mirror_ubuntu-kernels/security/apparmor/af_inet.c

857 lines
23 KiB
C

/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor inet fine grained mediation
*
* Copyright 2024 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include <net/tcp_states.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/af_inet.h"
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_SK(struct aa_ruleset *rules,
struct sock *sk)
{
return RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, sk->sk_family);
}
enum addr_type {
ADDR_LOCAL = 0,
ADDR_LOCAL_PRIV = 1,
ADDR_REMOTE = 2,
};
struct match_addr {
const char *addrp;
enum addr_type addrtype;
int len;
__be16 port;
};
struct stored_match_addr {
union {
struct sockaddr addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
};
int addrlen;
struct match_addr maddr;
};
static void set_ad_create(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
int family, int type, int protocol)
{
ad->common.u.net->family = family;
ad->net.type = type;
ad->net.protocol = protocol;
}
static int set_ad_addr(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
u16 family, bool source, struct match_addr *maddr)
{
ad->common.u.net->family = family;
if (source) {
ad->common.u.net->sport = maddr->port;
if (maddr->addrp) {
if (family == AF_INET)
//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
ad->common.u.net->v4info.saddr = *(__be32 *)maddr->addrp;
else
//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
ad->common.u.net->v6info.saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)maddr->addrp;
}
} else {
ad->common.u.net->dport = maddr->port;
if (maddr->addrp) {
if (family == AF_INET)
//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
ad->common.u.net->v4info.daddr = *(__be32 *)maddr->addrp;
else
//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
ad->common.u.net->v6info.daddr = *(struct in6_addr *)maddr->addrp;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* returns 0 on success
* raw_port - if set raw_port (protocol) when SOCK_RAW */
static int map_addr(struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen, u16 raw_port,
enum addr_type addrtype, struct match_addr *maddr,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
AA_BUG(!maddr);
maddr->addrtype = addrtype;
if (!addr || addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) {
maddr->addrp = NULL;
maddr->port = 0;
maddr->len = 0;
return 0;
}
/*
* its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
* addr->sa_family == AF_INET. sk_family is used for socket
* mediation, sa_family for when we have address ...
*/
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
maddr->port = addr4->sin_port;
maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
maddr->len = 4;
break;
case AF_INET6:
addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
maddr->port = addr6->sin6_port;
maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
maddr->len = 16;
break;
default:
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
/* per ip spec, && sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW*/
if (raw_port && addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE)
maddr->port = raw_port;
if (ad)
set_ad_addr(ad, addr->sa_family, addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE, maddr);
return 0;
}
/* -ENOTCONN if not connected */
static int map_sock_addr(struct socket *sock, enum addr_type addrtype,
struct stored_match_addr *maddr,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
maddr->addrlen = sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &maddr->addr, addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE ? 0 : 1);
if (maddr->addrlen == -ENOTCONN) {
maddr->addrlen = 0;
return map_addr(NULL, 0, 0, addrtype, &maddr->maddr, ad);
} else if (maddr->addrlen < 0)
return maddr->addrlen;
return map_addr(&maddr->addr, maddr->addrlen, 0, addrtype,
&maddr->maddr, ad);
}
/* TODO: combine with connect map addr */
/* TODO: raw_port */
static int bind_map_addr(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen,
struct match_addr *maddr,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
u16 family;
AA_BUG(!addr);
AA_BUG(!maddr);
if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
maddr->addrtype = ADDR_LOCAL;
/*
* its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
* addr->sa_family == AF_INET. sk_family is used for socket
* mediation, sa_family for when we have address ...
*/
family = addr->sa_family;
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
/* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
/* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
/* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
* AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
*/
if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
family = AF_INET;
fallthrough;
case AF_INET:
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
maddr->port = addr4->sin_port;
maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
maddr->len = 4;
break;
case AF_INET6:
addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
maddr->port = addr6->sin6_port;
maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
maddr->len = 16;
break;
default:
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
if (ad)
set_ad_addr(ad, family, true, maddr);
return 0;
}
/* only continue match if
* insufficient current perms at current state
* indicates there are more perms in later state
* Returns: perms struct if early match
*/
static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
aa_state_t state, u32 request)
{
struct aa_perms *p;
p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH))
return NULL;
return p;
}
static int do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state, u32 request,
struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms perms;
AA_BUG(!profile);
if (state || !p)
p = aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
perms = *p;
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
audit_net_cb);
}
static aa_state_t match_addr(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
struct match_addr *maddr)
{
char l = (char) maddr->addrtype;
state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, &l, 1);
state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *)&maddr->port, 2);
if (maddr->len == 0 && !maddr->addrp) {
l = 0;
} else if (maddr->len == 4) {
l = 1;
} else if (maddr->len == 16) {
l = 2;
} else {
AA_BUG("address length unsupported");
return 0;
}
state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, &l, 1);
if (maddr->addrp)
state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, maddr->addrp, maddr->len);
/* null transition between addr and label */
state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
return state;
}
static aa_state_t match_addr_info(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
struct match_addr *maddr,
const char **info)
{
state = match_addr(dfa, state, maddr);
if (!state) {
*info = maddr->addrtype == ADDR_REMOTE ?
