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-02 07:04:53 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This field stores the size of the data buffer after
|
|
|
|
* compression, and is set in the arc's zio completion handlers.
|
|
|
|
* It is in units of SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE (e.g. 1 == 512 bytes).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* While the block pointers can store up to 32MB in their psize
|
|
|
|
* field, we can only store up to 32MB minus 512B. This is due
|
|
|
|
* to the bp using a bias of 1, whereas we use a bias of 0 (i.e.
|
|
|
|
* a field of zeros represents 512B in the bp). We can't use a
|
|
|
|
* bias of 1 since we need to reserve a psize of zero, here, to
|
|
|
|
* represent holes and embedded blocks.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This isn't a problem in practice, since the maximum size of a
|
|
|
|
* buffer is limited to 16MB, so we never need to store 32MB in
|
|
|
|
* this field. Even in the upstream illumos code base, the
|
|
|
|
* maximum size of a buffer is limited to 16MB.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint16_t b_psize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This field stores the size of the data buffer before
|
|
|
|
* compression, and cannot change once set. It is in units
|
|
|
|
* of SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE (e.g. 2 == 1024 bytes)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint16_t b_lsize; /* immutable */
|
|
|
|
uint64_t b_spa; /* immutable */
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* L2ARC fields. Undefined when not in L2ARC. */
|
|
|
|
l2arc_buf_hdr_t b_l2hdr;
|
|
|
|
/* L1ARC fields. Undefined when in l2arc_only state */
|
|
|
|
l1arc_buf_hdr_t b_l1hdr;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 20:36:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Encryption parameters. Defined only when ARC_FLAG_ENCRYPTED
|
|
|
|
* is set and the L1 header exists.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
arc_buf_hdr_crypt_t b_crypt_hdr;
|
2014-12-30 06:12:23 +03:00
|
|
|
};
|
2014-10-22 04:59:33 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _SYS_ARC_IMPL_H */
|