857 lines
23 KiB
C
857 lines
23 KiB
C
/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor inet fine grained mediation
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*
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* Copyright 2024 Canonical Ltd.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*/
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#include <net/tcp_states.h>
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/af_inet.h"
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#include "include/apparmor.h"
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#include "include/file.h"
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#include "include/label.h"
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#include "include/path.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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#include "include/cred.h"
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static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_SK(struct aa_ruleset *rules,
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struct sock *sk)
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{
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return RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, sk->sk_family);
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}
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enum addr_type {
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ADDR_LOCAL = 0,
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ADDR_LOCAL_PRIV = 1,
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ADDR_REMOTE = 2,
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};
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struct match_addr {
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const char *addrp;
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enum addr_type addrtype;
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int len;
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__be16 port;
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};
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struct stored_match_addr {
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union {
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struct sockaddr addr;
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struct sockaddr_in addr4;
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struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
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};
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int addrlen;
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struct match_addr maddr;
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};
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static void set_ad_create(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
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int family, int type, int protocol)
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{
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ad->common.u.net->family = family;
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ad->net.type = type;
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ad->net.protocol = protocol;
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}
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static int set_ad_addr(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
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u16 family, bool source, struct match_addr *maddr)
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{
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ad->common.u.net->family = family;
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if (source) {
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ad->common.u.net->sport = maddr->port;
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if (maddr->addrp) {
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if (family == AF_INET)
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//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
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ad->common.u.net->v4info.saddr = *(__be32 *)maddr->addrp;
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else
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//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
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ad->common.u.net->v6info.saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)maddr->addrp;
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}
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} else {
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ad->common.u.net->dport = maddr->port;
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if (maddr->addrp) {
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if (family == AF_INET)
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//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
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ad->common.u.net->v4info.daddr = *(__be32 *)maddr->addrp;
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else
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//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
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ad->common.u.net->v6info.daddr = *(struct in6_addr *)maddr->addrp;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* returns 0 on success
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* raw_port - if set raw_port (protocol) when SOCK_RAW */
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static int map_addr(struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen, u16 raw_port,
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enum addr_type addrtype, struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
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struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
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AA_BUG(!maddr);
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maddr->addrtype = addrtype;
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if (!addr || addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) {
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maddr->addrp = NULL;
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maddr->port = 0;
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maddr->len = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
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* addr->sa_family == AF_INET. sk_family is used for socket
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* mediation, sa_family for when we have address ...
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*/
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switch (addr->sa_family) {
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case AF_INET:
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addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
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if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
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return -EINVAL;
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maddr->port = addr4->sin_port;
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maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
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maddr->len = 4;
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break;
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case AF_INET6:
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addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
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if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
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return -EINVAL;
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maddr->port = addr6->sin6_port;
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maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
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maddr->len = 16;
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break;
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default:
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return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
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}
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/* per ip spec, && sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW*/
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if (raw_port && addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE)
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maddr->port = raw_port;
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if (ad)
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set_ad_addr(ad, addr->sa_family, addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE, maddr);
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return 0;
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}
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/* -ENOTCONN if not connected */
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static int map_sock_addr(struct socket *sock, enum addr_type addrtype,
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struct stored_match_addr *maddr,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
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maddr->addrlen = sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &maddr->addr, addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE ? 0 : 1);
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if (maddr->addrlen == -ENOTCONN) {
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maddr->addrlen = 0;
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return map_addr(NULL, 0, 0, addrtype, &maddr->maddr, ad);
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} else if (maddr->addrlen < 0)
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return maddr->addrlen;
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return map_addr(&maddr->addr, maddr->addrlen, 0, addrtype,
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&maddr->maddr, ad);
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}
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/* TODO: combine with connect map addr */
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/* TODO: raw_port */
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static int bind_map_addr(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen,
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struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
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struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
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u16 family;
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AA_BUG(!addr);
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AA_BUG(!maddr);
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if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
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return -EINVAL;
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maddr->addrtype = ADDR_LOCAL;
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/*
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* its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
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* addr->sa_family == AF_INET. sk_family is used for socket
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* mediation, sa_family for when we have address ...