"failed remote addr match" :
"failed local addr match";
}
return state;
}
static aa_state_t match_addr_label(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
u32 request, struct match_addr *maddr,
struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
{
state = match_addr_info(policy->dfa, state, maddr, info);
*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
if (!*p) {
/* TODO: actual label match: */
if (!state) {
*info = maddr->addrtype == ADDR_REMOTE ?
"failed remote label match" :
"failed local label match";
}
/* null transition after label match */
state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
}
return state;
}
/* passing in state returned by PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF */
static aa_state_t match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
u32 request, int type, int protocol,
struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
{
__be16 buffer;
buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)type);
state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
if (!state)
*info = "failed type match";
*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
if (!*p) {
buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)protocol);
state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
2);
if (!state)
*info = "failed protocol match";
}
return state;
}
static aa_state_t match_to_sk(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
u32 request, struct sock *sk,
struct match_addr *maddr,
struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
{
*p = NULL;
state = match_to_prot(policy, state, request, sk->sk_type,
sk->sk_protocol, p, info);
if (*p || !state)
return state;
return match_addr_label(policy, state, request, maddr, p, info);
}
enum cmd_type {
CMD_ADDR = 1,
CMD_LISTEN = 2,
CMD_OPT = 4,
};
static inline aa_state_t match_to_cmd(struct aa_policydb *policy,
aa_state_t state, u32 request,
struct sock *sk, enum cmd_type cmd,
struct match_addr *maddr,
struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
{
state = match_to_sk(policy, state, request, sk, maddr, p, info);
if (!*p && state) {
char c = (char) cmd;
state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, &c, 1);
if (!state)
*info = "failed cmd selection match";
}
return state;
}
/*
static int match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *peer,
aa_state_t state, u32 request,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!peer);
ad->peer = &peer->label;
if (state) {
state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state,
peer->base.hname);
if (!state)
ad->info = "failed peer label match";
}
return do_perms(profile, state, request, ad);
}
*/
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static inline int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules),
list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!sk);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, sk->sk_family);
if (state) {
state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, request, sk,
maddr, &p, &ad->info);
return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
}
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
}
/* no kernel_t bailout */
static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
int type, int protocol,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
AA_BUG(!profile);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, family);
if (state) {
state = match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE,
type, protocol, &p, &ad->info);
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, p, ad);
}
return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type);
}
/* sendmsg/rcvmsg/connect */
static int profile_remote_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
u32 request, struct match_addr *raddr,
struct match_addr *laddr,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(!raddr);
AA_BUG(!laddr);
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
if (!state)
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
/* TODO: deal with sa_family vs. sk_family */
state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, sk, CMD_ADDR,
raddr, &p, &ad->info);
if (state && !p)
/* check if perm is restricted to a pairing */
state = match_addr_label(rules->policy, state, request,
laddr, &p, &ad->info);
return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
}
static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
struct match_addr *maddr,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
unsigned short sport;
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(!maddr);
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
if (!state)
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_BIND, sk);
/*
* its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
* addr->sa_family == AF_INET
*/
sport = ntohs(maddr->port);
if (sport) {
if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), sport)) {
/* cap NET_BIND_SERVICE will get raised */
maddr->addrtype = ADDR_LOCAL_PRIV;
}
}
state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND, sk,
maddr, &p, &ad->info);
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_BIND, p, ad);
}
static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
struct match_addr *maddr, int backlog,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(!maddr);
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
if (state) {
__be16 b = htons(backlog);
state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk,
CMD_LISTEN, maddr, &p, &ad->info);
if (state && !p) {
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
(char *) &b, 2);
if (!state)
ad->info = "failed listen backlog match";
}
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, p, ad);
}
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk);
}
static inline int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
struct sock *newsk,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!sk);
/* AA_BUG(!newsk); newsk can be null here, since not using atm ... */
AA_BUG(!maddr);
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
if (state) {
state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk,
maddr, &p, &ad->info);
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, p, ad);
}
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk);
}
/* getopt/setopt */
static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
int level, int optname,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
aa_state_t state;
AA_BUG(!profile);
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(!maddr);
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
if (state) {
__be16 l = htons(l);
__be16 n = htons(optname);
state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, sk,
CMD_OPT, maddr, &p, &ad->info);
if (state && !p) {
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
(char *) &l, 2);
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
(char *) &n, 2);
if (!state)
ad->info = "failed sockopt match";
}
return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
}
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
// TODO: cleanup init to use recursion, so we can have N init fns, in 1 macro
// TODO: lift DEFINE_AUDIT out of macro into init fn???
