708 lines
29 KiB
ReStructuredText
708 lines
29 KiB
ReStructuredText
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==================================
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VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O" [1]_
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==================================
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Many modern systems now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities
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to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been
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allotted. This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d,
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POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC
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systems such as Freescale PAMU. The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device
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agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in
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a secure, IOMMU protected environment. In other words, this allows
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safe [2]_, non-privileged, userspace drivers.
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Why do we want that? Virtual machines often make use of direct device
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access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible
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I/O performance. From a device and host perspective, this simply
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turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of
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significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of
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bare-metal device drivers [3]_.
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Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing
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field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from
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userspace. Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based)
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and compute accelerators. Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either
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go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream
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driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework,
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which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support,
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and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration
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space.
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The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the
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KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more
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secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO.
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Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs
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---------------------------
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Devices are the main target of any I/O driver. Devices typically
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create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts,
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and DMA. Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is
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by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment
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as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the
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greatest risk to the overall system integrity.
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To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate
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isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only
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meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices
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with limited address spaces). With this, devices can now be isolated
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from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing
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things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines.
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This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device
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though. Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices,
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interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation.
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For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi-
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function enclosure. While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish
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between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require
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transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU. Examples of this
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could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors
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between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable
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bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU. Topology
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can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices. A PCIe-to-PCI
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bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if
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from the bridge itself. Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor
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as well.
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Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level
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granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity. The
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IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups. A group is
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a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the
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system. Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO.
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While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to
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ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred
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granularity. In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be
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possible to share a set of page tables between different groups,
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reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing,
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reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only
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a single set of translations). For this reason, VFIO makes use of
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a container class, which may hold one or more groups. A container
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is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device.
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On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all
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but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away.
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The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level
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of functionality. To do this, the user first needs to identify the
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group associated with the desired device. This can be done using
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the sysfs links described in the example below. By unbinding the
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device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new
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VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where
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$GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member.
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If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to
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be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group
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are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from
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host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the
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group available, but not that particular device). TBD - interface
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for disabling driver probing/locking a device.
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Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening
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the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the
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VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the
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previously opened container file. If desired and if the IOMMU driver
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supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may
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be set to the same container. If a group fails to set to a container
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with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used
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instead.
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With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining
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ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces.
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Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each
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device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor.
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The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O
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regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as
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well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt
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notifications.
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VFIO Usage Example
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------------------
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Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0::
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$ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group
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../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26
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This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26. This device is on the
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pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the
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group::
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# modprobe vfio-pci
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Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group
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character devices for this group::
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$ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0
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06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08)
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# echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind
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# echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id
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Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free
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it for use by VFIO::
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$ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices
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total 0
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lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 ->
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../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0
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lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 ->
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../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0
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lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 ->
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../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1
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This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge [4]_, therefore we also
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need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same
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procedure as above. Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does
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not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to
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bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently
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support PCI bridges).
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The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if
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unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides
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no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to
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mode 0666 by the system)::
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# chown user:user /dev/vfio/26
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The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this
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group and can access them as follows::
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int container, group, device, i;
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struct vfio_group_status group_status =
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{ .argsz = sizeof(group_status) };
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struct vfio_iommu_type1_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) };
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struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) };
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struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) };
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/* Create a new container */
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container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio", O_RDWR);
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if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION)
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/* Unknown API version */
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if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU))
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/* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */
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/* Open the group */
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group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR);
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/* Test the group is viable and available */
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ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status);
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if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE))
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/* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */
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/* Add the group to the container */
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ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);
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/* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
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ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU);
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/* Get addition IOMMU info */
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ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info);
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/* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
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dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
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MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
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dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
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dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
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dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;
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ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);
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/* Get a file descriptor for the device */
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device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");
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/* Test and setup the device */
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ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info);
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for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) {
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struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) };
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reg.index = i;
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ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, ®);
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/* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps
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* For PCI devices, config space is a region */
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}
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for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) {
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struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) };
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irq.index = i;
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ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, &irq);
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/* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */
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}
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/* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
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ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);
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IOMMUFD and vfio_iommu_type1
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----------------------------
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IOMMUFD is the new user API to manage I/O page tables from userspace.