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*/
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family = addr->sa_family;
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switch (addr->sa_family) {
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case AF_UNSPEC:
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if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
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/* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
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if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
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return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
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}
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/* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
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* AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
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*/
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if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
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return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
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family = AF_INET;
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fallthrough;
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case AF_INET:
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addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
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if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
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return -EINVAL;
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maddr->port = addr4->sin_port;
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maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
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maddr->len = 4;
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break;
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case AF_INET6:
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addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
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if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
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return -EINVAL;
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maddr->port = addr6->sin6_port;
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maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
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maddr->len = 16;
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break;
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default:
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return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
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}
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if (ad)
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set_ad_addr(ad, family, true, maddr);
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return 0;
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}
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/* only continue match if
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* insufficient current perms at current state
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* indicates there are more perms in later state
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* Returns: perms struct if early match
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*/
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static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
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aa_state_t state, u32 request)
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{
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struct aa_perms *p;
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p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
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if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH))
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return NULL;
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return p;
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}
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static int do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state, u32 request,
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struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
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typeof(*rules), list);
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struct aa_perms perms;
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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if (state || !p)
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p = aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
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perms = *p;
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aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
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return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
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audit_net_cb);
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}
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static aa_state_t match_addr(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
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struct match_addr *maddr)
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{
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char l = (char) maddr->addrtype;
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, &l, 1);
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *)&maddr->port, 2);
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if (maddr->len == 0 && !maddr->addrp) {
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l = 0;
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} else if (maddr->len == 4) {
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l = 1;
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} else if (maddr->len == 16) {
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l = 2;
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} else {
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AA_BUG("address length unsupported");
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return 0;
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}
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, &l, 1);
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if (maddr->addrp)
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, maddr->addrp, maddr->len);
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/* null transition between addr and label */
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state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
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return state;
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}
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static aa_state_t match_addr_info(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
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struct match_addr *maddr,
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const char **info)
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{
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state = match_addr(dfa, state, maddr);
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if (!state) {
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*info = maddr->addrtype == ADDR_REMOTE ?
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"failed remote addr match" :
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"failed local addr match";
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}
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return state;
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}
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static aa_state_t match_addr_label(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
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u32 request, struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
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{
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state = match_addr_info(policy->dfa, state, maddr, info);
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*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
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if (!*p) {
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/* TODO: actual label match: */
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if (!state) {
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*info = maddr->addrtype == ADDR_REMOTE ?
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"failed remote label match" :
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"failed local label match";
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}
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/* null transition after label match */
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state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
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}
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return state;
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}
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/* passing in state returned by PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF */
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static aa_state_t match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
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u32 request, int type, int protocol,
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struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
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{
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__be16 buffer;
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buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)type);
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
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if (!state)
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*info = "failed type match";
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*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
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if (!*p) {
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buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)protocol);
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
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2);
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if (!state)
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*info = "failed protocol match";
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}
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return state;
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}
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static aa_state_t match_to_sk(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
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u32 request, struct sock *sk,
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struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
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{
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*p = NULL;
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state = match_to_prot(policy, state, request, sk->sk_type,
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sk->sk_protocol, p, info);
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if (*p || !state)
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return state;
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return match_addr_label(policy, state, request, maddr, p, info);
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}
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enum cmd_type {
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CMD_ADDR = 1,
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CMD_LISTEN = 2,
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CMD_OPT = 4,
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};
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static inline aa_state_t match_to_cmd(struct aa_policydb *policy,