/* no kernel_t bailout */
#define label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXX, YYYY, CALLBACKFN) \
({ \
int __EERROR = 0; \
if (label_mediates(LABEL, AA_CLASS_NET)) { \
struct aa_profile *PROFILE; \
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(AAD, OP, SOCKSK); \
(AAD).subj_cred = (CRED); \
__EERROR = (XXXX); \
if (__EERROR == 0) { \
__EERROR = (YYYY); \
if (__EERROR == 0) { \
__EERROR = fn_for_each(label, PROFILE, \
(CALLBACKFN)); \
} \
} \
} \
__EERROR; \
})
/* no kernel_t bailout */
#define label_sk_has_perm(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, CALLBACKFN) \
label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, \
0, 0, CALLBACKFN)
/* no kernel_t bailout */
#define label_sk_has_perm1(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXX, CALLBACKFN) \
label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, \
XXXX, 0, CALLBACKFN)
/* Early bailout for kernel_t - 2 init args before callback */
#define sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, YYYYX, CALLBACKFN) \
({ \
struct aa_label *label; \
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx= aa_sock(SOCKSK); \
int __ERROR = 0; \
if (ctx->label != kernel_t) { \
\
label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); \
__ERROR = label_sk_has_perm2(current_cred(), label, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, YYYYX, CALLBACKFN); \
end_current_label_crit_section(label); \
} \
__ERROR; \
})
/* Early bailout for kernel_t - no init args before callback */
#define sk_has_perm(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, CALLBACKFN) \
sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, 0, 0, CALLBACKFN)
/* Early bailout for kernel_t - 1 init arg before callback */
#define sk_has_perm1(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, CALLBACKFN) \
sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, 0, CALLBACKFN)
/* no kernel_t early bailout */
/* NOTE: already lifted label_mediates into lsm.c */
int aa_inet_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
int protocol)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, OP_CREATE, NULL, family, type, protocol);
ad.subj_cred = current_cred();
set_ad_create(&ad, family, type, protocol);
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
profile_create_perm(profile, family, type,
protocol, &ad));
return error;
}
int aa_inet_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addrlen)
{
struct match_addr maddr;
return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, profile, ad,
bind_map_addr(sock->sk, addr, addrlen, &maddr,
&ad),
profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, &maddr, &ad));
}
int aa_inet_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addrlen)
{
struct stored_match_addr laddr;
struct match_addr raddr;
/* disconnect socket */
if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
return 0;
if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
return sk_has_perm2(sock->sk, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, profile, ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
map_addr(addr, addrlen, 0, ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr,
&ad),
profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk,
AA_MAY_CONNECT, &raddr,
&laddr.maddr, &ad));
}
int aa_inet_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, profile, ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk, &maddr.maddr,
backlog, &ad));
}
/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */
int aa_inet_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
int error;
error = sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, profile, ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk,
&maddr.maddr,
newsock->sk, &ad));
/* selinux updates inode - need to investigate this more */
return error;
}
/* sendmsg, recvmsg. */
int aa_inet_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
struct stored_match_addr laddr;
struct match_addr raddr;
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
return sk_has_perm2(sock->sk, op, request, profile, ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
map_addr(msg->msg_name, msg->msg_namelen, 0,
ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr, &ad),
profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk, request,
&raddr, &laddr.maddr, &ad));
}
/* getopt, setopt */
int aa_inet_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
int level, int optname)
{
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, op, request, profile, ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
profile_opt_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
&maddr.maddr, level, optname, &ad));
}
static int inet_label_sock_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock)
{
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
return label_sk_has_perm1(cred, label, sock->sk, op, request, profile,
ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
profile_sk_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
&maddr.maddr, &ad));
}
/* revaliation, get/set attr/getsockname/peername */
int aa_inet_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx= aa_sock(sock->sk);
struct aa_label *label;
int error;
if (ctx->label == kernel_t)
return 0;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = inet_label_sock_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sock);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
int aa_inet_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK;
struct stored_match_addr laddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int error = 0;
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
/* access to the local sock */
error = label_sk_has_perm1(subj_cred, label, sock->sk, op, request,
profile, ad,
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
profile_sk_perm(profile, sk_req, sock->sk, &laddr.maddr,
&ad));
if (!error) {
struct stored_match_addr laddr, raddr;
/* TODO: have ad here: instead of in CB so we do have to redo */
error = map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr, NULL);
if (!error && raddr.maddr.addrp) {
error = label_sk_has_perm1(subj_cred, label, sock->sk,
op, request, profile, ad,
set_ad_addr(&ad, raddr.addr.sa_family,
false, &raddr.maddr),
profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk,
request,
&raddr.maddr,
&laddr.maddr, &ad));
}
}
return error;
}