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It intends to be the portal of delivering advanced userspace DMA
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features (nested translation [5]_, PASID [6]_, etc.) while also providing
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a backwards compatibility interface for existing VFIO_TYPE1v2_IOMMU use
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cases. Eventually the vfio_iommu_type1 driver, as well as the legacy
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vfio container and group model is intended to be deprecated.
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The IOMMUFD backwards compatibility interface can be enabled two ways.
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In the first method, the kernel can be configured with
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CONFIG_IOMMUFD_VFIO_CONTAINER, in which case the IOMMUFD subsystem
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transparently provides the entire infrastructure for the VFIO
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container and IOMMU backend interfaces. The compatibility mode can
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also be accessed if the VFIO container interface, ie. /dev/vfio/vfio is
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simply symlink'd to /dev/iommu. Note that at the time of writing, the
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compatibility mode is not entirely feature complete relative to
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VFIO_TYPE1v2_IOMMU (ex. DMA mapping MMIO) and does not attempt to
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provide compatibility to the VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU interface. Therefore
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it is not generally advisable at this time to switch from native VFIO
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implementations to the IOMMUFD compatibility interfaces.
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Long term, VFIO users should migrate to device access through the cdev
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interface described below, and native access through the IOMMUFD
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provided interfaces.
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VFIO Device cdev
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----------------
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Traditionally user acquires a device fd via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD
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in a VFIO group.
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With CONFIG_VFIO_DEVICE_CDEV=y the user can now acquire a device fd
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by directly opening a character device /dev/vfio/devices/vfioX where
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"X" is the number allocated uniquely by VFIO for registered devices.
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cdev interface does not support noiommu devices, so user should use
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the legacy group interface if noiommu is wanted.
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The cdev only works with IOMMUFD. Both VFIO drivers and applications
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must adapt to the new cdev security model which requires using
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VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD to claim DMA ownership before starting to
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actually use the device. Once BIND succeeds then a VFIO device can
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be fully accessed by the user.
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VFIO device cdev doesn't rely on VFIO group/container/iommu drivers.
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Hence those modules can be fully compiled out in an environment
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where no legacy VFIO application exists.
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So far SPAPR does not support IOMMUFD yet. So it cannot support device
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cdev either.
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vfio device cdev access is still bound by IOMMU group semantics, ie. there
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can be only one DMA owner for the group. Devices belonging to the same
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group can not be bound to multiple iommufd_ctx or shared between native
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kernel and vfio bus driver or other driver supporting the driver_managed_dma
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flag. A violation of this ownership requirement will fail at the
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VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD ioctl, which gates full device access.
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Device cdev Example
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-------------------
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Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:6a:01.0::
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$ ls /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/vfio-dev/
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vfio0
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This device is therefore represented as vfio0. The user can verify
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its existence::
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$ ls -l /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
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crw------- 1 root root 511, 0 Feb 16 01:22 /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
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$ cat /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:6a:01.0/vfio-dev/vfio0/dev
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511:0
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$ ls -l /dev/char/511\:0
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lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 21 Feb 16 01:22 /dev/char/511:0 -> ../vfio/devices/vfio0
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Then provide the user with access to the device if unprivileged
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operation is desired::
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$ chown user:user /dev/vfio/devices/vfio0
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Finally the user could get cdev fd by::
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cdev_fd = open("/dev/vfio/devices/vfio0", O_RDWR);
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An opened cdev_fd doesn't give the user any permission of accessing
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the device except binding the cdev_fd to an iommufd. After that point
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then the device is fully accessible including attaching it to an
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IOMMUFD IOAS/HWPT to enable userspace DMA::
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struct vfio_device_bind_iommufd bind = {
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.argsz = sizeof(bind),
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.flags = 0,
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};