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aa_state_t state, u32 request,
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struct sock *sk, enum cmd_type cmd,
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struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
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{
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state = match_to_sk(policy, state, request, sk, maddr, p, info);
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if (!*p && state) {
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char c = (char) cmd;
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state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, &c, 1);
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if (!state)
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*info = "failed cmd selection match";
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}
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return state;
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}
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/*
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static int match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *peer,
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aa_state_t state, u32 request,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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AA_BUG(!peer);
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ad->peer = &peer->label;
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if (state) {
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state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state,
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peer->base.hname);
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if (!state)
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ad->info = "failed peer label match";
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}
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return do_perms(profile, state, request, ad);
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}
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*/
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/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
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static inline int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
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struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
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typeof(*rules),
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list);
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struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
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aa_state_t state;
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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AA_BUG(!sk);
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state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, sk->sk_family);
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if (state) {
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state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, request, sk,
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maddr, &p, &ad->info);
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return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
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}
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return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
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}
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/* no kernel_t bailout */
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static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
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int type, int protocol,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
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typeof(*rules), list);
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struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
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aa_state_t state;
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, family);
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if (state) {
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state = match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE,
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type, protocol, &p, &ad->info);
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return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, p, ad);
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}
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return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type);
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}
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/* sendmsg/rcvmsg/connect */
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static int profile_remote_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
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u32 request, struct match_addr *raddr,
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struct match_addr *laddr,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
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typeof(*rules), list);
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struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
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aa_state_t state;
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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AA_BUG(!sk);
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AA_BUG(!raddr);
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AA_BUG(!laddr);
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AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
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"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
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state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
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if (!state)
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return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
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/* TODO: deal with sa_family vs. sk_family */
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state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, sk, CMD_ADDR,
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raddr, &p, &ad->info);
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if (state && !p)
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/* check if perm is restricted to a pairing */
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state = match_addr_label(rules->policy, state, request,
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laddr, &p, &ad->info);
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return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
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}
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static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
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struct match_addr *maddr,
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struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
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{
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struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
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typeof(*rules), list);
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struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
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aa_state_t state;
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unsigned short sport;
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AA_BUG(!profile);
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AA_BUG(!sk);
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AA_BUG(!maddr);
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AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
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"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
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state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
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if (!state)
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return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_BIND, sk);
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/*
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* its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
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* addr->sa_family == AF_INET
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*/
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sport = ntohs(maddr->port);
|
|
if (sport) {
|
|
if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), sport)) {
|
|
/* cap NET_BIND_SERVICE will get raised */
|
|
maddr->addrtype = ADDR_LOCAL_PRIV;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND, sk,
|
|
maddr, &p, &ad->info);
|
|
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_BIND, p, ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct match_addr *maddr, int backlog,
|
|
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
|
|
typeof(*rules), list);
|
|
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
|
|
aa_state_t state;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(!profile);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(!maddr);
|
|
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
|
|
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
|
|
|
|
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
|
|
if (state) {
|
|
__be16 b = htons(backlog);
|
|
|
|
state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk,
|
|
CMD_LISTEN, maddr, &p, &ad->info);
|
|
if (state && !p) {
|
|
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
|
|
(char *) &b, 2);
|
|
if (!state)
|
|
ad->info = "failed listen backlog match";
|
|
}
|
|
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, p, ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
|
|
struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
|
|
struct sock *newsk,
|
|
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
|
|
typeof(*rules), list);
|
|
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
|
|
aa_state_t state;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(!profile);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sk);
|
|
/* AA_BUG(!newsk); newsk can be null here, since not using atm ... */
|
|
AA_BUG(!maddr);
|
|
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
|
|
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
|
|
|
|
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
|
|
if (state) {
|
|
state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk,
|
|
maddr, &p, &ad->info);
|
|
return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, p, ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* getopt/setopt */
|
|
static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
|
|
struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
|
|
int level, int optname,
|
|
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
|
|
typeof(*rules), list);
|
|
struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
|
|
aa_state_t state;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(!profile);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(!maddr);
|
|
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
|
|
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
|
|
|
|
state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
|
|
if (state) {
|
|
__be16 l = htons(l);
|
|
__be16 n = htons(optname);
|
|
|
|
state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, sk,
|
|
CMD_OPT, maddr, &p, &ad->info);
|
|
if (state && !p) {
|
|
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
|
|
(char *) &l, 2);
|
|
state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
|
|
(char *) &n, 2);
|
|
if (!state)
|
|
ad->info = "failed sockopt match";
|
|
}
|
|
return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
// TODO: cleanup init to use recursion, so we can have N init fns, in 1 macro
|
|
// TODO: lift DEFINE_AUDIT out of macro into init fn???