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struct iommu_ioas_alloc alloc_data = {
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.size = sizeof(alloc_data),
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.flags = 0,
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};
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struct vfio_device_attach_iommufd_pt attach_data = {
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.argsz = sizeof(attach_data),
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.flags = 0,
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};
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struct iommu_ioas_map map = {
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.size = sizeof(map),
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.flags = IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_READABLE |
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IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_WRITEABLE |
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IOMMU_IOAS_MAP_FIXED_IOVA,
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.__reserved = 0,
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};
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iommufd = open("/dev/iommu", O_RDWR);
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bind.iommufd = iommufd;
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ioctl(cdev_fd, VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD, &bind);
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ioctl(iommufd, IOMMU_IOAS_ALLOC, &alloc_data);
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attach_data.pt_id = alloc_data.out_ioas_id;
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ioctl(cdev_fd, VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT, &attach_data);
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/* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
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map.user_va = (int64_t)mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
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MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
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map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
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map.length = 1024 * 1024;
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map.ioas_id = alloc_data.out_ioas_id;;
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ioctl(iommufd, IOMMU_IOAS_MAP, &map);
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/* Other device operations as stated in "VFIO Usage Example" */
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VFIO User API
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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|
Please see include/uapi/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO bus driver API
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces
|
||
|
into VFIO core. When devices are bound and unbound to the driver,
|
||
|
Following interfaces are called when devices are bound to and
|
||
|
unbound from the driver::
|
||
|
|
||
|
int vfio_register_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
|
||
|
int vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
|
||
|
void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device);
|
||
|
|
||
|
The driver should embed the vfio_device in its own structure and use
|
||
|
vfio_alloc_device() to allocate the structure, and can register
|
||
|
@init/@release callbacks to manage any private state wrapping the
|
||
|
vfio_device::
|
||
|
|
||
|
vfio_alloc_device(dev_struct, member, dev, ops);
|
||
|
void vfio_put_device(struct vfio_device *device);
|
||
|
|
||
|
vfio_register_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the
|
||
|
iommu_group of the specified dev and register the dev as owned by a VFIO bus
|
||
|
driver. Once vfio_register_group_dev() returns it is possible for userspace to
|
||
|
start accessing the driver, thus the driver should ensure it is completely
|
||
|
ready before calling it. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks
|
||
|
similar to a file operations structure::
|
||
|
|
||
|
struct vfio_device_ops {
|
||
|
char *name;
|
||
|
int (*init)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
|
||
|
void (*release)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
|
||
|
int (*bind_iommufd)(struct vfio_device *vdev,
|
||
|
struct iommufd_ctx *ictx, u32 *out_device_id);
|
||
|
void (*unbind_iommufd)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
|
||
|
int (*attach_ioas)(struct vfio_device *vdev, u32 *pt_id);
|
||
|
void (*detach_ioas)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
|
||
|
int (*open_device)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
|
||
|
void (*close_device)(struct vfio_device *vdev);
|
||
|
ssize_t (*read)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char __user *buf,
|
||
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
|
||
|
ssize_t (*write)(struct vfio_device *vdev, const char __user *buf,
|
||
|
size_t count, loff_t *size);
|
||
|
long (*ioctl)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int cmd,
|
||
|
unsigned long arg);
|
||
|
int (*mmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
|
||
|
void (*request)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int count);
|
||
|
int (*match)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char *buf);
|
||
|
void (*dma_unmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, u64 iova, u64 length);
|
||
|
int (*device_feature)(struct vfio_device *device, u32 flags,
|
||
|
void __user *arg, size_t argsz);
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
Each function is passed the vdev that was originally registered
|
||
|
in the vfio_register_group_dev() or vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev()
|
||
|
call above. This allows the bus driver to obtain its private data using
|
||
|
container_of().
|
||
|
|
||
|
::
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The init/release callbacks are issued when vfio_device is initialized
|
||
|
and released.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The open/close device callbacks are issued when the first
|
||
|
instance of a file descriptor for the device is created (eg.
|
||
|
via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD) for a user session.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The ioctl callback provides a direct pass through for some VFIO_DEVICE_*
|
||
|
ioctls.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The [un]bind_iommufd callbacks are issued when the device is bound to
|
||
|
and unbound from iommufd.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The [de]attach_ioas callback is issued when the device is attached to
|
||
|
and detached from an IOAS managed by the bound iommufd. However, the
|
||
|
attached IOAS can also be automatically detached when the device is
|
||
|
unbound from iommufd.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The read/write/mmap callbacks implement the device region access defined
|
||
|
by the device's own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The request callback is issued when device is going to be unregistered,
|
||
|
such as when trying to unbind the device from the vfio bus driver.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- The dma_unmap callback is issued when a range of iovas are unmapped
|
||
|
in the container or IOAS attached by the device. Drivers which make
|
||
|
use of the vfio page pinning interface must implement this callback in
|
||
|
order to unpin pages within the dma_unmap range. Drivers must tolerate
|
||
|
this callback even before calls to open_device().