|
|
|
|
/* no kernel_t bailout */
|
|
#define label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXX, YYYY, CALLBACKFN) \
|
|
({ \
|
|
int __EERROR = 0; \
|
|
if (label_mediates(LABEL, AA_CLASS_NET)) { \
|
|
struct aa_profile *PROFILE; \
|
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(AAD, OP, SOCKSK); \
|
|
(AAD).subj_cred = (CRED); \
|
|
__EERROR = (XXXX); \
|
|
if (__EERROR == 0) { \
|
|
__EERROR = (YYYY); \
|
|
if (__EERROR == 0) { \
|
|
__EERROR = fn_for_each(label, PROFILE, \
|
|
(CALLBACKFN)); \
|
|
} \
|
|
} \
|
|
} \
|
|
__EERROR; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/* no kernel_t bailout */
|
|
#define label_sk_has_perm(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, CALLBACKFN) \
|
|
label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, \
|
|
0, 0, CALLBACKFN)
|
|
|
|
/* no kernel_t bailout */
|
|
#define label_sk_has_perm1(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXX, CALLBACKFN) \
|
|
label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, \
|
|
XXXX, 0, CALLBACKFN)
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Early bailout for kernel_t - 2 init args before callback */
|
|
#define sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, YYYYX, CALLBACKFN) \
|
|
({ \
|
|
struct aa_label *label; \
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx= aa_sock(SOCKSK); \
|
|
int __ERROR = 0; \
|
|
if (ctx->label != kernel_t) { \
|
|
\
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); \
|
|
__ERROR = label_sk_has_perm2(current_cred(), label, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, YYYYX, CALLBACKFN); \
|
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label); \
|
|
} \
|
|
__ERROR; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/* Early bailout for kernel_t - no init args before callback */
|
|
#define sk_has_perm(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, CALLBACKFN) \
|
|
sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, 0, 0, CALLBACKFN)
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Early bailout for kernel_t - 1 init arg before callback */
|
|
#define sk_has_perm1(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, CALLBACKFN) \
|
|
sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, 0, CALLBACKFN)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* no kernel_t early bailout */
|
|
/* NOTE: already lifted label_mediates into lsm.c */
|
|
int aa_inet_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
|
|
int protocol)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_profile *profile;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, OP_CREATE, NULL, family, type, protocol);
|
|
|
|
ad.subj_cred = current_cred();
|
|
set_ad_create(&ad, family, type, protocol);
|
|
error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
|
|
profile_create_perm(profile, family, type,
|
|
protocol, &ad));
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int aa_inet_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
|
|
int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct match_addr maddr;
|
|
|
|
return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, profile, ad,
|
|
bind_map_addr(sock->sk, addr, addrlen, &maddr,
|
|
&ad),
|
|
profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, &maddr, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int aa_inet_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
|
|
int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stored_match_addr laddr;
|
|
struct match_addr raddr;
|
|
|
|
/* disconnect socket */
|
|
if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
|
|
return sk_has_perm2(sock->sk, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, profile, ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
|
|
map_addr(addr, addrlen, 0, ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr,
|
|
&ad),
|
|
profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk,
|
|
AA_MAY_CONNECT, &raddr,
|
|
&laddr.maddr, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int aa_inet_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
|
|
|
|
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
|
|
return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, profile, ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
|
|
profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk, &maddr.maddr,
|
|
backlog, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */
|
|
int aa_inet_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, profile, ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
|
|
profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk,
|
|
&maddr.maddr,
|
|
newsock->sk, &ad));
|
|
|
|
/* selinux updates inode - need to investigate this more */
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* sendmsg, recvmsg. */
|
|
int aa_inet_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stored_match_addr laddr;
|
|
struct match_addr raddr;
|
|
|
|
/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
|
|
return sk_has_perm2(sock->sk, op, request, profile, ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
|
|
map_addr(msg->msg_name, msg->msg_namelen, 0,
|
|
ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr, &ad),
|
|
profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk, request,
|
|
&raddr, &laddr.maddr, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* getopt, setopt */
|
|
int aa_inet_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
|
|
int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
|
|
|
|
return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, op, request, profile, ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
|
|
profile_opt_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
|
|
&maddr.maddr, level, optname, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int inet_label_sock_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label,
|
|
const char *op, u32 request,
|
|
struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
struct stored_match_addr maddr;
|
|
|
|
return label_sk_has_perm1(cred, label, sock->sk, op, request, profile,
|
|
ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
|
|
profile_sk_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
|
|
&maddr.maddr, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* revaliation, get/set attr/getsockname/peername */
|
|
int aa_inet_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx= aa_sock(sock->sk);
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->label == kernel_t)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
error = inet_label_sock_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sock);
|
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int aa_inet_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
|
|
const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK;
|
|
struct stored_match_addr laddr;
|
|
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(!label);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
|
|
"family=%d", sk->sk_family);
|
|
|
|
/* access to the local sock */
|
|
error = label_sk_has_perm1(subj_cred, label, sock->sk, op, request,
|
|
profile, ad,
|
|
map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
|
|
profile_sk_perm(profile, sk_req, sock->sk, &laddr.maddr,
|
|
&ad));
|
|
|
|
if (!error) {
|
|
struct stored_match_addr laddr, raddr;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: have ad here: instead of in CB so we do have to redo */
|
|
error = map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr, NULL);
|
|
if (!error && raddr.maddr.addrp) {
|
|
error = label_sk_has_perm1(subj_cred, label, sock->sk,
|
|
op, request, profile, ad,
|
|
set_ad_addr(&ad, raddr.addr.sa_family,
|
|
false, &raddr.maddr),
|
|
profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk,
|
|
request,
|
|
&raddr.maddr,
|
|
&laddr.maddr, &ad));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|