|
||
|
|
||
|
PPC64 sPAPR implementation note
|
||
|
-------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
This implementation has some specifics:
|
||
|
|
||
|
1) On older systems (POWER7 with P5IOC2/IODA1) only one IOMMU group per
|
||
|
container is supported as an IOMMU table is allocated at the boot time,
|
||
|
one table per a IOMMU group which is a Partitionable Endpoint (PE)
|
||
|
(PE is often a PCI domain but not always).
|
||
|
|
||
|
Newer systems (POWER8 with IODA2) have improved hardware design which allows
|
||
|
to remove this limitation and have multiple IOMMU groups per a VFIO
|
||
|
container.
|
||
|
|
||
|
2) The hardware supports so called DMA windows - the PCI address range
|
||
|
within which DMA transfer is allowed, any attempt to access address space
|
||
|
out of the window leads to the whole PE isolation.
|
||
|
|
||
|
3) PPC64 guests are paravirtualized but not fully emulated. There is an API
|
||
|
to map/unmap pages for DMA, and it normally maps 1..32 pages per call and
|
||
|
currently there is no way to reduce the number of calls. In order to make
|
||
|
things faster, the map/unmap handling has been implemented in real mode
|
||
|
which provides an excellent performance which has limitations such as
|
||
|
inability to do locked pages accounting in real time.
|
||
|
|
||
|
4) According to sPAPR specification, A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is an I/O
|
||
|
subtree that can be treated as a unit for the purposes of partitioning and
|
||
|
error recovery. A PE may be a single or multi-function IOA (IO Adapter), a
|
||
|
function of a multi-function IOA, or multiple IOAs (possibly including
|
||
|
switch and bridge structures above the multiple IOAs). PPC64 guests detect
|
||
|
PCI errors and recover from them via EEH RTAS services, which works on the
|
||
|
basis of additional ioctl commands.
|
||
|
|
||
|
So 4 additional ioctls have been added:
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO
|
||
|
returns the size and the start of the DMA window on the PCI bus.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE
|
||
|
enables the container. The locked pages accounting
|
||
|
is done at this point. This lets user first to know what
|
||
|
the DMA window is and adjust rlimit before doing any real job.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE
|
||
|
disables the container.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO_EEH_PE_OP
|
||
|
provides an API for EEH setup, error detection and recovery.
|
||
|
|
||
|
The code flow from the example above should be slightly changed::
|
||
|
|
||
|
struct vfio_eeh_pe_op pe_op = { .argsz = sizeof(pe_op), .flags = 0 };
|
||
|
|
||
|
.....
|
||
|
/* Add the group to the container */
|
||
|
ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU)
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Get addition sPAPR IOMMU info */
|
||
|
vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info spapr_iommu_info;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO, &spapr_iommu_info);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE))
|
||
|
/* Cannot enable container, may be low rlimit */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
|
||
|
dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
|
||
|
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
|
||
|
|
||
|
dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
|
||
|
dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
|
||
|
dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Check here is .iova/.size are within DMA window from spapr_iommu_info */
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Get a file descriptor for the device */
|
||
|
device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");
|
||
|
|
||
|
....
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
|
||
|
ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Make sure EEH is supported */
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_EEH);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Enable the EEH functionality on the device */
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_ENABLE;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* You're suggested to create additional data struct to represent
|
||
|
* PE, and put child devices belonging to same IOMMU group to the
|
||
|
* PE instance for later reference.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Check the PE's state and make sure it's in functional state */
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_GET_STATE;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Save device state using pci_save_state().
|
||
|
* EEH should be enabled on the specified device.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
....
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Inject EEH error, which is expected to be caused by 32-bits
|
||
|
* config load.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_INJECT_ERR;
|
||
|
pe_op.err.type = EEH_ERR_TYPE_32;
|
||
|
pe_op.err.func = EEH_ERR_FUNC_LD_CFG_ADDR;
|
||
|
pe_op.err.addr = 0ul;
|
||
|
pe_op.err.mask = 0ul;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
....
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* When 0xFF's returned from reading PCI config space or IO BARs
|
||
|
* of the PCI device. Check the PE's state to see if that has been
|
||
|
* frozen.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Waiting for pending PCI transactions to be completed and don't
|
||
|
* produce any more PCI traffic from/to the affected PE until
|
||
|
* recovery is finished.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Enable IO for the affected PE and collect logs. Usually, the
|
||
|
* standard part of PCI config space, AER registers are dumped
|
||
|
* as logs for further analysis.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_UNFREEZE_IO;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Issue PE reset: hot or fundamental reset. Usually, hot reset
|
||
|
* is enough. However, the firmware of some PCI adapters would
|
||
|
* require fundamental reset.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_HOT;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_DEACTIVATE;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Configure the PCI bridges for the affected PE */
|
||
|
pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_CONFIGURE;
|
||
|
ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Restored state we saved at initialization time. pci_restore_state()
|
||
|
* is good enough as an example.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Hopefully, error is recovered successfully. Now, you can resume to
|
||
|
* start PCI traffic to/from the affected PE.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
....
|
||
|
|
||
|
5) There is v2 of SPAPR TCE IOMMU. It deprecates VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE/
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE and implements 2 new ioctls:
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY
|
||
|
(which are unsupported in v1 IOMMU).
|
||
|
|
||
|
PPC64 paravirtualized guests generate a lot of map/unmap requests,
|
||
|
and the handling of those includes pinning/unpinning pages and updating
|
||
|
mm::locked_vm counter to make sure we do not exceed the rlimit.
|
||
|
The v2 IOMMU splits accounting and pinning into separate operations:
|
||
|
|
||
|
- VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY/VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY ioctls
|
||
|
receive a user space address and size of the block to be pinned.
|
||
|
Bisecting is not supported and VFIO_IOMMU_UNREGISTER_MEMORY is expected to
|
||
|
be called with the exact address and size used for registering
|
||
|
the memory block. The userspace is not expected to call these often.
|
||
|
The ranges are stored in a linked list in a VFIO container.
|
||
|
|
||
|
- VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA/VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA ioctls only update the actual
|
||
|
IOMMU table and do not do pinning; instead these check that the userspace
|
||
|
address is from pre-registered range.
|
||
|
|
||
|
This separation helps in optimizing DMA for guests.
|
||
|
|
||
|
6) sPAPR specification allows guests to have an additional DMA window(s) on
|
||
|
a PCI bus with a variable page size. Two ioctls have been added to support
|
||
|
this: VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE.
|
||
|
The platform has to support the functionality or error will be returned to
|
||
|
the userspace. The existing hardware supports up to 2 DMA windows, one is
|
||
|
2GB long, uses 4K pages and called "default 32bit window"; the other can
|
||
|
be as big as entire RAM, use different page size, it is optional - guests
|
||
|
create those in run-time if the guest driver supports 64bit DMA.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE receives a page shift, a DMA window size and
|
||
|
a number of TCE table levels (if a TCE table is going to be big enough and
|
||
|
the kernel may not be able to allocate enough of physically contiguous
|
||
|
memory). It creates a new window in the available slot and returns the bus
|
||
|
address where the new window starts. Due to hardware limitation, the user
|
||
|
space cannot choose the location of DMA windows.
|
||
|
|
||
|
VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE receives the bus start address of the window
|
||
|
and removes it.
|
||
|
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
.. [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its
|
||
|
initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco. We've since
|
||
|
outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy.
|
||
|
|
||
|
.. [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved". It's
|
||
|
possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between
|
||
|
functions and even for single function devices to have alternative
|
||
|
access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers. To
|
||
|
guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the
|
||
|
IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together
|
||
|
(iommu=group_mf). The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should
|
||
|
still provide isolation. For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the
|
||
|
best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for
|
||
|
virtualization usage models.
|
||
|
|
||
|
.. [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device
|
||
|
assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO. It's expected that
|
||
|
future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of
|
||
|
these trade-offs.
|
||
|
|
||
|
.. [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions
|
||
|
from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu::
|
||
|
|
||
|
-[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0
|
||
|
\-0d.1
|
||
|
|
||
|
00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90)
|
||
|
|
||
|
.. [5] Nested translation is an IOMMU feature which supports two stage
|
||
|
address translations. This improves the address translation efficiency
|
||
|
in IOMMU virtualization.
|
||
|
|
||
|
.. [6] PASID stands for Process Address Space ID, introduced by PCI
|
||
|
Express. It is a prerequisite for Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA)
|
||
|
and Scalable I/O Virtualization (Scalable IOV).
|